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 My master thesis studies the relationship between media concentration and corruption based 
on a panel data analysis, with a panel dataset which provides information about 29 countries over a 
span of 19 years. Based on a cross-section analysis Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova and Shleifer (2003, 
JLE) which focused on the relationship between corruption and media state-ownership, I enhance their 
results thanks to panel data fixed effects, to control for more unobservable effects, and several 
robustness checks. As Djankov et al did, we focus on two specific media markets: television (TV) and 
daily newspapers. Thanks to new data from the book “Who Owns the World‟s Media?” (Noam, 2016), 
I broaden the spectrum of their article to focus on the correlations between corruption and all types of 
media concentration (public, private and the industry). I confine their previous results: a positive 
correlation is found only for public TV with large shares of the market. In fact, I find a negative 
correlation between public TV shares and corruption for lower levels of state-ownership, especially in 
the case of developed countries. Contrary to daily newspapers, this result remains after many 
robustness checks. I provide evidence that low-levels of state-ownership limit concentration of private 
media, reducing the risk of media capture. Indeed, competition within the private sector is found to be 
negatively correlated with corruption. Finally, I find weak evidence for a positive correlation between 
corruption and media industry concentration in only two cases: when considering all types of media 
and when considering TV alone. 
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 Since 2015, the Media Ownership Monitor, created by Reporters without Borders (Reporters sans 
frontières, RSF), has been expanding to now reach 10 countries (Cambodia, Colombia, Ghana, Mongolia, 
Peru, Philippines, Serbia, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine). The goal of this new project is to support media 
pluralism and independence by combating and documenting media ownership concentration. Indeed, as they 
advocate, media pluralism and independence are both prerequisites for press freedom, which in the end 
improves political accountability. Henceforth, media ownership concentration can reinforce corruption, by 
limiting press freedom. Indeed, because of its influence on press freedom, media concentration can influence 
both extortive corruption and collusive corruption (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). Furthermore, as this RSF 
project reminded, the risk is even greater when the state regularly intervenes in media markets (e.g. state-
ownership, links with media owners, etc.). 
 Actually, economists have already studied and confirmed the potential relationship between 
corruption and media concentration. The first study to focus on this issue was made by Djankov , McLiesh, 
Nenova, and Shleifer (2003, JLE). Although a positive correlation between corruption, which is defined by 
Transparency International as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gains”, and media state-ownership 
has been confirmed, this result should be taken with caution: the database is limited and quite old, no 
particular robustness checks are displayed, and other studies on the same theme all used Djankov et al 
database. Moreover, it is a cross-section analysis, not a panel data analysis. 
 Therefore, our master thesis will be an improvement of the study by Djankov et al rather than just a 
replication. We will use a different database in order to improve the findings in the media concentration – 
corruption literature. Fortunately, in 2016, Eli Noam, Professor at the Columbia Business School, and the 
International Media Concentration Collaboration published the book “Who Owns the World‟s Media?” 
which compiles information about media concentration in 29 countries over a period of more than 20 years 
for more than 13 media markets (from news media to platforms and internet media). In particular, they 
computed indexes and market shares of ultimate owners (i.e. the shareholder which is the decision-maker in 
last resort) for each media market. Although they have some data about the top multinational media 
companies, data availability is still too limited for empirical analysis. Hence, we will focus on two media 
markets: television and daily newspapers. They were originally the ones chosen by Djankov et al, which 
makes sense because they are intuitively more likely to have an impact on the public opinion than other 
types of media. For instance, these two types of media are more likely to have an impact on the mindsets of 
the population and the decision-makers. As Djankov et al stated: “we focused on newspapers and television 
since these are the primary sources of news on political, economic, and social issues” (p. 344). Media 
concentration can be defined as a relative increase in the market shares of an ultimate owner on the market: 
fewer and fewer ultimate owners having higher and higher market shares levels. So, public and private 
media concentration definitions follow this definition too. Furthermore, “public” will be used as a synonym 
for “state-owned” and does not refer to publicly traded firms.  
 The novelty of our study is based on two facts. Firstly, from a positive viewpoint, we provide a 
rigorous examination for the findings about the correlation between media concentration and corruption, 




to a panel data analysis, we are able to use fixed effects: year and country fixed effects allow us to control 
for unobservable characteristics which are common to all countries or constant for all years. All previous 
studies were cross-sections, so our results will be less biased. Furthermore, thanks to Noam‟s book database, 
we are able to differentiate between state ownership concentration, private ownership concentration, and 
industry concentration. Secondly, from a normative approach, we provide precise insights and quantitative 
criteria for policy-makers. Indeed, subjective measures, which were used for press freedom in a great 
majority of previous studies, are based on questionnaires which often can‟t guide policies in a precise 
direction or give precise criteria for policies assessments. For instance, in the first category of the economic 
subcomponent of the press freedom index from the Freedom House, one of the questions is: “does the state 
or public media enjoy editorial independence, and do they provide a range of diverse, nonpartisan 
viewpoints?” Without providing a clear definition of editorial independence, it is hard to draw precise 
policies about public ownership to improve press freedom. Often, questions are clearer (e.g. “does the state 
have a monopoly on any news medium?” in the same category), but the drawbacks are that they are usually 
easily and already met by developed countries. It means that these indexes create a helpful tool for 
developing countries or new democracies, but when all the first easy criteria are met, it becomes harder for 
policy-makers to use results based on these measures. Using hard measures, like public media market shares 
or the Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (HHI) for a whole media market, criteria and policies insights can be 
more easily drawn from empirical results. 
  
 The two questions will we answer about the relationship between media concentration and 
corruption, for the television and the newspapers markets, are based on Djankov et al findings and on a 
theory provided by Besley and Prat‟s model (2006). However, as we will show later, this model is just a 
starting point for our reasoning because it has some defaults. Is media state-ownership positively correlated 
with corruption? Is media industry concentration positively correlated with corruption?  
 Regarding the first question, we find that only public TV is correlated with corruption. From Noam‟s 
book media markets study, we observe that these two markets have only two differences in terms of markets 
characteristics: television market is a mass media (in terms of audience) and is based on high fixed costs and 
low marginal costs (which leads to higher concentration), but daily newspapers market does not share any of 
these features. Hence, at least one of these two characteristics is needed for a specific type of media to create 
incentives for the state to consider media capture. However, we cannot distinguish between the two with our 
data. Future research should include more media markets, with different levels of viewership and different 
levels of fixed costs, in order to distinguish which one of these characteristics incentivizes media capture the 
most. Furthermore, we find that public TV is negatively correlated with corruption, and this relationship is 
quadratic: after some level of public TV market shares, public TV is positively correlated with corruption. 
This surprising result remains after several robustness checks. It can be explained by another finding: 
moderate levels of public TV have a pro-competitive impact on the private sector. A possible explanation is 
the impact of public TV on the set of strategies of private players: mergers and acquisitions constitute a 
profitable strategy for private players facing high fixed costs and low marginal costs. However, this strategy 
cannot be used against state-owned media: private players will then have to maintain more competitive 
strategies to acquire more market shares. Nevertheless, we don‟t provide causality. In fact, an alternative 
explanation could be a correlation due to our time frame. Indeed, thanks to a Chow test, we find that there is 
a structural change in 2002: only after this date a negative quadratic relationship between public TV and 




steadily decreased. Furthermore, omitted variable biases can‟t be totally dismissed. However, we can say 
that economic freedom, trade openness and especially development are requirements which have to be met 
in order to make the relationship between public TV and corruption negative. To conclude, we can answer 
positively to the first question only if some conditions are met and if public TV market shares are 
sufficiently high. Interestingly, this is not true for low levels of public TV which are negatively correlated 
with corruption. So, a global answer to the first question would be no, because the overall impact of public 
TV on corruption in the general case is negative. 
 Regarding the second question, the findings are less clear. If we define media industry concentration 
as the average of the HHI for all the 13 media markets, we find no correlation at all. However, total media 
industry concentration is likely to be positively correlated with corruption in countries with high defense 
expenditures and low levels of trade openness. Therefore, we used HHI variables for the TV market and the 
newspapers market separately. As before, the variables for the newspapers market (i.e. the HHI for the 
whole newspapers market) do not influence corruption. The industry concentration in the TV market seems 
to be positively correlated with corruption under some conditions: extreme levels of public TV sector (very 
high or very low levels), low competition in the private sector of the TV market, low level of development, 
and high levels of state expenditures, particularly in defense. A possible explanation for the non-significance 
comes from the opposite directions of the effects of public TV shares and private concentration regarding 
corruption. Indeed, private sector concentration is positively correlated with corruption, and its relationship 
with corruption is also quadratic (i.e. decreasing here). Hence, competition within the private sector reduces 
corruption. Therefore, the ultimate sign of the total industry concentration will depend on which effect 
between public and private concentration dominates. Henceforth, if the TV market is dominated by a private 
oligopoly, then total concentration will be positively correlated with corruption. To conclude, we can answer 
the second question positively, also under some conditions but these conditions are more likely to be met. 
Hence, we can say that we find weak evidence for a positive correlation between media industry 
concentration and corruption, especially in the case of the TV market. 
 
 This master thesis is structured as follows. The second part is a literature review. The third part 
presents a discussion about the first theory on this subject. The fourth part focuses on the choice of datasets 
and the variables construction. The fifth and the sixth parts display our results and interpretations 
respectively about the tests of first hypothesis and the tests of the second hypothesis. The seventh part is the 
conclusion. The eighth part and the ninth part are respectively the main tables and the appendix. The tenth 
part contains the references. 
 
2. Literature Review: 
 
2.1 Press Freedom and Corruption Studies: 
 
 
 To begin with, our study is linked to the scientific literature about the relationship between press 






 The first major empirical study on the subject was the article “A Free Press is Bad News for 
Corruption” by Brunetti and Weder (2003, JPE). This study is part of the literature about the impact of 
external checks on corruption (e.g. an independent judiciary body). The reasoning is that a free press has 
higher incentives to search and control corruption than other independent bodies because of 
commercialization: only media outlets make extra profits by publishing corruption scoops. According to the 
authors, a free press has the following features: competitive market, free entry in journalism, free entry in 
publishing, and freedom from outside pressures (politicians, etc.). In fact, they acknowledge that the impact 
of press on corruption is conditional to the production process of the press. The cross-country empirical 
analysis is based on the Freedom House different press freedom indexes, which focus on different aspects of 
press freedom (law, political environment, and economic environment), and on several subjective measures 
of corruption, including the CPI. The authors find that a free press reduces corruption, and this result is 
robust to different specifications, different estimation models (OLS and ordered probit estimation 
technique), and different measurements. The issue of a possible reverses causality (which could create 
endogeneity problems) is checked by estimating the same model without repressive regimes, because 
repressive regimes have a better chance to limit press freedom and so it is in those countries that the 
probability of reverse causality (i.e. a corrupt regime limiting press freedom) is the highest. A short panel 
data analysis provided by the authors also confirms their previous results.  
 
 The second significant empirical study on the same issue was the scientific paper called “A 
Contribution to the Empirics of Press Freedom and Corruption” by Freille, Haque and Kneller (EJPE, 2007). 
The idea is to use the disaggregated measures of press freedom published by the Freedom House and to 
apply an Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) with a database of 51 countries with a time frame of 10 years 
(1995 to 2004), in order to check the correlation between press freedom and corruption. The EBA is used as 
a robustness check for correlations: the goal is to see whether the results depend on the specifications used. 
The idea is to change the controls (in combinations of three in each specification) for every regression until 
all the possibilities for controls combinations have been exhausted. Then, the estimates for the main 
regressor (press freedom indexes here) are ordered, and the following condition needs to be checked: the 
extreme upper bound (i.e. the highest beta plus the double of its standard errors) and the extreme lower 
bound (i.e. the lowest beta plus two times its standard errors) are both statistically significant and of the 
same sign. It confirmed Brunetti and Weder study regarding the impact of the political environment and the 
economic environment of press freedom on corruption. However, the legal environment of press freedom 
does not pass the test: its relationship with corruption is insignificant. 
 
 Other studies confirm and improve the results found in the two studies cited above. Chowdhury 
(2004, EL) added to the existing literature an instrumental variable analysis (with colonial past in terms of 
legal system used as an instrument for press freedom) and dynamic panel analysis (based on the Arellano 
and Bond dynamic panel data model (1991)) to test the relationship between press freedom and corruption, 
and previous studies results were confirmed. Camaj (IJP, 2013) showed that the negative effect of press 




regarding the civil society) and higher horizontal accountability (i.e. accountability within the state). Hence, 
both internal and external controls make a free press more efficient. Moreover, Lindstedt and Naurin 
(ISPSR, 2010) investigated the real impact of transparency on corruption, and discovered that a free press 
was an efficient institution to increase transparency and reduce corruption (at least more efficient than self-
imposed transparency rules).  
 
 
 However, we will now focus on the two first studies, which are at the center of our analysis, and we 
will analyze their limits. The first default would be the lack of data, which is explained by the availability of 
data on this subject at the time of the study. Then, the type of measurement is problematic: all the measures 
(except the repressive actions count variable) are perception/subjective measures. An issue will be the policy 
implications of such results, and these implications are especially not accurate for developed countries. The 
commercialization incentives theory can be challenged by the possibility of media capture by the state. 
Rightly, the authors remind readers that collusion between the state and all journalists (or enough of them) is 
impossible, at least because of coordination failures. However, media capture is still possible because there 
is no free entry in publishing. And this fact is likely to last: media markets have high and growing fixed 
costs which a key factor for industry concentration (fact number 1 about media characteristics, Noam‟s 
book, 2016). Hence, the precise conditions needed for the alignment of journalists‟ incentives and media 
outlets owners‟ incentives are not yet totally clear. One of these conditions, according to the results 
concerning the economic subcomponent of the press freedom index, seems to be the concentration of media 
ownership. Actually, this subcomponent aggregates many different economic aspects of press freedom (e.g. 
“the economic situation of a country”, Freedom House Survey, 2008). So, the question of media ownership 
relationship with corruption is still not solved with these studies. In fact, other studies have focused on the 
impact of this hard measure concerning press market on corruption. 
 
 
2.2 Media Industry Concentration and Corruption Studies: 
 
 
 The most essential study in this field is the paper named “Who Owns the Media?” by Djankov et al 
(2003, JLE). Many papers followed the path of this article and used their database later. For instance, Besley 
and Prat (AER, 2006) used their database to test their model about the impact of public media concentration 
on corruption. Another example is the study made by Houston et al. (JFE, 2011): they used Djankov et al 
database to test the impact of media ownership on corruption in bank lending. Hence, that‟s why it is 
important to look at the roots of this literature. 
 The original goal of their study was to test opposite approaches about state-ownership in the 
particular case of media property. Indeed, Djankov et al wanted to confront the public interest (Pigouvian) 
theory and the public choice theory regarding state-ownership of media. According to the Pigouvian theory 




begin with, regarding information itself, it is a public good, so the non-exclusivity feature reduces the 
possibility of profitability for private owners. Henceforth, state production can help to re-establish allocative 
efficiency. Then, the production process is characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs, which 
creates increasing returns to scale. Hence, if the economies of scale are not used (e.g. if producers are too 
many and not big enough), productive efficiency won‟t be reached. Finally, the state-owned media are less 
likely to be biased by special interests, at least not in the same way private ultimate owners influence their 
media outlets. For instance, these arguments were used to support the existence of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (cf Coase, 1950). The public choice approach would highlight the fact that politicians in power 
can also influence the editorial policy of the state-owned media. Moreover, competition within the private 
sector should give rise to a sufficient number of media outlets, with different biases and viewpoints, such 
that on average information is not biased. Therefore, the authors studied the different consequences of media 
state-ownership (including the impact on corruption), and they concluded that the public choice approach 
was more likely to be true. 
 Djankov et al. made a database of the ultimate owners of newspapers and television in 97 countries 
in 1999 and 2003. The ultimate owner is defined as the largest shareholder at each level of the chain of 
indirect ownership. It is the decision-maker as a last resort. The graph B1 is an example of the construction 
of the ultimate owners variable. Here TVN is owned by the Schneider family through different indirect 
control deals. They created four categories for the ultimate owners: “the state, families, widely held and 
other” (p. 350). In our last example, TVN would be considered as family owned. Two important variables 
were created by the authors: the state-ownership by count, which is the ratio of the number of public 
newspapers among the five largest newspapers/TV stations, and the state-ownership by share, which 
represents the percentage of the top five largest newspapers/TV stations total markets shares that is state-
owned. For instance, the authors found that 2 out of the top five newspapers in the Philippines are public, 
and these two public stations have 43.5% of the top five newspapers total market shares. So, the state-
ownership by count would be 40% and the state-ownership by shares would be 43.5%, for the Philippines. 
The definition of state-ownership is crucial here: Djankov et al consider that political party ownership is not 
state-ownership, even if the political party in question holds power. The part of the article which is the most 
important for us is the fifth part of the article about the consequences of state ownership of the media on 
political and economic freedom.  The authors checked the impact of the state variables on corruption in the 
Tables 7 in their article (p.370). Public press is significantly positively correlated with corruption, whereas 
the estimates for public TV are negative and insignificant.  
  
 
 Nevertheless, there are some issues with this study, and it explains why an improvement of this study 
with a new dataset and a panel data analysis would be useful. Firstly, there is an issue with the dataset: the 
time frame is limited to two years, 1997 and 2003, which correspond to the last years of era of privatizations 
and opening to competition. Hence, media state-ownership, especially in TV, was still significant in terms of 
market shares. Therefore, there might an upward bias in the estimates for TV public ownership: the state 
ownership impact on corruption might be overestimated, compared to the true long term relationship 
between media public ownership and corruption. Secondly, there is an issue with the variables construction. 
Actually, the top five players of a market might not be representative of the whole market: it depends on the 




owner) might have a different impact on corruption if the rest of the market is a competitive fringe or if the 
rest of the market is composed of few middle-sized private firms. Their dataset time frame and variables 
construction can both lead to an upward bias, which can explain the gap between what they found and what 
we found. Actually, without this upward bias, the correlation between public press and corruption could 
become insignificant and the correlation between public TV and corruption could become significant (and 
still negative), which is precisely what we found. Furthermore, the case of political party ownership is an 
interesting example of a larger problem with their variables construction rules. Even though there aren‟t any 
clear-cut answers and it should be done on a case by case basis. A media owned by a political party in power 
or even by a firm with close ties to the political party in power should be considered as public, because it 
will have the same behavior as state-owned media outlets. Anecdotal historical evidence is provided by the 
behavior of many politicians while they were in power (e.g. Erdogan or Berlusconi with Mediaset media 
group). As a result, state-ownership in their dataset might actually be underestimated because of the 
restrictive definition of state-ownership. Finally, there is a problem with the empirical analysis provided by 
the authors. Actually, they only used simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions in a cross-country 
analysis, with only four control variables, and with only 95 observations for each regression. For instance, 
the results could be biased by specific factors common for all the countries or constant over time. 
Henceforth, the correlations would be biased by using simple OLS.  
 These are the reasons why a refinement of Djankov et al study will be useful. A theoretical first step 
useful for this is the model made by Besley and Prat, who used the Djankov et al database in order to test 
their model. Because their model was adapted to Djankov et al data and supported by previous empirical 
evidence, we will discuss this model in order to extract testable hypotheses. However, we will also explain 
why this model fails to be supported by our empirical findings, and we will give insights about how this 
model should be modified in order to be adapted to new empirical evidence. This will help us discuss our 
empirical results later. 
 
3. Theoretical Starting Point:  
 
 We will now present the theory created by Besley and Prat in order to discuss the impact of media 
concentration on corruption. 
 
 Firstly, we will rapidly present their model. We have the following set-up. It is a two-period voting 
model, where an incumbent in power is seeking for reelection. The incumbent has the type θ, which can be 
either good g or bad b. A bad incumbent practices embezzlement and extracts a rent r if he is reelected. 
Voters don‟t know these parameters, but there is a probability q that the news outlets (n in number) receive a 
signal which demonstrates that the incumbent is of type b. The payoff of the media i is the following: 
                    
  
 
      {
                                               
                                                    
 
In fact, voters only buy “informative news”, meaning that media outlets sales are different from zero only 
when they receive and publish the signal about the bad incumbent in power. The voters are equally 




revenues    . So a is the audience-related revenues when m is equal to 1, so it represents the 
commercialization of the media outlets. It is similar to the two rules of Bertrand (1883) competition (equal 
shares when equal prices and winning all the market by undercutting). The higher a is, the higher the 
incentives to be the one to publish the information. However, the bad incumbent can “bribe” media outlets 
owners in order to prevent his real type to be revealed to the public. If his bribery is successful, he can stay 
in power for another term. Before the vote and before the publication of the news, the incumbent can 
transfer    to the media outlet i in order to silence it. However, there is a transaction cost  , which makes the 
transfer paid    by the incumbent become      when it arrives to the media outlet i. This is precisely media 
capture. However, the authors notice that the transfer is not necessarily direct bribe to the owner of the 
media outlet: it can take the form of subsidies or of favorable regulations in other sectors. Then, voters will 
vote and will systematically reject bad incumbents, if the information asymmetry is resolved thanks to the 
news outlets publishing the information. It gives two pure strategy equilibria (cf Proposition 1 p. 724):  
- If       , then the signal is not published and the incumbent is reelected because of media capture 
- If       , then the signal is published and no media is captured. 
 
In fact, the condition is based on the minimal bribe each identical media outlet would need to receive in 
order to compensate for the opportunity cost of no publication, which at most is equal to a. So, each media 
outlet owner i needs to receive  , but because of the transaction cost, the briber needs to send      . 
Because there are n outlets and the briber can spend at most his rents r, media capture is possible when the 
following condition is reached: 
      
 We will now analyze the equilibria and the comparative statics of the parameters of this model. The 
variable a represents media commercialization: it is the dependence of media outlets to sales revenues. The 
variable n represents media pluralism (i.e. the number of independent outlets). The variable τ could represent 
the media independence regarding the incumbent and so regarding the state. Actually, it is an inverse 
measure of the ability to capture media. An increase in any of these three previous variables would lead to a 
decrease of the probability of media capture, and so it would reduce corruption. In this model, corruption is 
the sum of the bribes and the embezzlement, which in case of successful media capture is: 
  ∑  
 
   
       
It could seem here that the variables a and n increase corruption because they increase the amount of bribes 
given, but it is not the case if you take the probabilities of the different cases into account. In fact, the 
measure of corruption in the model can be rewritten, taking probabilities into account: 
          [                 (  ∑  
   
)          ] 
                         ∑  





Here, I is the set of media outlets who accepted the bribe even when the information was published. Hence, 
we see that the variables a and n will increase the amount of bribes in the case of successful media capture 
but they will decrease the probability of it happening by increasing the cost of media capture. In another 
version of the model, the authors endogenized the number of outlets by allowing free entry with an entry 
cost c. Hence, an increase in the variable c will increase the barriers to entry to the media market, limiting 
media pluralism and so increasing the probability of media capture, which would increase corruption.  
 
 Finally, we will extract testable hypotheses from this model. Actually, the three variables we are 
interested in are c, n, and τ, or more precisely n(c) (n as a function of c) and τ. Indeed, we are interested in 
the impact of media industry concentration on corruption and also in the difference between public media 
concentration and private media concentration regarding their respective impact on corruption. Total, public 
and private media concentration will have an impact on press freedom because market structure and 
ownership structure influence the probability of media capture. Regarding state-ownership of media, it could 
be modeled here by stating that one media outlet i has a transaction cost             : this media outlet i 
would be easier to capture, or even free to capture. For instance, it could be argue that the incumbent can 
appoint a favorable administrator at the head of the state-owned media outlet, facilitating media capture. 
This difference in terms of media independence can be explained by the difference in terms of ownership 
link with the incumbent. The incumbent can influence more easily the revenues of a media outlet through a 
direct ownership link. Hence, it is why, contrary to Djankov et al study, party-ownership will be considered 
as state-ownership as long as the party holds the state power. In addition, it also means that the private 
media outlets would be the (n(c)-1) other outlets. It is easy to see that it would reduce the media capture 
cost, even with equal market shares. Hence, just the existence of a public media outlet should increase 
corruption. However, we are looking for the impact of public media concentration on corruption. A way to 
find a prediction about this is to compare the case of a public monopoly and the case of a duopoly (with a 
public firm and a private firm), where in both cases         [   ] and           . We choose this 
particular transaction costs structure because here media capture is possible only with public media 
concentration, which corresponds to switching from the duopoly to public monopoly. Indeed, in this 
transaction costs structure, press freedom is at its highest point in the private sector because of complete 
media independence in terms of revenues. Hence, public media concentration acts as a new strategy for the 
corruption bureaucrat when bribing isn‟t possible anymore. So, our first hypothesis states that state-owned 
media concentration should be positively correlated with corruption. From the original model, we see that a 
decrease in the number of media outlets owners increases the probability of media capture, so it increases 
corruption. Therefore, our second hypothesis is that total media concentration should be positively 
correlated with corruption. Finally, regarding private media concentration, there are two conflicting effects. 
On one hand, an increase in private media concentration leads to an increase in total media concentration, so 
it should increase corruption. On the other hand, the existence of private media outlets reduces corruption, 
because it prevents public monopoly (or at least public firm dominant position) from happening. So, the 
effect is bound to be non-linear: higher levels of private media concentration increase corruption but lower 
levels actually decrease corruption. 
 





                                                                         
 
                                                                                  
 
 
 However, because we already know that this model is not supported by our empirical evidence, we 
need to discuss what this model is missing and why we only keep it as a starting point. 
 In reality, only the second hypothesis directly comes from the authors‟ model. The first hypothesis is 
extrapolated from it in our last paragraph because there is no differentiation between public and private 
property in the model. That‟s why the second hypothesis is weakly supported by our analysis, but the first 
hypothesis is not at all supported by empirical evidence. Indeed, their article models media industry 
concentration but it is not fitted to differentiate between public and private media concentration. However, 
even by extrapolating from it, too much is missing from the basic hypotheses to consider this model more 
than a starting point. Indeed, the most important error is in the strategy set of a media: they can either be 
captured or they can expose corruption and take part in the Bertrand game between all the free media 
outlets. One strategy, which is in the core definition of private ownership, is missing: merging. Because of 
that, private ownership cannot be completely modeled, and so this model fails to take into account the 
relationship between state-owned media and private media. Hence, the positive impact of moderate levels of 
public media market shares on competition within the private sector is not taken into account. As a result, 
only the pro-corruption impact of media state-ownership can be taken into account, which explains why the 
first result / hypothesis extracted from this model is not supported by empirical evidence. However, the 
model should have to be significantly changed to take into account this strategy.  
 We try to modify the model to align theoretical background with our empirical results. We add 6 
hypotheses to the model. To begin with, we add two stages to the model before the “media capture stage” 
we presented above, which becomes stage 3. The stage 1 is an investment choice by the corrupt incumbent 
in state-ownership of media. In fact, the incumbent can invest X% of his rent in public media in order to 
create a state-owned media of X% in the next stage. The one-for-one rule is a simplification. The cost for the 
incumbent is the spending in public property, and the benefit from this investment is to lower the future cost 
of media capture, because the next added assumption is that the transaction cost for media capture is lower 
for state-owned media. The incumbent choice is only based on the trade-off between a lower media capture 
cost and a higher rent for media capture in the future. Hence, we add that the incumbent does not take into 
account the impact of stage 1 on stage 2: the incumbent only focus on the direct impact on future media 
capture setting. It could take the form of time inconsistency or limited rationality (e.g. level k game). The 
stage 2 is a standard Cournot competition with the possibility of merger between private firms. For 
simplicity, n is the number of private firms on the market in the second stage, so there are n+1 firms in stage 
2 competition, and the private firms share equally the market shares not taken by the public firm, (1-X)% at 
the beginning of stage 2. As a simplification, we fix the parameters at a level such that every firm would 
have a positive profit in the end, with or without mergers happening. The idea is that stage 2 is the stage of a 
possible merger. Hence, we have in this stage 2 the differences between the public ownership and the private 
ownership (in terms of merger and of media capture). This is when both types of ownership influence each 
other. The key point is that in a standard Cournot model, merger is profitable for the merging firms only if 





- Case 1: X < 20% : a merger occurs, so media capture is highly more likely. 
- Case 2: 20% < X < 100%: no merger occurs, so media capture is more likely due to public media. 
- Case 3: X = 100%: no merger occurs, but media capture does occur. 
 The idea behind these three cases is the introduction of the non-linear impact of media state-
ownership on corruption. Indeed, public media has two conflicting effects on corruption. Public media 
concentration reduces the cost of media capture and could even lead to a public monopoly, but at the same 
time it might prevent a large-scale merger which would reduce drastically the number of media outlets and 
highly facilitate media capture. So, we included the possibility of mergers and the impact of public 
ownership on the probability of private mergers, which gives theoretical predictions supported by our 
empirical evidence. As in Besley and Prat‟s model, media industry concentration still has a pro-corruption 
effect. Competition within the private sector limits media capture, and moderate levels of investment in 
public media foster this type of competition. At the same time, there is the risk of public monopoly or at 
least the risk of lowering the cost of media capture through high levels of media state-ownership. 
Henceforth, the impact of public media concentration on corruption should be negative but at a decreasing 
rate, with a turning point after some level of public media ownership. However, because we didn‟t really go 
in depth, the non-linearity described is an extreme case, and in a future theoretical model it should be 
smoothened. Furthermore, we didn‟t focus on what are the consequences on stage 3 mechanics, so a better 
model should also modify stage 3 as well but it is not at the heart of our study. To conclude, with this 
reasoning, we could actually adapt Besley and Prat‟s model to be supported by empirical results. It will help 
us in the discussion of the results. Nevertheless, the two hypotheses of their original model will still be the 
starting point of our discussion, because it is the only theory which was published to cope with Djankov et al 
empirical study and this theory was actually supported by previous empirical evidence. 
 
4. Datasets and Variables Construction: 
 
 
 Firstly, we will discuss the choice of the variables we will use in the empirical analysis. 
 
 The dependent variable will be the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which is one of the most used 
measures of corruption in scientific studies, and furthermore it is available for a long period of time (since 
1995, coinciding with the periods available in Eli Noam‟s book). Even if it is a subjective measure, which 
implies that corruption perception can differ from corruption experience (cf Donchev and Ujhelyi, 2014), it 
is a second best choice regarding measures available for our set of countries.  
 
 Our regressors are media concentration variables coming from Eli Noam‟s book, Who owns the 
world’s media? (2016). There are two types of variables at stake here: count/share variables and Herfindhal-
Hirschman Index (HHI) variables. The count and shares variables are close the variables used in Djankov et 
al‟s paper (2003) to measure state ownership, but some differences exist. Our variables are not limited to the 
five biggest players on the market, because it is not always representative of the media market. It is the same 
for the HHI variables, which measure concentration either within the private sector of a market or within the 
whole market. The private HHI for a particular market is an inverse measure of competition within private 




To construct the private HHI, we recomputed market shares of each private firm on the market (excluding 
firms in “the others” category) as a percentage of the private sector on the specific market. For instance, if 
there are only two private TV channels in a country and each of them has two percent of the whole TV 
market, it means that each of them has fifty percent of the market shares belonging to the private sector. 
Then, we applied the HHI computation technique to these new private sector shares. As a result, the private 
HHI measure does not take into account the absolute size of the private sector in the market (e.g. in our 
previous example, we would have the same private HHI if there were only two private firms on the market 
with half the market shares each). The total HHI for a specific market adapts the same technique to the 
whole market. In fact, it is the sum of the squares of the market shares both private and public firms, except 
the ones in the category the others which means that the sum of the market shares used to compute the total 
HHI variables are not always equal to one. The variable Total HHI is just the average of the total HHI for all 
media markets. However, considering more than five firms comes with a downside: “the others” category, 
which gathers all the public and private firms which have less than one percent of the market shares for all 
the periods and which is excluded from the concentration variables computation. It can be compared to a 
competitive fringe which varies overtime. It has two consequences. Firstly, the media concentration 
variables are not systematically linked. For example, if the share of public TV increases, and the private HHI 
for TV market increases, the total HHI can actually decrease if the others share increases sufficiently. In this 
example, it just means that the higher concentration in the private sector comes from the transfer of private 
firms in the others category because of too small market shares. Secondly, it could bias our results. It creates 
a systematic downward bias for the total HHI variables and the public shares variables. Indeed, if we could 
decompose the others category into separate firms, the number of firms with strictly positive market shares 
taken into account in computation would increase  leading to an increase of the total HHI and an increase of 
the public shares if there are public firms among the others category. But because we can‟t decompose it, it 
leads to a systematic downward bias for both of these variables. However, it is different for the private HHI 
variables. By decomposing the others category into separate firms, it would change the composition of the 
private sector, adding new actors with strictly positive market shares. Hence, the relative size of the firms 
that were already counted as private firms in the private sector decreases. In our previous example, if we add 
another firm with 0.5 percent of the market shares, it increases both the size of the market sector (to 2.5 
percent of the market) and the number of firms (three firms instead of two firms). So, the private HHI for a 
market overestimates the concentration within the private sector because of the others category, leading to a 
systematic upward bias of this measure. Nonetheless, the count measures would not change if the others 
category was decomposable, because it only takes into account the number of firms (public, private, or all 
firms) with more than one percent of the market shares during a period. Henceforth, the count measures 
should be used as a robustness check in the future.  
 
 Our control variables choice is inspired by the Djankov et al study (2003) and by the Freille et al 
study (2007). Table A1 gives the pairwise correlations of all the variables which are determinants of 
corruption and so which should be used for a press freedom – corruption study. The variables which are 
highly correlated have to be rejected, namely two of the three press freedom indexes, and one of the two 
Freedom House‟s freedom indexes. Then, for a panel data analysis, variables which are too constant should 
be taken out because it could drive the results otherwise. This choice is based on the Graphs B2 to B8. Civil 
liberties index, democracy stability dummy, executive system dummy, imprisoned journalists count, 
majoritarian rule dummy and total rents measure are rejected. The murdered journalists count is a limit case: 
reducing the number of controls can increase the probability of an omitted variable bias but it seems to be 





 We will know motivate the choice of the remaining control variables in detail. It is based on the 
classification of corruption determinants made by Brunetti and Weder (2003). 
 
 First, there are the variables linked to the internal controls of corruption, which are the controls of 
corruption within the administration. For instance, this category is about the administration quality and 
independence from political pressures. Here, we have two measures revealing a low-quality bureaucracy 
which is used for political means. However, these variables actually gather elements from the first and the 
second category of corruption determinants 
 The first variable is the murdered journalists count extracted from the Committee to Protect 
Journalists reports. Bjornskov and Freytag (2016, PC) found that the number of murdered journalists was 
positively correlated with corruption. They built a game theoretic model to understand this correlation. They 
explain it by a strategy from the bribers to set an example in order to continue corrupt practices but also to 
reduce the probability of future bribe rejections or future refusals to get involved in corruption-related 
activities. The authors also demonstrate empirically that this strategy is used when the threat from press is 
credible (i.e. when there is sufficient press freedom) and when the overall costs for escalation from 
corruption to murder is low (i.e. when there is a low-quality bureaucracy).  
 The second variable is the political subcomponent of the press freedom index created by the Freedom 
House organization. It aggregates the scores from a questionnaire about different types of political pressures 
on the press. Especially, some criteria show the use of the state by the political power to limit press freedom. 
Hence, it partially shows the degree of control of the political power over the administration. Freille et al 
showed that only two components of the Freedom House‟s press freedom index are convincingly correlated 
with corruption: the political subcomponent and the economic subcomponent. Actually, the economic 
subcomponent could be correlated to some extent with our media concentration variables. So, to limit 
multicollinearity issues, we prefer to use the political component of the press freedom index, to control for 
press freedom outside of media markets considerations. It is an inverse measure of press freedom (the higher 
the index, the lower press freedom), so it should be positively correlated with corruption. Because these two 
subcomponents are highly correlated, using one component instead of the other is not really an issue. 
 
 Then, the external controls category takes into account the environment (e.g. citizens involvement in 
monitoring the state) and the independent checks and balances around the bureaucracy.   
 The first variable in this category is the logarithm of the Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita 
(log(RGDPa)). There is strong empirical evidence that development is negatively correlated with corruption 
(e.g. Mauro, 1995; Treisman 2000; Paldam, 2001; Lambsdorff, 2007; and Lucic et al, 2016). On one hand, 
corruption fosters rent-seeking and the advent of low-quality institutions leading to lower growth (e.g. Gupta 
and Terme, 1998; Wei, 2000). The different channels for this direction of causality have been identified by 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997). On the other hand, development brings means to combat corruption (e.g. Abed 
and Davoodi, 2002). The use of the logarithm transformation is there to reduce the magnitude of the data 
and it was used before in other corruption studies (e.g. Badinger and Nindl, 2014). 
 The second and third variables are the net primary school enrollment rate from the World Bank and 
the human capital index from the Penn World Tables. Both are complementary variables about education. 
Primary school enrollment rate is actually in the original Djankov et al study. The human capital index is 
here to complete the set of education measures, because it also takes into account higher education. 
Education is bound to have a non-linear impact on corruption (Boikos, REA, 2016). For instance, education 




However, education might increase corruption by increasing the corrupt bureaucrat‟s productivity in 
corruption-related activities. There are some evidence of a possible positive correlation between corruption 
and education (e.g. corruption and schooling in Frechette, 2006) 
 The fourth variable in this category is the trade openness index, computed by the World Bank. The 
reason it decreases corruption is that trade openness imposes foreign competition and so it diminishes 
domestic rents extractable by bureaucrats (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Even if more recent studies showed 
that the support for this claim is less strong than usually expected when different measures of trade openness 
and trade restrictions are used (cf Torrez, 2010), the negative impact is still verified in many cases, for 
instance by using trade liberalizations measures instead (cf Sarwar and Pervaiz, JESD 2013). 
 Finally, the last category corresponds to the indirect determinants of corruption which create 
distortions in the economy. We divide it into two types of indirect determinants. 
 On one side, there are the short term / mid-term indirect determinants, which usually are economic 
and political variables. The first variable corresponds to economic freedom index from the Heritage 
Foundation. Economic freedom is found to be negatively correlated in empirical analyses (e.g. Graeff and 
Mehlkop, 2003 EJPE) because corruption develops on the limitations to economic freedom (Rose-
Ackermann, 1999), for instance by fostering illegal services provision or red taping by civil servants (e.g. 
trade permits, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The second variable is the government intervention index from 
the Heritage Foundation. It is a function of the overall government expenditures. Government expenditures 
are positively correlated with corruption under some circumstances (cf Holcombe and Boudreaux, 2015, 
PC), because it increases the possibility of targeted expenditures, which is a feature of neopatrimonialism 
(Eisenstadt, 1973), and it offers more opportunities for corrupt civil servants. The last variable corresponds 
to the defense expenditures. Like government expenditures it can increase corruption, but the effect is 
clearer because of the higher secrecy involved. Contrary to government expenditures, even in countries with 
transparent and controlled public expenditures, defense expenditures are still positively correlated with 
corruption (cf Gupta, Mello and Sharan, 2001, EJPE). 
 On the other side, other factors can affect corruption in the long run, but their effects will be either 
absorbed by the fixed effects because they are constant over time or common across countries, or they lack 
enough variation to be taken into account. Political institutions, ethnic diversity, colonial past, natural rents, 
religious or ethnic majority, or any other cultural long-term factors can influence but these variables are in 
this case. For a complete view, see the survey of literature made by Seldadyo and de Haan (2006, EPCS 




5. First Hypothesis Testing: 
 
 
 Secondly, we will examine the first results concerning our test of the first hypothesis of Besley and 
Prat model (2006), namely the positive correlation between corruption and public media ownership. 
 
  
 To compare our results to Djankov et al study, we did three regressions for each model: an OLS 
regression without controls and country and year fixed effects and two fixed effects regressions (with and 
without controls). Another way to limiting an OVB is to use different combinations of media concentration 




controls for competition within the private sector using the private HHI market-specific variable. Model 1 
will be close to a replication of Djankov et al‟s work. In the cited study, corruption was positively and 
significantly correlated with press public ownership, but not with television (negative insignificant 
correlation) and radio public ownership.  
 We already see that a fixed effects model gives opposite results compared to the simple OLS model, 
even without the controls. The country fixed effect and the year fixed effect capture respectively the country 
specific factors constant over time and the year specific factors constant across countries. The difference 
comes from the between year effect and the between country effect taken out. The simple OLS regressions 
in Tables 1 and 2 tend to give results similar to Djankov et al study. The public TV variable is usually not 
significantly correlated with the CPI, except in model 3 where it is negatively correlated with the CPI, so it 
is positively correlated with corruption. Regarding public press, it is always negatively correlated with the 
CPI in simple OLS regressions. However, adding country and year fixed effects completely changes the 
results (cf Tables 1 and 2 and tables A4 and A5). Public press is no longer significantly correlated with the 
CPI, even with the controls. Furthermore, in every fixed effects model, public TV ownership is positively 
correlated with the CPI, so it is negatively correlated with corruption, even with the controls. 
 The difference in terms of results can be explained by the differences between TV and press. 
Performing a paired t-test and two two-sample t-tests (one assuming equal variances and one without this 
assumption) for the total HHI variables and for the public shares variables showed us that the means of the 
total HHI and the public shares for TV are significantly higher than the means of the total HHI and of the 
public shares for daily newspapers. Secondly, because our sample of countries is representative of the world 
media market, we can add that the media market for TV is on average larger (in terms of audience) than the 
media market for traditional press. These two arguments give us the supply-side and the demand-side 
explanations for the difference between press and TV regarding the media – corruption relationship. On the 
demand side, press is not a mass media anymore, so the use of public press ownership to ensure the capacity 
of media capture by a corrupt regime is too costly with little benefits. Furthermore, on the supply-side, 
barriers to entry are low due to low fixed costs, so the emergence of a competitive fringe would reduce the 
effectiveness of media capture. This explains why public press shares variable has no impact on corruption. 
Public TV ownership used as a way to facilitate media capture is a more effective strategy, because fixed 
costs are higher, leading to higher potentiality for concentration on this market, and the size of the market is 
larger. Furthermore, we see from graphic B9 that the more recent the media, the higher the concentration. 
This graph shows that there is a significant difference between traditional media (press, magazines…) and 
20
th
 Century media (television, radio…) in terms of concentration. However, we find a negative correlation 
between public TV ownership and corruption. This positive association must be quadratic and conditional to 
some requirements. 
 Tables 3 and 4 (and tables A6 and A7) examine the quadratic impact of public media concentration 
on corruption. The first regressions of each model reproduce the Djankov et al model. We see that allowing 
for quadratic impact changes the results found by Djankov et al: in simple OLS regressions, public media 
concentration for TV and for the press had a significant positive and concave impact on the CPI (even if it is 
more systematic for TV than for the press). However, adding country and year fixed effects and controls 
modifies the results. In the fixed effects models without controls, this relationship is verified for public TV 
ownership in two out of four models whereas the square public press variable is no longer significant. In the 
fixed effects models with controls, this quadratic relationship is confirmed only in a minority of regressions, 




happen more often for public TV than for public press. We can conclude from these tables that public TV is 
more likely to be positively and significantly correlated with the CPI than public press, but in each case the 
impact of public media concentration on the CPI is bound to be concave.  
 Table 5 and tables A8 to A12 explore the requirements making this relationship more likely. We see 
that economic freedom, development, and trade openness increase the strength of the relationship between 
the CPI and public TV ownership, meaning that developed countries with more economic freedom are more 
likely to have this negative (and quadratic) effect of public TV ownership on corruption. Adding the main 
effect in tables A11 and A12 show that the strongest requirement is development. Indeed, the estimates for 
the interaction variable between the log(RGDPa) and the public TV shares are positive and the public TV 
variable estimates are negative, both being significant in the same regression. Not only development 
increases the negative impact of public TV on corruption, but the negative estimates for public TV variable 
show that public TV shares have a positive impact on corruption in a under-developed country / when the 
development of a country is very low. 
 We further examine the quadratic impact of public TV on corruption. The main effects were not 
added because they reduce the sample to less than 20 countries and less than 100 observations. In tables 6 
and A13, we investigate the long term effect of public TV on corruption. For a one year lag, the estimates of 
the public TV variable and of the public TV square variable are respectively positive and negative, both 
being significant in all the specifications. However, with a two year lag, the estimates are always 
insignificant. Not only it confirms our previous results about public TV, but it also shows that state 
ownership of television has a medium term effect on corruption. From a policy viewpoint, it means that the 
privatization of public TV will have direct consequences on corruption, not only the year of the 
implementation, but also the year after. Interestingly enough, public press might have an effect on 
corruption, with at least a year lag. Indeed, the estimates for public press in tables 7 and A14 are positive 
and significant for a year lag, and in some specifications for a two years lag. The estimates for the square 
variables are negative and significant in some specifications. Hence, public press may have the same impact 
on corruption as public TV does, but it takes more time to be significant. 
 We can summarize these results by saying that public press is likely to have no impact on corruption 
because it is neither a mass media nor prone to natural oligopolies due to low fixed costs, making press 
capture useless. Public TV ownership has an impact on corruption because its capture can be useful for the 
opposite reasons. Furthermore, public TV ownership impact on the CPI is positive but decreasing, and the 
duration of this impact is bound to be two years. However, if public press has an impact on corruption, it is 
likely to have a year-delayed positive and concave impact on the CPI. 
 
 
 We need to check the results for public TV before going further.  
 
 Firstly, we look for structural changes within our time frame. The idea is that nearly all privatizations 
and openings to competition in the broadcast TV market were done before the beginning of the 2000‟s. 
Henceforth, there should be a point break in the mid 2000‟s, because after that the variation of public TV 




shares variations comes from mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for private players and from privatizations 
for state-owned firms. Indeed, two common characteristics of media markets are the cost structure, “high 
and growing fixed costs, low and declining marginal costs” (Fact #1 in Noam‟s book), and the “price 
deflation” (Fact #4 in Noam‟s book). The first characteristic leads to scale economies and the second one 
makes competition likely to end in price wars, making anti-competitive strategies preferable (price 
discrimination, price differentiation…). Furthermore, anti-concentration laws were usually abandoned in the 
same time period. Hence, M&As represent a profitable and frequent strategy on this market. In addition, 
graph B10 from Noam‟s book demonstrates the weakening of the decrease in terms of public market shares 
for all regions since the mid 2000‟s. On top of it, we have some empirical evidence of this break. We 
performed a Chow test for different years in the beginning of the 2000‟s and the Chow test displays a point 
break in 2002 (with a p-value of 0.00088513, so we can reject the null hypothesis of no structural change). 
So, our hypothesis is that we will have two opposite trends before and after 2002. Before 2002, so before the 
end of the privatization processes, the estimates should be negative because public TV was still too 
dominant and it still facilitated media capture. However, after 2002, the estimates should be positive because 
public TV was sufficiently small not to trigger media capture and still sufficiently important to limit private 
oligopolization of the market. 
 Tables 8 and A15 display the result for this structural change in trends in 2002. At least, the second 
part of the hypothesis is true: public TV interaction variable (with the dummy of years after 2002) is 
positively correlated with the CPI. However, the interaction variable estimates before 2002 are never 
significant. Hence, we can say that public TV started to have a negative impact on corruption after the 
privatization era when it was not dominant. It partially justifies our results for public TV: when it is 
sufficiently small, it is not interesting for media capture and it deters private oligopolization. Nevertheless, it 
should be kept in mind that we are trying to test the strength of the correlation found for public TV and to 
find a possible causal explanation of this phenomenon, but we are not establishing or proving causality. For 
instance, we can find an alternative explanation for the structural change in 2002. Graph B11 shows the 
average CPI for all countries for each year. We see that 2002 marks the beginning of a steady increase in the 
mean CPI. At the same time, as we showed with the graph B10, public TV ownership globally decreased. 
Hence, the positive quadratic association between corruption and public TV ownership could just be due to 
our time frame. 
 
 Secondly, we need to take care of possible outliers, because it could influence our results. To identify 
them, we use two types of statistics among the different techniques available (cf Besley et al, 1980). 
Studentized and standardized residuals are discrepancy measures, where discrepancy is the difference 
between the predicted dependent variable and the observed dependent variable. It helps find observations 
which are unusual compared to the rest of the data set. Cook‟s distance (Cook, 1977) and DFBETAs are 
both influence measures, where influence is the product of the discrepancy and the leverage (i.e. the 
leverage being the impact of an observation on the model‟s predicted dependent variable). While DFBETA 
is used to measure the particular influence on a unique parameter estimates, Cook‟s distance looks at the 
influence of an observation on all the parameters estimates. To identify outliers, we should look for 
observations with studentized and standardized residuals levels above the critical level of ±3 (cf Besley et al, 
1980; Greene, 1993), with Cook‟s distance above 4/N (where N is the number of observations), and with 
DFBETA levels over   √ . However, the DFBETA critical level used can also be equal to 1 (Bollen and 




majority of the critical levels above. The graphics of these statistics are gathered in Graph B12. Five 
observations could be identified as outliers: Brazil in 1996, Finland in 2000, Israel in 2000, Italy in 1996, 
and Spain in 1996. Except Brazil, all these outliers have a high CPI (especially Finland and Israel) and large 
public TV market shares. So, it might create an upward bias in our public TV estimates. The results are 
presented in tables A16 and A17. It still confirms our previous results. First of all, the estimates for the 
public TV variable are never significant if we don‟t allow for a quadratic impact on corruption. Then, in 
models 3 and 4 in each table, when we control for private concentration, the public TV estimates are positive 
and significant, and the squared variable estimates are negative and sometimes significant. Henceforth, it 
confirms that public TV has a negative impact (at a decreasing rate) on corruption. 
 
 Finally, we need to take care of a serial correlation issue. Fixed effects model with clustered standard 
errors provide heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors, but it doesn‟t correct autocorrelation in the 
errors. In fact, we performed a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and it confirmed the 
presence of serial correlation (F(1,11)=39.374, Prob>F=0.0001). Hence, we perform fixed effect estimation 
with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which provide heteroscedasticity-corrected and 
autocorrelation-corrected standard errors. The results are displayed in tables A18 and A19. It still confirms 
our results concerning public TV. Indeed, the estimates for the public TV and the squares of public TV 
shares variables are respectively positive and negative, and both are significant in some specifications. 
 
 
 Now, we will discuss these results. 
 
 We explain the negative and quadratic impact of public TV on corruption by the trade-off between its 
impact on competition and its impact on media capture. The idea is that public TV will have two 
contradicting consequences on corruption, both depending on the size of the public sector. On one hand, 
public media are easier to capture because of its deeper links with the state and bureaucrats (appointments, 
budget …). Hence, it makes its capture more favorable for corrupt bureaucrats. Nevertheless, this media 
capture effect is increasing in the size of the public sector: if the public sector is too small, it is less 
interesting to capture it. Furthermore, because it facilitates media capture, it pushes for a positive correlation 
between public TV and corruption. On the other hand, public media cannot be part M&As happening on the 
market until they are privatized. In fact, facts number 1 and 4 from Noam‟s book (high fixed costs and price 
deflation) show that less aggressive strategies such as M&As are more profitable than open competition for 
market shares, because open competition could trigger price wars. Moreover, because of the fixed costs in 
broadcast TV markets, it promotes natural oligopolies. Hence, public TV imposes more aggressive strategies 
on the private players, and so it limits private oligopolization of the market. This competition effect is 
decreasing in public TV size: if the public sector is too high, private players will need to increase their size 
to maintain their position in the competition, triggering M&As and so reducing competition within the 
public sector. Because this effect reduces the chances of private oligopolization, it pushes for a negative 
correlation between public TV and corruption. Graph B13 summarizes that with a representation of the 




combination of the two gives this parabola shape. Therefore, the reason why Djankov et al. found 
contradicting results can be explained both by the statistical methods used but also by the time frame, the 
end of the 1990‟s, when the privatization process wasn‟t complete and anti-concentration laws were still 
relatively widespread. 
 
 Contrary to the media capture effect which is straightforward, we need to prove the competition 
effect. To prove that the competition effect is at least non-null but constant, the necessary and sufficient 
condition needed is that public TV shares should increase the positive impact private sector competition has 
on the CPI. The results of this test are displayed in tables 9 and A20. The estimates of the interaction 
variable between public TV shares and private HHI for TV are negative, while the estimates for the two 
variables separated are respectively positive and negative. We should add that these estimates are always 
significant, and the square of the public TV variable is still negative (even though it is not significant). It 
means that public TV shares variable has a negative impact on the relationship between private sector 
concentration and the CPI. But because the private HHI for TV is an inverse measure for competition within 
the TV private sector, it means that public TV has a positive impact on the relationship between private 
sector competition and the CPI. In other words, public TV makes private competition even worse for 
corruption, or even better for the CPI. In addition, because of the estimates of these two variables separated, 
public TV still has a positive but concave impact on the CPI (even when private concentration tends to 0), 
and private sector concentration has still a negative and increasing negative impact on the CPI (even when 
public sector is residual). Hence, the competition effect of the public TV sector is verified and it is the 
reason why smaller levels of state ownership in the TV market can decrease corruption. 
  
 These results are insightful to find new policy viewpoints regarding the improvement of press 
freedom. Although it still confirms that developing countries with weak economic freedom should beware 
state-ownership in media, governments in developed countries should take into account the downsides in 
terms of concentration within the private sector when assessing privatization in media markets. Indeed, if the 
state-owned media already have small market shares, privatization could lead to more corruption in the 
future by reducing the competitive pressure on the private ultimate owners. Without anti-concentration laws, 
the likeliness of private oligopolization of the market after privatization will be even higher. In fact, it 
contradicts the conclusion of Djankov et al, which favored the public choice approach over the public 
interest (Pigouvian) approach on the basis of their results. However, it seems that both theoretical 
approaches can be proven right or wrong depending on the circumstances in which public media ownership 
takes place. The public choice approach seems to be particularly useful for developing countries with low 
trade openness and economic freedom levels. In this case, media capture of state-owned media is not costly 
and so it is very likely to happen. On the other hand, the Pigouvian approach is found true in developed 
countries where the actions of the state are scrutinized and limited. Both approaches miss the non-linearity 
because they focus on the inherent qualities or defaults of media state-ownership. They don‟t take into 
account how public and private media ownership can be mutually beneficial in some circumstances (i.e. 
development, economic freedom, trade openness, and limited public media ownership). In fact, when these 
requirements are met, regarding media markets, state-ownership will prevent the private oligopolization of 
the market, sustaining competition within the private sector by limiting the M&As strategies, and private 




these effects are missed is because the M&As strategy as a way to avoid competition in the advent of high 
fixed costs and low marginal costs, which is a key in our reasoning, is not really taken into account. 
 
 As a result, we can conclude that the first hypothesis about public ownership of media is true only for 
higher levels of public TV, but smaller levels of state ownership in the TV market can decrease corruption, 
on condition of some requirements, the most important one being development. Hence, we can say that in 
general, the first hypothesis is not supported by our dataset. Our robustness checks confirm that the 
correlation is strong, but we insist that it is not causality. However, from a normative viewpoint, 
privatization of public media, especially in developed countries, should be assessed and the impact on 
private sector concentration should be a determining criterion in this assessment. 
 
6. Second Hypothesis Testing: 
 
 Thirdly, we will test the second hypothesis from Besley and Prat‟s model, which states that total 
media concentration should be positively correlated with corruption. 
 
 To begin with, we will examine total HHI variable impact on corruption. 
 From the tables which used total HHI as a control, we can see that this variable estimates are rarely 
significant. In fact, the estimates for this variable are negative and significant only in the model 2 
specification, without controls and without country and year fixed effects (cf Table 1 regression (5), table 2 
regression (4), and table 4 (4)). Other specifications are used in tables 10 and A21, but it confirms that total 
HHI has usually no significant impact on corruption. A Woolridge test for autocorrelation showed that we 
have a problem of serial correlation (F(1,25)=99.047, Prob>F=0.0000). Hence, we used Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors to correct standard errors for autocorrelation. Results are presented in tables A22 and A23. It 
confirms the non-significance of total HHI estimates.  
 Hence, we need to find the requirements which could influence total concentration impact on 
corruption. Results are displayed in tables 11 and A23 to A25. We will first focus on tables 11 and A23, 
which look at heterogeneous effects with covariates. Two covariates seem to be important: trade openness 
and defense expenditures. Regarding trade openness, the estimates for the interaction variable with the total 
HHI are positive and significant (at least once), while the estimates for the total HHI variables in the same 
regressions are both negative and significant. It shows that trade openness reduces the negative impact of 
total HHI on the CPI. That‟s why when trade openness tends to be inexistent (cf estimates of total HHI in 
the same regression), total media concentration has a clear negative impact on the CPI, meaning a clear 
positive impact on corruption. Regarding defense expenditures, the estimates for the interaction variable 
with the total HHI are both negative and significant, while the estimates for the total HHI alone are 
insignificant. Hence, we can say that defense expenditures worsen the negative impact of total media 




at all on corruption. Therefore, we can conclude that total HHI may increase corruption, but it should be the 
case only in countries with high defense expenditures and low trade openness. 
 
 Then, we will examine the total HHI for TV and press markets. In fact, as we saw with public TV 
and public press, media concentration might have a different impact depending on the type of media. 
 We will begin by observing the impact of total TV concentration on corruption. Similarly to total 
HHI, the total TV HHI seems not to have an impact on the CPI, except without controls and fixed effects 
where it is negative and significant (cf Tables 12 and A26). It can be explained by the existence of 
conflicting forces inside this concentration variable. On one hand, there is the quadratic relationship between 
public TV and the CPI, which is confirmed again in these tables. Hence, when we control for it (cf 
regressions 7 and 8), the total HHI estimates tends to be negative (but insignificant) and the estimates for the 
squared total HHI variable are positive and sometimes significant. So, when we control for public TV 
concentration, what is left in the total TV HHI variable variation is the private sector concentration, which 
has a negative and convex impact on the CPI. On the other hand, we have the opposite results when we 
control for private sector concentration (cf regressions 9 and 10). Therefore, the total concentration for the 
TV market has an insignificant impact on corruption because of these two conflicting forces. However, we 
can still find some requirements to make it more likely to have a negative impact on corruption. The results 
are displayed in tables A27 to A29. Regarding the covariates, tables A27 and A28 highlights the impact of 
three control variables: the logarithm of the real GDP per capita, the government expenditures variable and 
the defense expenditures variable. The development interaction variable estimates are positive and 
significant, while the total TV HHI estimates are negative and significant at the same time. In addition, the 
estimates for government intervention are negative and significant while the estimates for total TV HHI are 
positive and significant. It is the same for the defense expenditures variable, except its estimates are negative 
but insignificant. Therefore, high development and low state intervention, especially in defense, are two 
important requirements improving the impact of total TV HHI concentration on the CPI. Table A29 
confirms our hypothesis about the conflicting forces inside the total TV HHI variable. Indeed, the public TV 
interaction variable estimates are positive and significant, while the total HHI TV estimates alone in the 
same regressions are not significant. Furthermore, the estimates for private TV concentration are negative 
(and sometimes significant), while the total TV HHI estimates are positive and significant. Hence, it shows 
that public TV concentration (up to a certain level) and private TV competition improve the impact of total 
TV concentration on the CPI. 
 Regarding press concentration, the results are different. By looking at tables A30 and A31, we see 
that the impact of total press concentration is insignificant, but for different reasons than before. Indeed, the 
public press market shares are so low that it is unlikely to influence the total HHI press variable too much. 
Most of the total press concentration is private press concentration. However, private press concentration has 
usually an insignificant impact on corruption (e.g. table 2). Even though it seems that the impact of private 
press concentration is similar to the effect of private TV concentration on the CPI (i.e. negative and convex), 
there are two structural differences between these two markets: fixed costs and massive audience. Because 
of the lower fixed costs, private oligopolization, even without public press, is less likely. Moreover, even 
with a private oligopoly in the press market, media capture is less likely because of the lower audience. 
Henceforth, private press concentration impact on corruption remains insignificant, and so the total press 




total press concentration actually has an impact on corruption. Regarding control variables, the results are 
displayed in tables A32 and A33, and three covariates seem to be significant: human capital index, 
log(RGDPa) and trade openness. In each case, the interaction variables estimates are negative and 
significant, while the total press HHI estimates alone are positive and significant (except in the trade 
openness interaction regression) and the other variables estimates alone are positive and significant (except 
for the human capital variable). Hence, there are two interpretations for these results. Firstly, it could mean 
that total press HHI in developing countries with low human capital index and with low trade openness rate 
has a positive impact on the CPI. In fact, in poor countries, a concentrated press might be a good way to 
stand up against corruption in the state. Even if media capture might be more interesting if press is 
concentrated, the state is likely to be too poor to capture it if the press is strong enough. However, when 
development comes (which will be correlated with an increase of trade openness and human capital level), 
concentrated press actually makes media capture more likely and so press concentrations has then a negative 
impact on the CPI. It explains the negative signs for the interaction variables: as human capital, development 
and trade openness improve, concentrated press stops being useful against corruption, because now media 
capture by the state is feasible. However, we should be cautious with this interpretation because press is 
rarely concentrated, so there might be too few cases confirming this interpretation. The second interpretation 
is much more likely. Because in many cases the press is not concentrated, the estimates for the total press 
HHI variable and the control variables are not representative of a large number of observations. That‟s why 
the estimates for human capital, development and trade openness variables alone are significant and positive 
(except for human capital). Indeed, it means that when total press HHI tends to zero, development and trade 
openness (and maybe human capital) have a positive impact on the CPI. And in most of the cases, press 
concentration tends to be low. 
 
 Regarding total media market concentration, we can conclude by saying that total HHI may increase 
corruption but only in countries with high defense expenditures and low levels of trade openness. Regarding 
the television market, we can say that the total concentration impact on corruption will depend on the size of 
the public sector, the competition within the private sector, the level of development and the level of state 
expenditures, especially regarding the military. Total TV concentration will be positively correlated with 
corruption in countries with extreme levels of public sector in TV (very high or very low levels), low 
competition in the private sector, low level of development and high levels of state expenditures, particularly 
in defense. Total press concentration is unlikely to have any impact on corruption because it doesn‟t have 
the necessary high fixed costs, leading to the natural oligopolization of the market, and it isn‟t a mass media 
anymore. 
 
 Ultimately, we will end by summing up what we found for private concentration within the private 
sector. 
 We will begin with the television market. Among all our specifications including the private TV HHI 
variable, we could find more than ten regressions depicting the same relationship between private sector 
concentration and corruption. In each case, the private TV HHI has a negative and convex relationship with 
the CPI. It means that concentration within the private sector in TV markets increases corruption but at a 
decreasing rate (i.e. it has a positive but concave impact on corruption). Furthermore, it also has a delayed 




The quadratic relationship can be explained as in Besley and Prat‟s model: a reduction in the number of 
firms on the market increases the possibility of media capture because bribes are easier. Furthermore, we 
could add that coordination failure (if strategic behaviors were allowed in the model) of media capture is 
more likely with more agents involved. The reason why the relationship is quadratic can be explained by a 
positive effect of a concentrated private sector: it has a sufficiently large audience to resist the state. 
Nevertheless, because this effect is dominated by the effect of concentration on media capture probability, 
the overall impact of private TV concentration is still negative. However, we can find some conditions 
making private TV concentration less harmful. The results are displayed in tables A35 and A36. The only 
condition seems to be high press freedom regarding the political environment. Indeed, the only significant 
estimates are those of the interaction variable between the private TV HHI and the political press freedom 
index, which is an inverse measure of press freedom, and these estimates are negative. Hence, it confirms 
our hypothesis about the non-linear impact of private TV HHI on corruption: political pressures prevent a 
concentrated private sector from resisting the state. Hence, the impact of private TV HHI on corruption is 
negative and linear when resistance is not possible because of the political environment. 
 We will now end with the press market. Because press is not a mass media and has low fixed costs, 
private press HHI estimates are mainly insignificant. Indeed, the two effects of private concentration found 
in for the TV market actually cancel one another here. Private concentration can make media capture more 
interesting for a corrupt bureaucrat (and for the media outlet owners who can extract higher rents) but it also 
helps resist the state. It confirms our previous hypothesis about the heterogeneity in the likelihood of media 
capture depending on the media type. Media capture will be used strategically by corrupt bureaucrats: they 
will prefer to target mass media, to capture a larger audience, and media with high fixed costs, which limits 
entry and so facilitates capture (like in the specification of the Besley and Prat‟s model with free entry with 
an entry cost). However, there are some requirements affecting the impact of private press concentration on 
corruption. The results are presented in table A37 and A38. Only the estimates for the interaction between 
economic freedom and private press HHI are significant. These estimates are positive while the private press 
HHI variable estimates are negative and significant. It means that in countries with low economic freedom, 
where media capture by the state is easier, private press concentration will increase corruption. Hence, 
economic freedom is a condition to reduce the capacity of media capture. It is coherent with our previous 
reasoning, because, in this case, a concentrated press sector cannot resist the state because of the lack of 
economic freedom. 
 
 To sum up our findings about private media concentration, only private TV concentration has an 
impact on corruption because of the structure of this media market (large audience, high fixed costs). Hence 
private press concentration is unlikely to have an impact on corruption, except in countries with low 
economic freedom which increases the media capture probability. Regarding private TV, concentration 
increases corruption at a decreasing rate: it facilitates media capture, even though a large audience increases 
the opportunity cost of media capture and the capacity to resist it. Higher levels of press freedom regarding 
the political environment make private TV concentration less harmful, because it reduces the possibilities 








 The main finding of this research paper is the negative and quadratic association between corruption 
and state-ownership of television. It limits the idea that media privatization is always a necessary good 
against corruption. TV state-ownership will be harmful in developing countries, with low levels of economic 
freedom and trade openness. Nevertheless, only high levels of public TV market shares will increase 
corruption in the case of developed countries with high levels of economic freedom. Competition within the 
private sector of TV, which is negatively correlated with corruption, is likely to be the channel through 
which state-ownership influences corruption. A possible explanation why previous studies missed this 
correlation is that private concentration was barely taken into account. Regarding the industry concentration, 
the overall correlation sign with corruption will depend on the dominant effect on corruption, between 
public media concentration and private media concentration. Nonetheless, we can say that this correlation 
with media industry concentration is likely to be positive, especially in the case of the television market. 
Furthermore, some circumstances (e.g. low economic freedom, high state expenditures especially defense 
expenditures) can increase the possibility of media capture, making the correlation between overall 
concentration and corruption more likely to be positive. 
 Another interesting finding is that only the correlation with television is robust to different tests and 
specifications. State-ownership of traditional press is not correlated with corruption. By comparing the two 
media markets, we can highlight two structural differences: only TV is a mass media and it has higher levels 
of fixed costs. Hence, we hypothesize that media capture likeliness is increasing in the viewership and in the 
fixed costs of a media type. Therefore, corrupt bureaucrats have less incentive to capture a type of media 
with limited fixed costs (and so limited natural levels of concentration) and with limited audience.  
 However, there are several limitations with this research paper which should be taken into account 
for further research. Firstly, even if more robustness checks and better specifications than previous studies 
are used, we can‟t totally exclude the possibility of omitted variables biases. Hence, we only find 
correlations. However, the use of panel data analysis, contrary to previous studies, is still a step forward 
towards more robust results. Furthermore, as we said before, an alternative explanation is still possible: our 
results could come from our time frame (i.e. from the simultaneous decrease of corruption and of media 
state-ownership levels). Henceforth, the use of an EBA (cf Freille et al, 2007) could be another test of the 
robustness of our correlations. Secondly, regarding our interpretation of the reasons why press and TV 
concentration effects differ, the application of our method to a wider range of media markets could be used 
to test this hypothesis. However, there are two findings from this master thesis which should be taken into 







8. Main Tables: 
 
 
Table 1: Public TV and corruption  
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CPI Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 
          
Shares of Public TV -18.25 10.86* 9.602* -3.224 11.84* 9.524* -27.27** 10.76* 9.757* 
 (13.41) (6.134) (5.515) (16.05) (6.161) (5.458) (11.63) (6.109) (4.919) 
Total HHI    -43.10** -1.967 0.225    
    (17.58) (3.632) (4.665)    
Private HHI TV       2.402 -2.506 -5.209 
       (9.803) (3.667) (4.511) 
Economic Freedom   0.265**   0.255*   0.252* 
   (0.105)   (0.128)   (0.134) 
Murdered Journalists   0.665   1.170*   1.689*** 
   (0.729)   (0.677)   (0.548) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate   -0.284   -0.367   -0.280 
   (0.260)   (0.263)   (0.195) 
Human Capital   -3.905   -3.581   -3.703 
   (4.530)   (4.924)   (4.528) 
log(RGDPa)   28.73***   29.09***   32.50*** 
   (8.323)   (8.783)   (8.773) 
Trade Openness   0.0229   0.0376   0.0289 
   (0.0378)   (0.0394)   (0.0390) 
Government Intervention   0.0401   0.0474   0.0386 
   (0.0730)   (0.0747)   (0.0753) 
Defense Expenditures   64.87   69.91   90.80* 
   (51.54)   (54.67)   (47.54) 
Political Press Freedom   -0.171   -0.191   -0.200 
   (0.151)   (0.163)   (0.187) 
Constant 64.20*** 51.82*** -56.32 76.49*** 53.30*** -51.10 69.65*** 53.12*** -71.61* 
 (8.210) (2.609) (43.80) (5.302) (3.045) (43.33) (8.385) (3.960) (38.83) 
          
Observations 232 232 216 218 218 203 202 202 191 
R-squared 0.081 0.030 0.203 0.272 0.034 0.217 0.166 0.037 0.241 
Country FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 



















Table 2: Public press and corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CPI Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 
          
Shares of Public Press -38.60*** 5.581 1.612 -28.02*** 5.322 1.818 -45.31*** 7.150 2.401 
 (5.160) (5.433) (6.612) (7.193) (5.354) (5.731) (5.187) (5.110) (4.883) 
Total HHI    -22.80** -1.247 -2.995    
    (9.236) (3.248) (2.788)    
Private HHI Press       -37.97*** -2.965 0.242 
       (12.33) (2.888) (3.474) 
Economic Freedom   0.255*   0.325**   0.374** 
   (0.126)   (0.156)   (0.148) 
Murdered Journalists   0.407   0.778**   0.902* 
   (0.469)   (0.319)   (0.501) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate   -0.0373   -0.223   -0.423 
   (0.219)   (0.238)   (0.261) 
Human Capital   -9.106   -9.330*   -9.877* 
   (6.455)   (5.028)   (5.599) 
log(RGDPa)   21.31**   22.09**   16.24** 
   (8.774)   (9.082)   (7.236) 
Trade Openness   0.0410   0.0518   0.0712 
   (0.0431)   (0.0451)   (0.0507) 
Government Intervention   0.0199   0.0395   0.0437 
   (0.0666)   (0.0766)   (0.0761) 
Defense Expenditures   -12.10   -14.51   -47.15 
   (63.29)   (53.79)   (45.69) 
Political Press Freedom   -0.221   -0.169   -0.0634 
   (0.182)   (0.174)   (0.210) 
Constant 67.73*** 63.13*** -16.95 75.24*** 61.95*** -8.783 77.08*** 57.48*** 29.13 
 (3.894) (0.565) (50.94) (4.674) (1.604) (51.16) (5.133) (1.176) (44.01) 
          
Observations 407 407 388 324 324 305 200 200 189 
R-squared 0.259 0.002 0.128 0.353 0.004 0.203 0.477 0.006 0.256 
Country FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 

















Table 3: Public TV and corruption: quadratic impact: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CPI Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 
             
Shares of Public TV 100.9** 23.88 19.45 78.46* 24.06 21.54 136.6*** 37.96** 30.87* 137.3*** 29.29*** 27.28 
 (43.61) (18.03) (20.30) (41.32) (18.61) (19.97) (33.91) (15.50) (17.15) (31.00) (8.787) (16.69) 
(Shares of Public TV)
2
 -119.3*** -10.85 -8.011 -92.38** -10.28 -9.906 -153.8*** -22.76* -16.96 -155.1*** -19.22** -16.38 
 (34.91) (14.86) (17.50) (38.60) (15.74) (16.74) (30.03) (11.53) (13.72) (29.30) (7.473) (14.41) 
Total HHI    -16.99 -1.726 0.776       
    (20.50) (3.729) (4.730)       
Private HHI TV       -19.56** -5.570** -7.052 -22.86 -32.28*** -32.62*** 
       (8.906) (2.519) (4.259) (51.30) (10.52) (11.60) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
         2.997 24.61** 24.27** 
          (47.15) (9.522) (10.71) 
Economic Freedom   0.259**   0.248*   0.248*   0.236* 
   (0.104)   (0.129)   (0.134)   (0.133) 
Murdered Journalists   0.642   1.173*   1.553***   1.528** 
   (0.735)   (0.680)   (0.537)   (0.570) 
Primary School 
Enrollment Rate 
  -0.315   -0.405   -0.320   -0.340* 
   (0.259)   (0.266)   (0.207)   (0.197) 
Human Capital   -3.541   -3.067   -3.200   -2.312 
   (4.693)   (5.208)   (4.847)   (4.881) 
log(RGDPa)   28.34***   28.55***   31.79***   32.66*** 
   (8.197)   (8.748)   (8.837)   (8.431) 
Trade Openness   0.0221   0.0375   0.0271   0.0211 
   (0.0386)   (0.0402)   (0.0401)   (0.0400) 
Government 
Intervention 
  0.0486   0.0591   0.0566   0.0755 
   (0.0804)   (0.0816)   (0.0805)   (0.0785) 
Defense Expenditures   62.88   66.72   85.37*   97.07** 
   (50.86)   (54.01)   (47.37)   (45.53) 
Political Press 
Freedom 
  -0.166   -0.182   -0.191   -0.163 
   (0.152)   (0.165)   (0.188)   (0.178) 
Constant 49.46*** 49.55*** -54.52 58.66*** 50.98*** -49.05 52.02*** 49.00*** -70.20* 52.70*** 56.29*** -70.05* 
 (10.41) (3.687) (43.63) (12.11) (4.480) (43.74) (7.865) (4.273) (39.61) (15.38) (2.653) (37.50) 
             
Observations 232 232 216 218 218 203 202 202 191 202 202 191 
R-squared 0.394 0.036 0.205 0.410 0.039 0.220 0.503 0.055 0.248 0.503 0.080 0.265 
Country FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 



















Table 4: Public press and Corruption: Quadratic Impact: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CPI Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 
             
Shares of Public Press -125.5*** 9.686** 3.140 -128.2*** 9.486** 2.753 -79.95 16.90 4.883 -82.32* 16.37* 4.017 
 (29.27) (4.248) (9.884) (34.26) (4.033) (11.54) (47.53) (10.77) (12.11) (46.28) (9.121) (10.85) 
(Shares of Public Press)2 89.69*** -9.256 -3.265 104.7*** -9.392 -2.004 37.88 -20.86 -5.244 37.60 -19.14 -1.975 
 (27.35) (8.790) (12.89) (33.33) (8.548) (15.12) (50.88) (15.16) (19.75) (52.01) (11.75) (18.01) 
Total HHI    -26.12*** -1.249 -3.000       
    (8.515) (3.253) (2.799)       
Private HHI Press       -27.12 -3.904 0.0274 -43.36 -7.805 -6.788 
       (21.52) (3.523) (3.548) (50.39) (23.20) (20.11) 
(Private HHI Press)2          19.88 3.756 6.535 
          (44.37) (19.31) (17.13) 
Economic Freedom   0.256*   0.326**   0.376**   0.378** 
   (0.128)   (0.158)   (0.148)   (0.149) 
Murdered Journalists   0.381   0.757*   0.828   0.860 
   (0.548)   (0.435)   (0.735)   (0.726) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate   -0.0382   -0.224   -0.422   -0.427 
   (0.220)   (0.239)   (0.262)   (0.264) 
Human Capital   -9.132   -9.355*   -9.938*   -9.984* 
   (6.492)   (5.101)   (5.628)   (5.688) 
log(RGDPa)   21.26**   22.05**   16.14**   15.98** 
   (8.849)   (9.200)   (7.352)   (7.315) 
Trade Openness   0.0412   0.0520   0.0717   0.0719 
   (0.0432)   (0.0453)   (0.0507)   (0.0501) 
Government Intervention   0.0199   0.0396   0.0436   0.0417 
   (0.0667)   (0.0768)   (0.0765)   (0.0771) 
Defense Expenditures   -12.48   -14.79   -47.94   -47.73 
   (63.92)   (54.88)   (47.05)   (47.45) 
Political Press Freedom   -0.221   -0.168   -0.0619   -0.0577 
   (0.182)   (0.175)   (0.209)   (0.210) 
Constant 68.30*** 63.58*** -16.48 77.32*** 62.50*** -8.435 74.50*** 59.65*** 30.04 77.18*** 60.04*** 31.92 
 (3.931) (0.849) (51.74) (4.501) (1.775) (52.36) (6.341) (1.718) (44.75) (10.17) (3.464) (45.66) 
             
Observations 407 407 388 324 324 305 200 200 189 200 200 189 
R-squared 0.292 0.002 0.128 0.409 0.004 0.203 0.482 0.008 0.256 0.483 0.008 0.256 
Country FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 














Table 5: Public media ownership and corruption: heterogeneous effects: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
           
Public TV Shares * Economic Freedom 0.155*          
 (0.0830)          
Public TV Shares * Log(RGDPa)  2.893**         
  (1.249)         
Public TV Shares * Defense Expenditures   77.96        
   (52.70)        
Public TV Shares * Human Capital    3.242       
    (1.959)       
Public TV Shares * Primary School Enrollment Rate     0.0740      
     (0.0457)      
Public Press Shares * Economic Freedom      0.0792     
      (0.118)     
Public Press Shares * Log(RGDPa)       1.525    
       (1.333)    
Public Press Shares * Defense Expenditures        -2.962   
        (52.11)   
Public Press Shares * Human Capital         -0.422  
         (3.303)  
Public Press Shares * Primary School Enrollment Rate          -0.0183 
          (0.0861) 
Economic Freedom  0.293*** 0.267** 0.239** 0.253**  0.321*** 0.250* 0.239* 0.253** 
  (0.0972) (0.115) (0.108) (0.113)  (0.109) (0.123) (0.126) (0.123) 
Log(RGDPa) 29.94***  30.13*** 27.38*** 26.23*** 26.09***  22.32** 19.02* 21.08** 
 (8.385)  (7.814) (8.281) (7.983) (8.682)  (8.931) (9.519) (8.873) 
Defense Expenditures 75.97 -45.58  84.83* 53.85 13.44 -88.92*  18.74 -13.60 
 (51.34) (44.60)  (48.78) (49.79) (61.66) (48.66)  (60.72) (62.99) 
Human Capital -2.097 -1.876 -4.634  -5.143 -8.477 -7.196 -8.684  -8.982 
 (4.960) (4.920) (4.455)  (4.163) (6.498) (6.526) (5.612)  (6.521) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.308 -0.167 -0.278 -0.340  -0.00194 0.0205 -0.0346 -0.00123  
 (0.250) (0.247) (0.273) (0.250)  (0.211) (0.234) (0.222) (0.236)  
Murdered Journalists 0.886 0.168 0.704 0.705 0.736 0.635 0.179 0.427 0.633 0.395 
 (0.732) (0.671) (0.737) (0.741) (0.746) (0.407) (0.453) (0.453) (0.473) (0.474) 
Trade Openness 0.0163 0.0623 0.0166 0.00922 0.00877 0.0306 0.0662 0.0399 0.0208 0.0406 
 (0.0390) (0.0396) (0.0373) (0.0404) (0.0330) (0.0426) (0.0403) (0.0418) (0.0468) (0.0426) 
Government Intervention 0.0804 0.0509 0.0248 0.0438 0.0252 0.0752 0.0213 0.0194 0.00557 0.0197 
 (0.0741) (0.0769) (0.0770) (0.0716) (0.0765) (0.0555) (0.0695) (0.0670) (0.0654) (0.0667) 
Political Press Freedom Index -0.180 0.0210 -0.194 -0.210 -0.113 -0.232 -0.145 -0.222 -0.278 -0.221 
 (0.148) (0.128) (0.152) (0.141) (0.150) (0.197) (0.174) (0.186) (0.176) (0.179) 
Constant -49.81 49.02* -53.60 -54.51 -66.01 -29.80 62.34* -22.92 -35.28 -19.41 
 (42.36) (25.98) (45.81) (42.92) (41.37) (50.41) (32.20) (36.71) (46.78) (47.63) 
           
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 388 388 388 388 388 
R-squared 0.175 0.141 0.184 0.197 0.179 0.108 0.103 0.128 0.113 0.128 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 















Table 6: Public TV delayed effect / lagged variables: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 
         
Public TVt-1 
41.55** 49.28*** 49.40*** 41.20**     
 (17.34) (14.28) (11.49) (16.79)     
(Public TVt-1)
2 -30.38** -36.29*** -38.30*** -29.85**     
 (14.31) (10.92) (9.821) (13.66)     
Private TV HHIt-1 
 -4.625 -30.75**      
  (4.360) (14.31)      
(Private TV HHIt-1)
2   23.76*      
   (12.85)      
Total HHIt-1 
   -0.0887     
    (4.070)     
Public TVt-2 
    15.35 25.19 22.62 15.81 
     (17.98) (16.41) (14.00) (17.60) 
(Public TVt-2)
2     -10.71 -17.97 -17.98 -11.45 
     (14.35) (11.46) (10.99) (13.77) 
Private TV HHIt-2 
     -4.183 -26.02  
      (6.183) (21.12)  
(Private TV HHIt-2)
2       19.68  
       (17.86)  
Total HHIt-2 
       1.154 
        (3.502) 
Economic Freedom 0.221** 0.217 0.226 0.272* 0.101 0.161 0.171 0.104 
 (0.104) (0.152) (0.154) (0.134) (0.173) (0.206) (0.201) (0.184) 
Murdered Journalists -0.213 0.293 0.449 0.111 0.382 0.751 0.589 0.454 
 (0.411) (0.353) (0.355) (0.432) (0.852) (0.960) (0.991) (0.965) 
Primary School Enrollment -0.328 -0.307 -0.349* -0.386 -0.0455 -0.120 -0.223 -0.0825 
 (0.211) (0.198) (0.188) (0.232) (0.197) (0.209) (0.211) (0.194) 
Human Capital -8.634* -9.523* -8.022 -9.338* -4.604 -3.888 -1.950 -4.000 
 (4.695) (4.862) (5.142) (4.785) (4.721) (4.965) (5.280) (4.901) 
log(RGDPa) 15.96** 15.61** 17.36*** 17.09** 18.53** 20.86*** 22.49*** 18.21** 
 (6.981) (6.978) (6.191) (7.222) (7.499) (7.009) (6.161) (7.068) 
Trade Openness 0.0185 0.0264 0.0216 0.0347 0.0248 0.0274 0.0223 0.0344 
 (0.0398) (0.0410) (0.0394) (0.0406) (0.0389) (0.0365) (0.0341) (0.0359) 
Government Intervention 0.00348 0.0102 0.0280 -0.00398 -0.0163 -0.0341 -0.0190 -0.00891 
 (0.0482) (0.0518) (0.0548) (0.0517) (0.0488) (0.0551) (0.0623) (0.0551) 
Defense Expenditures -37.99 -38.65 -24.70 -27.32 17.25 44.53 62.56* 19.83 
 (44.52) (47.05) (39.82) (48.67) (46.91) (42.03) (32.47) (45.81) 
Political Press Freedom -0.170 -0.172 -0.196 -0.257 -0.162 -0.173 -0.200 -0.183 
 (0.156) (0.205) (0.194) (0.166) (0.172) (0.201) (0.197) (0.174) 
Constant 24.53 26.32 21.59 24.69 -16.01 -25.40 -25.00 -13.37 
 (41.32) (38.62) (33.25) (39.64) (33.60) (32.84) (31.14) (33.61) 
         
Observations 216 190 190 203 205 179 179 193 
R-squared 0.191 0.203 0.230 0.202 0.097 0.117 0.133 0.097 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 









Table 7: Public press delayed effect / lagged variables: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 
         
Public Presst-1 
14.92*** 32.63*** 20.89** 15.11***     
 (3.400) (10.39) (7.696) (3.682)     
(Public Presst-1)
2 -5.495 -36.06* -9.338 -7.176     
 (8.894) (17.72) (16.22) (7.880)     
Private Press HHIt-1 
 -5.110 -35.99*      
  (3.097) (20.46)      
(Private Press HHIt-1)
2   30.39      
   (18.48)      
Total HHIt-1 
   -1.997     
    (1.840)     
Public Presst-2 
    31.71** 23.68 13.50 27.01** 
     (12.80) (18.61) (18.76) (12.95) 
(Public Presst-2)
2     -19.01 -7.112 16.60 -12.35 
     (19.35) (30.11) (35.06) (19.34) 
Private Press HHIt-2 
     2.140 -26.70  
      (4.014) (21.84)  
(Private Press HHIt-2)
2       27.66  
       (18.23)  
Total HHIt-2 
       -0.152 
        (1.143) 
Economic Freedom 0.209* 0.167 0.154 0.214 0.159 0.158 0.127 0.165 
 (0.112) (0.145) (0.130) (0.143) (0.110) (0.175) (0.165) (0.171) 
Murdered Journalists 0.178 -0.0402 0.0225 0.179 0.746 1.236 1.403 1.000 
 (0.475) (0.480) (0.500) (0.533) (0.735) (0.900) (0.889) (0.704) 
Primary School Enrollment -0.0752 -0.355 -0.379 -0.172 -0.0716 -0.235 -0.221 -0.100 
 (0.213) (0.285) (0.279) (0.250) (0.234) (0.321) (0.298) (0.261) 
Human Capital -13.64** -15.22** -16.12** -14.37** -15.12** -9.645 -10.51 -13.60** 
 (6.011) (6.654) (6.859) (5.486) (5.710) (6.318) (6.378) (5.568) 
log(RGDPa) 18.97** 15.12 13.18 18.64** 17.70* 12.75 12.00 16.46* 
 (8.346) (8.923) (8.741) (9.066) (8.960) (8.936) (8.463) (8.859) 
Trade Openness 0.0289 0.0291 0.0398 0.0266 0.0206 0.0558 0.0564 0.0205 
 (0.0338) (0.0382) (0.0367) (0.0360) (0.0318) (0.0436) (0.0441) (0.0357) 
Government Intervention -0.00509 0.0347 0.0415 0.0466 -0.0646 -0.0536 -0.0408 -0.0311 
 (0.0587) (0.0424) (0.0453) (0.0508) (0.0456) (0.0467) (0.0474) (0.0545) 
Defense Expenditures -17.54 -60.64 -70.63 -30.72 -29.57 -33.47 -39.26 -38.28 
 (57.74) (66.37) (68.72) (61.66) (60.59) (70.32) (67.95) (60.70) 
Political Press Freedom -0.0976 -0.0784 -0.0382 -0.0939 -0.0511 -0.0780 -0.0449 -0.0765 
 (0.153) (0.199) (0.195) (0.169) (0.158) (0.189) (0.190) (0.178) 
Constant 14.06 63.15 78.78 24.29 30.34 41.85 49.85 30.58 
 (45.74) (53.10) (52.53) (49.84) (49.62) (60.29) (57.45) (51.81) 
         
Observations 387 187 187 304 379 178 178 297 
R-squared 0.115 0.195 0.215 0.163 0.136 0.171 0.184 0.142 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 








Table 8: Public TV and heterogeneous trends 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CPI Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 
           
Public TV * Pre-2002 -0.705 1.042 0.850 0.807 0.833      
 (1.747) (1.489) (1.379) (1.421) (1.457)      
Public TV * Post-2002      2.277 2.393 2.506* 2.857** 2.185 
      (1.578) (1.408) (1.339) (1.366) (1.478) 
Total HHI   2.676     3.221   
   (4.439)     (4.696)   
Private HHI TV    -3.310 -34.05**    -4.440 -30.80** 
    (5.366) (12.76)    (5.587) (13.74) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
    28.81**     24.93** 
     (10.86)     (12.07) 
Economic Freedom  0.289*** 0.306** 0.284** 0.282**  0.263** 0.286** 0.263* 0.263** 
  (0.101) (0.127) (0.131) (0.129)  (0.104) (0.130) (0.131) (0.128) 
Murdered Journalists  0.169 0.747 1.105** 0.986*  0.354 0.950 1.278** 1.147* 
  (0.699) (0.623) (0.539) (0.567)  (0.709) (0.649) (0.571) (0.571) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate  -0.140 -0.218 -0.147 -0.161  -0.160 -0.235 -0.145 -0.160 
  (0.261) (0.255) (0.219) (0.211)  (0.273) (0.261) (0.209) (0.206) 
Human Capital  -2.193 -1.827 -2.312 -1.119  -3.156 -2.694 -3.567 -2.324 
  (5.267) (5.752) (5.496) (5.291)  (5.304) (5.792) (5.579) (5.445) 
log(RGDPa)  0.0613 0.0786* 0.0720* 0.0695*  0.0404 0.0594 0.0497 0.0512 
  (0.0369) (0.0387) (0.0371) (0.0373)  (0.0377) (0.0403) (0.0383) (0.0390) 
Trade Openness  0.0370 0.0423 0.0369 0.0629  0.0290 0.0338 0.0266 0.0513 
  (0.0891) (0.0925) (0.0948) (0.0885)  (0.0860) (0.0891) (0.0908) (0.0868) 
Government Intervention  -62.86 -60.19 -53.11 -45.39  -40.52 -38.83 -31.00 -28.01 
  (57.62) (58.29) (62.67) (64.01)  (52.73) (53.54) (57.46) (58.72) 
Defense Expenditures  0.0404 0.0309 0.0519 0.0951  -0.0161 -0.0264 -0.0188 0.0316 
  (0.140) (0.155) (0.166) (0.153)  (0.122) (0.133) (0.145) (0.142) 
Constant 56.54*** 54.40* 58.58** 56.85** 57.54** 55.75*** 61.27** 64.27** 62.74** 62.65** 
 (0.250) (27.98) (27.38) (25.69) (24.01) (0.475) (29.03) (27.35) (24.41) (23.15) 
           
Observations 232 216 203 191 191 232 216 203 191 191 
R-squared 0.002 0.103 0.118 0.117 0.143 0.022 0.113 0.130 0.133 0.151 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 
















Table 9: Public TV, private sector concentration and corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
         
Public TV * Private HHI TV -10.30** -11.69** -15.85 -16.69* -10.87** -11.93** -13.58 -14.71 
 (3.996) (4.682) (9.457) (9.545) (4.214) (4.749) (9.451) (9.898) 
Shares of Public TV 16.86*** 18.91*** 20.37** 17.87** 31.76* 31.10* 30.59* 26.79 
 (5.245) (5.861) (9.305) (8.088) (18.09) (18.27) (17.07) (16.91) 
(Shares of Public TV)2     -11.76 -9.909 -9.426 -8.193 
     (13.38) (14.52) (13.10) (14.36) 
Total HHI  -3.286    -2.681   
  (4.909)    (5.241)   
Private HHI TV   5.084 -21.66*   2.588 -23.49* 
   (7.670) (11.63)   (7.432) (12.30) 
(Private HHI TV)2    25.84**    25.51** 
    (11.30)    (11.24) 
Economic Freedom 0.284* 0.280** 0.284* 0.273* 0.275* 0.273* 0.277* 0.267* 
 (0.139) (0.134) (0.139) (0.136) (0.140) (0.136) (0.142) (0.142) 
Murdered Journalists 1.431*** 1.303*** 1.393*** 1.345** 1.366** 1.258** 1.360** 1.317** 
 (0.495) (0.455) (0.495) (0.492) (0.508) (0.469) (0.508) (0.508) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.215 -0.201 -0.216 -0.236 -0.255 -0.238 -0.248 -0.263 
 (0.179) (0.173) (0.187) (0.165) (0.196) (0.190) (0.198) (0.186) 
Human Capital -4.169 -4.855 -4.093 -3.151 -3.704 -4.392 -3.757 -2.871 
 (4.533) (4.655) (4.616) (4.579) (4.863) (5.037) (4.875) (4.918) 
log(RGDPa) 32.50*** 33.24*** 32.31*** 33.19*** 31.92*** 32.63*** 31.94*** 32.86*** 
 (8.724) (9.182) (8.724) (8.419) (8.798) (9.311) (8.793) (8.449) 
Trade Openness 0.0320 0.0286 0.0342 0.0280 0.0311 0.0291 0.0324 0.0265 
 (0.0406) (0.0413) (0.0410) (0.0410) (0.0416) (0.0420) (0.0419) (0.0419) 
Government Intervention 0.0435 0.0423 0.0484 0.0697 0.0572 0.0545 0.0570 0.0769 
 (0.0768) (0.0763) (0.0792) (0.0750) (0.0816) (0.0818) (0.0821) (0.0797) 
Defense Expenditures 89.92* 95.56* 90.50* 102.7** 86.56* 91.80* 87.52* 100.0** 
 (47.11) (51.65) (47.01) (46.32) (47.09) (52.04) (47.07) (45.94) 
Political Press Freedom -0.172 -0.177 -0.151 -0.117 -0.161 -0.166 -0.153 -0.120 
 (0.179) (0.176) (0.186) (0.177) (0.180) (0.177) (0.188) (0.178) 
Constant -82.97** -84.57** -85.79** -86.32** -81.19* -82.61* -82.98* -83.87** 
 (40.32) (41.09) (41.52) (39.46) (40.87) (41.72) (41.81) (39.88) 
         
Observations 191 190 191 191 191 190 191 191 
R-squared 0.253 0.258 0.256 0.275 0.258 0.260 0.258 0.276 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 

















Table 10: Total media concentration and corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 
         
Total HHI -3.456 -3.712 -4.255 -3.301 -11.79 -12.64 -11.85 -11.82 
 (5.850) (7.110) (5.527) (7.139) (9.115) (11.70) (9.132) (11.38) 
Shares of Public TV 7.072 6.167 37.28* 26.53     
 (6.203) (4.841) (20.02) (20.34)     
(Shares of Public TV)2   -25.75 -16.57     
   (16.17) (15.52)     
Shares of Public Press 6.239 -5.995 97.99 -11.39     
 (21.72) (11.34) (165.2) (146.8)     
(Shares of Public Press)2   -118.9 9.389     
   (195.3) (185.4)     
Private HHI TV     14.39* 13.64* -15.54 -19.02 
     (7.967) (7.672) (14.13) (16.95) 
(Private HHI TV)2       23.06* 28.38* 
       (11.35) (15.27) 
Private HHI Press     -4.479 -0.656 -3.559 -7.338 
     (2.928) (4.930) (24.53) (27.94) 
(Private HHI Press)2       -0.960 6.734 
       (22.02) (25.03) 
Economic Freedom  0.326*  0.327**  0.299  0.289 
  (0.160)  (0.160)  (0.178)  (0.180) 
Murdered Journalists  0.860**  0.804**  1.001**  0.948** 
  (0.329)  (0.294)  (0.459)  (0.429) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate  -0.313  -0.347  -0.289  -0.380 
  (0.270)  (0.278)  (0.331)  (0.312) 
Human Capital  -10.48  -9.714  -7.851  -5.805 
  (6.430)  (7.001)  (7.162)  (7.196) 
log(RGDPa)  26.96**  26.05**  24.41**  27.02** 
  (11.13)  (11.19)  (10.81)  (10.44) 
Trade Openness  0.0386  0.0394  0.0447  0.0346 
  (0.0469)  (0.0489)  (0.0484)  (0.0477) 
Government Intervention  0.0673  0.0838  0.0470  0.0679 
  (0.0870)  (0.0921)  (0.0796)  (0.0752) 
Defense Expenditures  25.97  21.19  47.45  71.47 
  (75.67)  (75.97)  (89.61)  (86.57) 
Political Press Freedom Index  -0.106  -0.0955  -0.00270  -0.0208 
  (0.222)  (0.221)  (0.258)  (0.242) 
Constant 55.19*** -26.39 53.81*** -27.02 56.37*** -26.60 61.88*** -29.87 
 (5.817) (65.35) (6.598) (68.34) (4.732) (65.98) (4.859) (62.31) 
         
Observations 196 183 196 183 151 143 151 143 
R-squared 0.014 0.253 0.038 0.259 0.077 0.295 0.095 0.314 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 28 28 28 28 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 

















Table 11: Total media concentration and additional heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
         
Total HHI * Public TV 15.78**    12.96    
 (7.311)    (11.01)    
Total HHI * Public Press  -1.018    -2.676   
  (7.738)    (9.956)   
Total HHI * Private HHI TV   -8.303    -9.763  
   (5.824)    (8.263)  
Total HHI * Private HHI Press    4.514    16.81 
    (6.998)    (19.18) 
Public TV     3.094    
     (8.198)    
Public Press      3.085   
      (8.075)   
Private HHI TV       1.549  
       (7.396)  
Private HHI Press        -5.679 
        (8.040) 
Total HHI -7.439 -2.972 1.549 -10.37 -6.290 -2.923 2.611 -12.77 
 (5.319) (2.847) (6.680) (8.748) (5.717) (2.867) (8.415) (9.871) 
Economic Freedom 0.236* 0.325** 0.202 0.381** 0.241* 0.327** 0.200 0.383** 
 (0.128) (0.154) (0.140) (0.147) (0.130) (0.153) (0.140) (0.147) 
Murdered Journalists 0.664 0.769** 1.848*** 0.645 0.730 0.795** 1.868*** 0.547 
 (0.552) (0.322) (0.644) (0.453) (0.499) (0.313) (0.650) (0.470) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.296 -0.221 -0.314 -0.443 -0.307 -0.223 -0.319 -0.453 
 (0.234) (0.237) (0.216) (0.265) (0.240) (0.240) (0.209) (0.270) 
Human Capital -4.677 -9.262* -3.822 -10.58* -4.462 -9.230* -3.884 -10.41* 
 (4.777) (4.971) (5.011) (5.621) (4.794) (4.961) (5.066) (5.610) 
log(RGDPa) 29.21*** 22.02** 36.80*** 18.26** 29.10*** 22.01** 36.79*** 17.86** 
 (8.472) (9.016) (10.36) (8.603) (8.572) (9.004) (10.35) (8.564) 
Trade Openness 0.0445 0.0513 0.0197 0.0683 0.0444 0.0508 0.0207 0.0667 
 (0.0415) (0.0458) (0.0376) (0.0491) (0.0417) (0.0463) (0.0374) (0.0490) 
Government Intervention 0.0498 0.0395 0.0229 0.0429 0.0504 0.0390 0.0245 0.0420 
 (0.0759) (0.0766) (0.0837) (0.0705) (0.0744) (0.0765) (0.0806) (0.0714) 
Defense Expenditures 58.51 -15.11 111.3** -27.20 59.90 -13.35 111.3** -28.45 
 (53.47) (54.71) (53.80) (59.58) (53.90) (55.86) (53.83) (60.30) 
Political Press Freedom -0.199 -0.172 -0.268 -0.0914 -0.197 -0.175 -0.259 -0.102 
 (0.182) (0.177) (0.203) (0.193) (0.181) (0.179) (0.202) (0.192) 
Constant -49.87 -8.434 -79.77* 27.51 -50.60 -8.684 -80.08* 31.34 
 (40.95) (51.01) (44.77) (44.21) (40.90) (51.24) (45.26) (43.77) 
         
Observations 203 305 198 188 203 305 198 188 
R-squared 0.228 0.203 0.248 0.280 0.229 0.204 0.248 0.281 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 
















Table 12: Total TV concentration and corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CPI Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 
           
Total HHI TV -36.14*** 12.84 -40.83** 9.169 21.97 -3.909 -44.37 -17.60 177.3 3.279 
 (7.769) (8.176) (19.92) (7.369) (47.61) (16.67) (40.86) (18.59) (110.2) (20.67) 
(Total HHI TV)
2     -50.15 16.74 60.91 28.00* -201.5* 7.835 
     (38.69) (13.87) (38.59) (15.98) (108.2) (19.25) 
Public TV   2.442 6.394   143.5*** 33.63*   
   (20.24) (3.960)   (46.40) (19.19)   
(Public TV)
2       -176.3*** -22.74   
       (56.27) (14.61)   
Private HHI TV   -7.241 -4.660     -63.02 -30.94** 
   (10.27) (4.187)     (78.90) (12.76) 
(Private HHI TV)
2         19.00 26.23** 
         (57.73) (11.13) 
Economic Freedom  0.229  0.266*  0.254*  0.253*  0.252* 
  (0.136)  (0.133)  (0.139)  (0.137)  (0.133) 
Murdered Journalists  1.977***  1.705***  1.889***  1.685***  1.730*** 
  (0.683)  (0.560)  (0.622)  (0.582)  (0.620) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate  -0.279  -0.227  -0.213  -0.274  -0.230 
  (0.237)  (0.206)  (0.205)  (0.215)  (0.175) 
Human Capital  -4.276  -4.444  -3.608  -1.727  -3.216 
  (4.388)  (4.332)  (4.546)  (5.102)  (4.455) 
log(RGDPa)  32.34***  32.31***  32.45***  30.88***  33.38*** 
  (8.925)  (8.936)  (8.753)  (8.626)  (8.569) 
Trade Openness  0.0407  0.0400  0.0365  0.0340  0.0316 
  (0.0433)  (0.0429)  (0.0412)  (0.0431)  (0.0421) 
Government Intervention  0.0523  0.0479  0.0483  0.0742  0.0684 
  (0.0828)  (0.0799)  (0.0823)  (0.0828)  (0.0764) 
Defense Expenditures  91.06*  86.98*  97.44*  92.80*  104.1** 
  (47.07)  (46.25)  (48.18)  (47.19)  (46.82) 
Political Press Freedom Index  -0.153  -0.171  -0.121  -0.0809  -0.119 
  (0.181)  (0.190)  (0.175)  (0.175)  (0.178) 
Constant 72.69*** -72.96* 76.53*** -78.54* 61.81*** -81.10* 50.33*** -81.18* 58.58*** -80.67** 
 (6.001) (42.29) (7.895) (39.82) (10.32) (40.61) (12.70) (40.61) (12.66) (38.61) 
           
Observations 202 191 202 191 202 191 202 191 202 191 
R-squared 0.250 0.238 0.259 0.252 0.275 0.247 0.470 0.266 0.390 0.269 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 



















Table A1: Pairwise Correlation
CPI 1.0
Total HHI -0.4 1.0
Shares of Public 
TV -0.3 0.7 1.0
Total HHI TV -0.5 0.9 0.8 1.0
Private HHI TV -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 1.0
Shares of Public 
Newspapers
-0.2 -0.1 -0.1 1.0
Total HHI 
Newspapers -0.6 0.9 0.8 0.9 -0.6 1.0
Private HHI 
Newspapers -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 0.5 0.4 -0.5 1.0
Political Rights -0.7 0.4 0.6 0.8 -0.4 0.2 0.9 -0.4 1.0
Civil Liberties -0.8 0.5 0.6 0.8 -0.4 0.1 0.8 -0.4 0.9 1.0
Economic 
Freedom 0.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 -0.7 1.0
Total Rents -0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 -0.3 1.0
Murdered 
Journalists -0.4 0.2          0.2 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.3 1.0
Imprisoned 
Journalists -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 -0.3 0.5 -0.3 0.5 0.5 -0.3 1.0
Primary School 0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.5 -0.5 0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 1.0
Human Capital 0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 1.0
Log(RGDA) 0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.7 0.3 -0.6 -0.7 0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.7 0.8 1.0
Democracy 
Stability 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.0
Trade Openness 0.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.0
Government 
Expenditures -0.6 0.3 0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.5 -0.2 0.5 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 1.0
Defense 
Expenditures -0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.4 -0.2 0.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 1.0
Majoritarian Rule -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2          -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0
Executive 0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.3          0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 1.0
Legal Press 
Freedom -0.7 0.4 0.6 0.7 -0.4 0.3 0.8 -0.2 0.9 0.8 -0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 0.5 0.4 -0.4 1.0
Political Press 
Freedom -0.8 0.4 0.4 0.6 -0.3 0.2 0.7 -0.2 0.8 0.8 -0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.9 1.0
Economic Press 
Freedom




Table A2: Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
      
CPI 547 61.56 22.12 21 100 
Total HHI 408 0.454 0.284 0.0315 1 
Public TV Shares 234 0.430 0.350 0 1 
Total HHI TV 204 0.431 0.312 0.0743 1 
Private HHI TV 212 0.437 0.339 0 1 
Public Press Shares 410 0.108 0.295 0 1 
Total HHI Press 202 0.368 0.320 0.0188 1 
Private HHI Press 202 0.240 0.181 0 0.887 
Economic Freedom 547 66.76 8.995 45.10 83.10 
Murdered Journalists 551 0.223 0.674 0 6 
Primary School Enrollment Rate 551 96.87 3.778 83.87 100 
Human Capital 551 2.926 0.541 1.601 3.726 
Log(RGDPa) 551 4.361 0.300 3.314 4.751 
Trade Openness 551 65.62 34.22 15.64 196.4 
Government Intervention 547 53.39 25.48 0 95.90 
Defense Expenditures 519 0.0587 0.0401 0.00882 0.203 
Political Press Freedom Index 551 11.71 8.122 1 35 
























Table A3: Variables description 
   
VARIABLES Description Sources 
   
CPI 
Corruption Perception Index: subjective measure of corruption with a range between 0 





It is the mean of the total Herfindahl Hirschman Index (of both public and private 
medias) of all the medias types. The average is done on all 13 media types, with equal 
weights. (0-1 Scale) 
 
“Who owns world‟s media?” (E. Noam) 
 
 
Shares of Public TV 
It represents the sum of market shares of public TV channels. 
 
 
“Who owns world‟s media?” (E. Noam) 
 
 
Shares of Public Press 
It represents the sum of market shares of public press. 
 
 
“Who owns world‟s media?” (E. Noam) 
 
 
Private HHI TV 
It corresponds to the HHI applied to the private entities in the TV market. It gives the 
level of competition within the private sector in the TV market. (0-1 Scale) 
 
 
“Who owns world‟s media?” (E. Noam) 
 
 
Private HHI Press 
It corresponds to the HHI applied to the private entities in the press market. It gives the 
level of competition within the private sector in the Press market. (0-1 Scale) 
 
 





Political Rights Index: from 1 to 7 (lowest degree of freedom). 
 
Freedom House 
Civil Liberties Civil Liberties Index: from 1  to 7 (lowest degree of freedom). Freedom House 
Economic Freedom 
 
The Index of Economic Freedom:  from 0 to 100 (highest degree of freedom). 
 
Heritage Foundation 
Total Rents It is the total natural resources rents (as a % of GDP) of a country. World Bank 
Murdered Journalists 
 
It is the number of journalists murdered in each country. 
 
 
Committee to Protect Journalists 
Imprisoned Journalists 
 
It is the number of journalists jailed in each country. 
 
Committee to Protect Journalists 
 
Primary School Enrolment Rate 





Human Capital Index per person (which is based on the average years of schooling and 
the return to education) 
 
Penn World Tables 
Log(RGDPa) 
 






Proxy for the stability of democracy. It is a dummy equal to 1 when the democracy has 
been continuous for more than 50 years, and it is equal to 0 otherwise 
 
Our World in Data 
Trade Openness 
 
Trade openness index measured as the sum of imports and exports expressed as a share 









Military expenditures divided by the GDP SIPRI 
Majoritarian Rule 
 




Index for the chief executive system of election. It is equal to 2 for a Parliamentary 
system, 1 for an Assembly-elected President, and 0 for a Presidential system 
Inter-American Development Bank 
 
Legal Press Freedom Index 
 
 
Sub-component accounting for the legal environment in the aggregate freedom of the 





Political Press Freedom Index 
 
 





Economic Press Freedom Index 
 
 
Sub-component accounting for the economic environment in the aggregate freedom of 








Table A4: Public TV and corruption (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CPI Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Shares of Public TV 9.911* 10.34* 10.67** 
 (5.546) (5.562) (5.016) 
Total HHI  -0.799  
  (4.619)  
Private HHI TV   -6.640 
   (4.793) 
Economic Freedom 0.281** 0.281** 0.304** 
 (0.103) (0.125) (0.129) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.292 -0.366 -0.265 
 (0.271) (0.287) (0.215) 
Human Capital -4.066 -4.172 -4.225 
 (4.571) (4.954) (4.562) 
log(RGDPa) 27.20*** 26.90*** 29.67*** 
 (8.034) (8.594) (8.087) 
Trade Openness 0.0283 0.0447 0.0382 
 (0.0390) (0.0402) (0.0393) 
Government Intervention 0.0372 0.0415 0.0307 
 (0.0730) (0.0751) (0.0757) 
Defense Expenditures 58.07 60.97 75.72 
 (51.46) (56.35) (46.94) 
Political Press Freedom -0.139 -0.148 -0.168 
 (0.142) (0.150) (0.179) 
Constant -49.72 -41.44 -61.86 
 (44.03) (44.31) (36.90) 
    
Observations 216 203 191 
R-squared 0.198 0.205 0.221 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 

























Table A5: Public press and corruption (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CPI Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Shares of Public Press 1.307 1.259 1.627 
 (6.949) (6.320) (5.499) 
Total HHI  -3.131  
  (2.819)  
Private HHI Press   0.332 
   (3.619) 
Economic Freedom 0.260** 0.331** 0.383** 
 (0.125) (0.155) (0.146) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.0412 -0.221 -0.399 
 (0.220) (0.237) (0.265) 
Human Capital -9.391 -9.968** -10.39* 
 (6.370) (4.837) (5.512) 
log(RGDPa) 20.88** 21.29** 15.63** 
 (8.675) (8.900) (7.104) 
Trade Openness 0.0426 0.0557 0.0751 
 (0.0437) (0.0450) (0.0509) 
Government Intervention 0.0201 0.0430 0.0454 
 (0.0668) (0.0768) (0.0766) 
Defense Expenditures -15.74 -20.27 -52.75 
 (61.81) (52.26) (43.78) 
Political Press Freedom -0.220 -0.158 -0.0647 
 (0.183) (0.173) (0.211) 
Constant -14.02 -4.036 30.61 
 (50.30) (49.66) (42.98) 
    
Observations 388 305 189 
R-squared 0.127 0.200 0.251 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 













Table A6: Public TV and corruption: quadratic impact (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Shares of Public TV 20.64 22.21 35.56** 31.83* 
 (20.17) (19.95) (16.40) (15.99) 
(Shares of Public TV)
2
 -8.735 -9.784 -20.05 -19.42 
 (17.57) (17.11) (13.30) (14.02) 
Total HHI  -0.257   
  (4.658)   
Private HHI TV   -8.684* -34.62*** 
   (4.523) (11.53) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
   24.65** 
    (10.43) 
Economic Freedom 0.274** 0.274** 0.294** 0.281** 
 (0.102) (0.125) (0.128) (0.127) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.325 -0.405 -0.313 -0.334 
 (0.270) (0.288) (0.222) (0.206) 
Human Capital -3.664 -3.666 -3.580 -2.672 
 (4.747) (5.220) (4.908) (4.917) 
log(RGDPa) 26.83*** 26.35*** 29.09*** 30.02*** 
 (7.912) (8.500) (8.168) (7.839) 
Trade Openness 0.0272 0.0447 0.0351 0.0289 
 (0.0400) (0.0410) (0.0403) (0.0402) 
Government Intervention 0.0466 0.0530 0.0528 0.0720 
 (0.0809) (0.0829) (0.0810) (0.0788) 
Defense Expenditures 56.16 57.80 70.73 82.86* 
 (50.75) (55.51) (46.52) (44.89) 
Political Press Freedom -0.135 -0.138 -0.160 -0.132 
 (0.143) (0.151) (0.179) (0.170) 
Constant -48.00 -39.40 -61.12 -61.11 
 (44.13) (44.61) (37.96) (36.06) 
     
Observations 216 203 191 191 
R-squared 0.200 0.207 0.232 0.249 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 












Table A7: Public Press and corruption: quadratic impact (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Shares of Public Press 6.244 8.987 12.38 11.90* 
 (7.511) (8.377) (7.822) (6.613) 
(Shares of Public Press)
2
 -10.42 -16.30* -22.15** -20.00*** 
 (7.758) (8.094) (8.425) (6.637) 
Total HHI  -3.141   
  (2.824)   
Private HHI Press   -0.605 -6.237 
   (3.389) (20.18) 
(Private HHI Press)
2 
   5.381 
    (17.15) 
Economic Freedom 0.261** 0.334** 0.385** 0.388** 
 (0.126) (0.157) (0.147) (0.148) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.0432 -0.225 -0.401 -0.405 
 (0.221) (0.240) (0.264) (0.265) 
Human Capital -9.416 -10.02** -10.47* -10.52* 
 (6.381) (4.854) (5.537) (5.579) 
log(RGDPa) 20.81** 21.15** 15.39** 15.24** 
 (8.702) (8.930) (7.108) (7.094) 
Trade Openness 0.0429 0.0562 0.0756 0.0760 
 (0.0439) (0.0452) (0.0511) (0.0505) 
Government Intervention 0.0202 0.0431 0.0444 0.0429 
 (0.0669) (0.0770) (0.0769) (0.0776) 
Defense Expenditures -16.20 -21.20 -54.15 -54.18 
 (62.00) (52.54) (43.81) (44.26) 
Political Press Freedom -0.218 -0.154 -0.0576 -0.0541 
 (0.183) (0.173) (0.211) (0.211) 
Constant -13.11 -2.290 33.92 35.59 
 (50.57) (50.11) (43.21) (44.22) 
     
Observations 388 305 189 189 
R-squared 0.127 0.201 0.253 0.253 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 











Table A8: Heterogeneous effects (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
           
Public TV Shares * Economic Freedom 0.163*          
 (0.0830)          
Public TV Shares * Log(RGDPa)  2.902**         
  (1.249)         
Public TV Shares * Defense Expenditures   73.52        
   (53.56)        
Public TV Shares * Human Capital    3.342       
    (1.978)       
Public TV Shares * Primary School Enrollment Rate     0.0776      
     (0.0462)      
Public Press Shares * Economic Freedom      0.0748     
      (0.122)     
Public Press Shares * Log(RGDPa)       1.485    
       (1.373)    
Public Press Shares * Defense Expenditures        -6.146   
        (51.74)   
Public Press Shares * Human Capital         -0.570  
         (3.420)  
Public Press Shares * Primary School Enrollment Rate          -0.0214 
          (0.0893) 
Economic Freedom  0.297*** 0.282** 0.255** 0.271**  0.322*** 0.254** 0.247* 0.258** 
  (0.0965) (0.113) (0.106) (0.110)  (0.109) (0.121) (0.123) (0.121) 
Log(RGDPa) 27.96***  28.86*** 25.70*** 24.45*** 25.54***  21.90** 18.26* 20.64** 
 (8.008)  (7.834) (8.111) (8.030) (8.704)  (8.955) (9.503) (8.784) 
Defense Expenditures 67.66 -45.59  78.39 45.93 8.515 -89.95*  14.46 -17.15 
 (51.68) (44.26)  (49.04) (49.69) (60.59) (48.01)  (60.18) (61.57) 
Human Capital -2.159 -1.943 -4.723  -5.357 -8.897 -7.343 -8.851  -9.247 
 (5.002) (4.900) (4.489)  (4.111) (6.389) (6.438) (5.579)  (6.435) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.319 -0.171 -0.289 -0.350  -0.00685 0.0182 -0.0378 -0.00556  
 (0.265) (0.253) (0.286) (0.262)  (0.214) (0.235) (0.224) (0.238)  
Trade Openness 0.0231 0.0631 0.0213 0.0143 0.0144 0.0328 0.0667 0.0417 0.0222 0.0422 
 (0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0387) (0.0413) (0.0341) (0.0436) (0.0408) (0.0428) (0.0473) (0.0431) 
Government Intervention 0.0802 0.0500 0.0216 0.0408 0.0216 0.0774 0.0213 0.0198 0.00513 0.0199 
 (0.0743) (0.0764) (0.0771) (0.0716) (0.0768) (0.0559) (0.0695) (0.0671) (0.0657) (0.0669) 
Political Press Freedom Index -0.137 0.0265 -0.162 -0.178 -0.0755 -0.230 -0.145 -0.219 -0.278 -0.220 
 (0.137) (0.130) (0.144) (0.131) (0.143) (0.197) (0.174) (0.187) (0.176) (0.179) 
Constant -40.47 49.30* -48.00 -47.47 -58.97 -25.56 62.94* -20.65 -31.73 -16.85 
 (41.49) (26.25) (47.18) (43.09) (41.91) (50.17) (32.05) (37.24) (46.92) (46.84) 
           
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 388 388 388 388 388 
R-squared 0.165 0.141 0.178 0.191 0.173 0.105 0.103 0.127 0.111 0.127 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 






















Table A9: Additional heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
       
Public TV Shares * Trade Openness 0.106*      
 (0.0563)      
Public TV Shares * Government Intervention  0.0590     
  (0.123)     
Public TV Shares * Political Press Freedom   0.103    
   (0.179)    
Public Press Shares * Trade Openness    -0.0443   
    (0.0516)   
Public Press Shares * Government Intervention     0.106  
     (0.0716)  
Public Press Shares * Political Press Freedom      0.269 
      (0.162) 
Trade Openness  0.0155 0.0278  0.0392 0.0468 
  (0.0356) (0.0399)  (0.0428) (0.0447) 
Government Intervention 0.0475  0.0398 0.0201  0.0252 
 (0.0751)  (0.0835) (0.0668)  (0.0675) 
Political Press Freedom -0.133 -0.187  -0.233 -0.225  
 (0.141) (0.154)  (0.183) (0.179)  
Economic Freedom 0.261** 0.263** 0.254** 0.238* 0.274** 0.271** 
 (0.101) (0.117) (0.111) (0.124) (0.107) (0.122) 
Murdered Journalists 0.605 0.732 0.505 0.486 0.485 0.368 
 (0.718) (0.766) (0.833) (0.513) (0.480) (0.497) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.297 -0.285 -0.209 -0.0305 -0.0372 0.0381 
 (0.238) (0.272) (0.263) (0.221) (0.212) (0.207) 
Human Capital -4.461 -4.481 -6.050 -8.026 -8.953 -10.03 
 (4.787) (4.635) (4.582) (6.897) (6.358) (6.298) 
Log(RGDPa) 26.13*** 29.46*** 23.10*** 24.95** 22.70** 15.72* 
 (8.093) (8.366) (8.042) (9.157) (8.941) (8.744) 
Defense Expenditures 65.31 64.68 48.06 -2.955 -9.059 -11.85 
 (53.26) (51.22) (49.06) (61.59) (67.11) (64.34) 
Constant -40.48 -52.08 -30.71 -33.05 -24.48 -1.693 
 (44.11) (47.78) (47.38) (50.62) (55.19) (52.95) 
       
Observations 216 216 216 388 388 388 
R-squared 0.209 0.182 0.172 0.124 0.130 0.122 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 














Table A10: Additional heterogeneous effects (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
       
Public TV Shares * Trade Openness 0.111*      
 (0.0575)      
Public TV Shares * Government Intervention  0.0577     
  (0.125)     
Public TV Shares * Political Press Freedom   0.106    
   (0.179)    
Public Press Shares * Trade Openness    -0.0445   
    (0.0536)   
Public Press Shares * Government Intervention     0.0997  
     (0.0752)  
Public Press Shares * Political Press Freedom      0.267 
      (0.166) 
Trade Openness  0.0212 0.0307  0.0412 0.0482 
  (0.0371) (0.0404)  (0.0434) (0.0452) 
Government Intervention 0.0449  0.0364 0.0204  0.0254 
 (0.0750)  (0.0826) (0.0670)  (0.0676) 
Political Press Freedom -0.105 -0.151  -0.231 -0.223  
 (0.135) (0.144)  (0.184) (0.180)  
Economic Freedom 0.275*** 0.277** 0.267** 0.243* 0.281** 0.275** 
 (0.0987) (0.116) (0.108) (0.123) (0.107) (0.120) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.302 -0.295 -0.224 -0.0350 -0.0420 0.0339 
 (0.248) (0.286) (0.274) (0.224) (0.213) (0.210) 
Human Capital -4.475 -4.667 -5.941 -8.312 -9.276 -10.28 
 (4.802) (4.709) (4.589) (6.819) (6.275) (6.204) 
Log(RGDPa) 24.81*** 27.77*** 22.44*** 24.55** 22.10** 15.37* 
 (7.847) (8.176) (8.072) (9.080) (8.825) (8.627) 
Defense Expenditures 60.03 57.45 45.20 -6.760 -13.29 -15.04 
 (53.08) (51.41) (49.37) (60.44) (65.58) (62.91) 
Constant -35.17 -44.38 -27.27 -30.12 -20.73 0.848 
 (44.41) (48.59) (48.39) (50.05) (54.45) (52.29) 
       
Observations 216 216 216 388 388 388 
R-squared 0.204 0.176 0.169 0.123 0.129 0.122 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 
















Table A11: Heterogeneous effects with main effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
         
Public TV * Economic Freedom 0.274        
 (0.342)        
Public TV * Primary School Enrollment  -0.706       
  (0.428)       
Public TV * Human Capital   -0.302      
   (7.285)      
Public TV * Log(RGDPa)    20.81***     
    (4.489)     
Public TV * Trade Openness     0.0817    
     (0.0594)    
Public TV * Government Intervention      -0.0319   
      (0.179)   
Public TV * Defense Expenditures       37.22  
       (66.78)  
Public TV * Press Freedom Index        -0.0630 
        (0.237) 
Public TV -7.852 77.18* 10.64 -81.49*** 5.353 10.30 7.945 10.63* 
 (22.39) (43.35) (20.96) (22.79) (5.749) (9.700) (7.191) (5.483) 
Economic Freedom  0.300*** 0.247** 0.251** 0.265** 0.315*** 0.280** 0.268** 
  (0.0932) (0.107) (0.0995) (0.101) (0.0995) (0.106) (0.108) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.332  -0.304 -0.279 -0.285 -0.253 -0.258 -0.234 
 (0.253)  (0.270) (0.248) (0.239) (0.247) (0.260) (0.253) 
Human Capital -2.267 -3.423  -0.410 -3.889 -3.805 -4.961 -5.525 
 (4.972) (4.591)  (5.167) (4.661) (4.455) (4.489) (4.335) 
Log(RGDPa) 29.82*** 28.54*** 28.05***  26.91*** 29.03*** 25.09** 25.62*** 
 (8.165) (8.440) (8.450)  (7.846) (8.808) (10.08) (8.651) 
Trade Openness 0.0161 0.0250 0.0115 0.0407  0.0183 0.0291 0.0299 
 (0.0391) (0.0369) (0.0397) (0.0400)  (0.0356) (0.0376) (0.0394) 
Government Intervention 0.0734 0.0371 0.0402 0.0652 0.0480  0.0365 0.0455 
 (0.0696) (0.0728) (0.0724) (0.0741) (0.0721)  (0.0736) (0.0748) 
Defense Expenditures 74.70 59.01 74.80 40.72 65.16 69.85  49.56 
 (50.81) (47.17) (51.01) (42.16) (52.13) (51.01)  (48.70) 
Political Press Freedom -0.180 -0.189 -0.205 -0.0599 -0.143 -0.185 -0.150  
 (0.150) (0.139) (0.143) (0.128) (0.139) (0.156) (0.163)  
Murdered Journalists 0.865 0.731 0.688 0.444 0.609 0.610 0.582 0.438 
 (0.734) (0.674) (0.742) (0.709) (0.713) (0.724) (0.702) (0.818) 
Constant -45.71 -86.10** -61.10 56.99** -48.43 -61.21 -37.86 -45.52 
 (40.88) (41.48) (45.69) (25.67) (40.87) (42.97) (50.75) (45.67) 
         
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 
R-squared 0.176 0.228 0.198 0.184 0.214 0.199 0.194 0.194 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 











Table A12: Heterogeneous effects with main effect (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
         
Public TV * Economic Freedom 0.302        
 (0.346)        
Public TV * Primary School Enrollment  -0.703       
  (0.450)       
Public TV * Human Capital   -0.480      
   (7.222)      
Public TV * Log(RGDPa)    20.22***     
    (4.363)     
Public TV * Trade Openness     0.0868    
     (0.0614)    
Public TV * Government Intervention      -0.0375   
      (0.179)   
Public TV * Defense Expenditures       30.41  
       (66.23)  
Public TV * Press Freedom Index        -0.0627 
        (0.238) 
Public TV -9.217 77.25 11.46 -78.70*** 5.321 10.80 8.568 10.80* 
 (22.81) (45.57) (20.64) (22.17) (5.866) (9.671) (7.109) (5.535) 
Economic Freedom  0.317*** 0.264** 0.262** 0.279*** 0.329*** 0.293*** 0.279** 
  (0.0924) (0.105) (0.0971) (0.0984) (0.0988) (0.105) (0.106) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.347  -0.311 -0.285 -0.290 -0.260 -0.265 -0.247 
 (0.266)  (0.281) (0.255) (0.249) (0.256) (0.269) (0.264) 
Human Capital -2.356 -3.634  -0.633 -3.907 -3.926 -5.059 -5.422 
 (5.033) (4.648)  (5.147) (4.693) (4.510) (4.502) (4.344) 
Log(RGDPa) 27.87*** 26.77*** 26.46***  25.58*** 27.63*** 23.66** 25.10*** 
 (7.799) (7.934) (8.276)  (7.601) (8.449) (9.879) (8.647) 
Trade Openness 0.0227 0.0306 0.0166 0.0435  0.0232 0.0338 0.0325 
 (0.0401) (0.0378) (0.0406) (0.0409)  (0.0369) (0.0390) (0.0398) 
Government Intervention 0.0719 0.0335 0.0370 0.0624 0.0454  0.0348 0.0426 
 (0.0700) (0.0730) (0.0722) (0.0736) (0.0721)  (0.0735) (0.0740) 
Defense Expenditures 66.41 51.15 67.74 37.77 59.84 64.13  47.11 
 (51.16) (46.56) (50.62) (41.86) (51.98) (50.79)  (48.90) 
Political Press Freedom -0.139 -0.152 -0.173 -0.0429 -0.114 -0.155 -0.121  
 (0.138) (0.129) (0.134) (0.125) (0.133) (0.146) (0.155)  
Constant -35.93 -79.13* -54.77 57.42** -43.04 -55.31 -32.07 -42.78 
 (40.14) (40.27) (46.04) (26.13) (41.31) (42.58) (51.15) (46.28) 
         
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 
R-squared 0.167 0.222 0.193 0.181 0.210 0.195 0.190 0.192 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 












Table A13: Public TV delayed effect / lagged variables (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 
         
Public TVt-1 
41.45** 49.49*** 49.71*** 41.22**     
 (17.30) (14.31) (11.67) (16.74)     
(Public TVt-1)
2 -30.21** -36.53*** -38.62*** -29.91**     
 (14.29) (10.96) (9.919) (13.62)     
Private TV HHIt-1 
 -4.688 -30.24**      
  (4.331) (14.27)      
(Private TV HHIt-1)
2   23.21*      
   (12.86)      
Total HHIt-1 
   -0.105     
    (4.039)     
Public TVt-2 
    14.66 22.08 20.03 14.98 
     (18.15) (17.48) (15.53) (17.73) 
(Public TVt-2)
2     -10.24 -15.74 -16.27 -10.93 
     (14.39) (12.28) (12.04) (13.74) 
Private TV HHIt-2 
     -3.598 -27.30  
      (6.310) (21.00)  
(Private TV HHIt-2)
2       21.24  
       (17.62)  
Total HHIt-2 
       1.335 
        (3.485) 
Economic Freedom 0.219** 0.218 0.228 0.271* 0.103 0.146 0.160 0.103 
 (0.103) (0.151) (0.152) (0.133) (0.171) (0.207) (0.202) (0.183) 
Primary School Enrollment -0.326 -0.308 -0.349* -0.385 -0.0492 -0.135 -0.243 -0.0885 
 (0.210) (0.197) (0.187) (0.231) (0.195) (0.202) (0.200) (0.191) 
Human Capital -8.637* -9.383* -7.845 -9.317* -4.648 -3.758 -1.696 -3.945 
 (4.675) (4.798) (5.104) (4.763) (4.762) (4.927) (5.144) (4.943) 
log(RGDPa) 16.36** 15.38** 16.96*** 16.90** 17.82** 20.20*** 22.12*** 17.54** 
 (6.882) (6.891) (6.086) (7.024) (7.456) (6.907) (6.031) (6.980) 
Trade Openness 0.0176 0.0266 0.0221 0.0348 0.0259 0.0287 0.0229 0.0358 
 (0.0399) (0.0410) (0.0393) (0.0406) (0.0393) (0.0372) (0.0343) (0.0364) 
Government Intervention 0.00390 0.00947 0.0264 -0.00385 -0.0173 -0.0332 -0.0171 -0.00851 
 (0.0481) (0.0509) (0.0534) (0.0514) (0.0481) (0.0537) (0.0620) (0.0548) 
Defense Expenditures -36.47 -38.48 -24.77 -28.03 14.74 44.72 64.13** 17.53 
 (43.84) (46.92) (39.68) (48.36) (47.81) (41.40) (31.21) (47.07) 
Political Press Freedom -0.185 -0.160 -0.176 -0.250 -0.135 -0.136 -0.173 -0.156 
 (0.156) (0.198) (0.185) (0.157) (0.172) (0.194) (0.193) (0.170) 
Constant 22.76 26.84 22.49 25.43 -12.57 -20.49 -21.21 -10.04 
 (41.15) (38.33) (32.87) (39.28) (33.64) (32.85) (30.87) (33.56) 
         
Observations 216 190 190 203 205 179 179 193 
R-squared 0.191 0.202 0.228 0.202 0.095 0.109 0.129 0.094 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 










Table A14: Public press delayed effect / lagged variables (without murdered journalists) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 
         
Public Presst-1 
14.58*** 32.71*** 20.85** 14.79***     
 (3.554) (10.67) (7.792) (4.005)     
(Public Presst-1)
2 -5.442 -36.08* -9.344 -7.167     
 (9.041) (17.86) (16.19) (8.003)     
Private Press HHIt-1 
 -5.108 -35.98*      
  (3.092) (20.53)      
(Private Press HHIt-1)
2   30.37      
   (18.56)      
Total HHIt-1 
   -1.996     
    (1.835)     
Public Presst-2 
    32.15** 26.76 18.76 27.95** 
     (12.60) (17.96) (18.00) (12.66) 
(Public Presst-2)
2     -20.61 -13.51 5.201 -15.00 
     (19.71) (29.40) (34.96) (19.28) 
Private Press HHIt-2 
     1.658 -22.01  
      (3.987) (22.82)  
(Private Press HHIt-2)
2       22.65  
       (19.15)  
Total HHIt-2 
       -0.0329 
        (1.121) 
Economic Freedom 0.211* 0.166 0.154 0.216 0.166 0.155 0.129 0.166 
 (0.110) (0.144) (0.128) (0.141) (0.105) (0.168) (0.158) (0.167) 
Primary School Enrollment -0.0762 -0.356 -0.379 -0.173 -0.0779 -0.267 -0.259 -0.104 
 (0.213) (0.285) (0.279) (0.249) (0.236) (0.303) (0.284) (0.265) 
Human Capital -13.72** -15.24** -16.11** -14.40** -15.26** -8.923 -9.551 -13.57** 
 (5.950) (6.626) (6.857) (5.478) (5.756) (6.610) (6.767) (5.747) 
log(RGDPa) 18.79** 15.14* 13.16 18.38** 17.05* 11.94 11.23 15.19* 
 (8.145) (8.812) (8.610) (8.678) (8.723) (8.614) (8.274) (8.414) 
Trade Openness 0.0293 0.0291 0.0398 0.0269 0.0218 0.0550 0.0555 0.0228 
 (0.0338) (0.0382) (0.0369) (0.0359) (0.0321) (0.0445) (0.0451) (0.0362) 
Government Intervention -0.00479 0.0347 0.0415 0.0469 -0.0638 -0.0570 -0.0469 -0.0291 
 (0.0587) (0.0423) (0.0451) (0.0506) (0.0456) (0.0446) (0.0453) (0.0541) 
Defense Expenditures -18.75 -60.61 -70.64 -32.24 -32.69 -32.50 -37.13 -44.47 
 (56.10) (66.04) (68.44) (59.24) (59.74) (71.06) (69.84) (59.38) 
Political Press Freedom -0.0950 -0.0792 -0.0377 -0.0896 -0.0428 -0.0614 -0.0324 -0.0528 
 (0.150) (0.197) (0.193) (0.163) (0.156) (0.181) (0.181) (0.175) 
Constant 15.16 63.15 78.77 25.52 33.86 47.43 54.59 36.59 
 (44.52) (52.94) (52.47) (48.32) (48.23) (57.91) (56.09) (50.12) 
         
Observations 387 187 187 304 379 178 178 297 
R-squared 0.115 0.195 0.215 0.163 0.130 0.156 0.164 0.131 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 












Table A15: Heterogeneous trends (without the murdered journalist variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 
         
Public TV * Pre-2002 1.100 1.112 1.039 1.040     
 (1.532) (1.440) (1.442) (1.461)     
Public TV * Post-2002     2.281 2.253 2.665* 1.976 
     (1.440) (1.398) (1.364) (1.462) 
Total HHI  1.959    2.371   
  (4.350)    (4.665)   
Private HHI TV   -4.237 -35.84**   -5.483 -33.22** 
   (5.560) (13.00)   (5.834) (14.12) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
   29.71**    26.33** 
    (10.86)    (12.14) 
Economic Freedom 0.293*** 0.322** 0.317** 0.311** 0.272** 0.305** 0.299** 0.295** 
 (0.100) (0.125) (0.130) (0.129) (0.103) (0.129) (0.130) (0.127) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.144 -0.221 -0.144 -0.159 -0.168 -0.244 -0.144 -0.160 
 (0.266) (0.267) (0.223) (0.211) (0.282) (0.280) (0.215) (0.207) 
Human Capital -2.242 -2.215 -2.660 -1.391 -3.271 -3.235 -4.017 -2.656 
 (5.218) (5.623) (5.374) (5.141) (5.259) (5.679) (5.436) (5.272) 
log(RGDPa) 0.0625 0.0826** 0.0767* 0.0736* 0.0426 0.0636 0.0543 0.0554 
 (0.0381) (0.0390) (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0388) (0.0406) (0.0385) (0.0391) 
Trade Openness 0.0361 0.0382 0.0310 0.0584 0.0274 0.0290 0.0202 0.0470 
 (0.0884) (0.0921) (0.0945) (0.0879) (0.0856) (0.0893) (0.0909) (0.0865) 
Government Intervention -63.31 -61.62 -56.32 -48.00 -41.27 -39.80 -33.92 -30.45 
 (56.88) (58.08) (61.00) (62.41) (52.15) (53.79) (56.07) (57.38) 
Defense Expenditures 0.0467 0.0526 0.0631 0.106 -0.00274 0.000634 -0.00664 0.0453 
 (0.143) (0.148) (0.162) (0.149) (0.123) (0.127) (0.143) (0.139) 
Constant 54.51* 59.22** 56.08** 56.87** 61.73** 65.72** 62.51** 62.44** 
 (28.05) (28.14) (25.68) (23.91) (29.44) (28.69) (24.50) (23.09) 
         
Observations 216 203 191 191 216 203 191 191 
R-squared 0.103 0.113 0.109 0.137 0.111 0.121 0.121 0.142 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 















Table A16: Public TV and corruption relationship: exclusion of outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
         
Shares of Public TV 4.138 3.094 4.413 3.994 12.58 16.49 27.06* 26.51* 
 (5.610) (5.255) (4.735) (4.555) (18.17) (17.00) (15.26) (14.84) 
(Shares of Public TV)
2
     -6.880 -11.14 -18.25 -18.09 
     (16.13) (14.04) (11.84) (11.82) 
Total HHI  2.952    3.642   
  (4.128)    (4.099)   
Private HHI TV   -6.548* -11.20   -8.610** -12.42 
   (3.792) (12.42)   (3.510) (11.58) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
   4.430    3.648 
    (12.57)    (10.95) 
Economic Freedom 0.246** 0.243* 0.245* 0.242* 0.244** 0.238* 0.252* 0.249* 
 (0.0986) (0.133) (0.125) (0.127) (0.0975) (0.132) (0.126) (0.128) 
Murdered Journalists 0.539 1.090* 1.371*** 1.370*** 0.523 1.100* 1.240*** 1.240*** 
 (0.628) (0.562) (0.409) (0.415) (0.641) (0.568) (0.430) (0.435) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.211 -0.279 -0.190 -0.195 -0.239 -0.323 -0.239 -0.243 
 (0.248) (0.235) (0.189) (0.189) (0.244) (0.242) (0.199) (0.200) 
Human Capital -8.742 -8.218 -8.668 -8.423 -8.342 -7.579 -7.869 -7.674 
 (5.961) (6.413) (6.062) (6.229) (5.988) (6.605) (6.272) (6.453) 
log(RGDPa) 28.60*** 28.40*** 32.66*** 32.82*** 28.28*** 27.74*** 32.00*** 32.14*** 
 (8.243) (8.590) (8.628) (8.500) (8.173) (8.623) (8.737) (8.624) 
Trade Openness 0.0116 0.0293 0.0166 0.0157 0.0107 0.0290 0.0141 0.0134 
 (0.0328) (0.0354) (0.0338) (0.0343) (0.0340) (0.0365) (0.0354) (0.0359) 
Government Intervention -0.0166 -0.00941 -0.0170 -0.0123 -0.0102 0.00142 -0.000353 0.00337 
 (0.0627) (0.0664) (0.0676) (0.0688) (0.0663) (0.0690) (0.0683) (0.0716) 
Defense Expenditures 44.97 45.13 70.27 72.68 43.69 41.59 66.13 68.15 
 (49.30) (52.20) (44.90) (44.37) (49.45) (52.21) (46.05) (45.65) 
Political Press Freedom -0.184 -0.193 -0.231 -0.226 -0.181 -0.182 -0.225 -0.221 
 (0.151) (0.172) (0.187) (0.188) (0.151) (0.172) (0.185) (0.185) 
Constant -39.62 -34.73 -57.09 -57.29 -38.33 -32.54 -56.76 -56.92 
 (46.21) (45.55) (41.53) (41.12) (46.39) (46.24) (42.27) (41.93) 
         
Observations 211 198 186 186 211 198 186 186 
R-squared 0.204 0.220 0.253 0.254 0.206 0.225 0.265 0.265 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 



























Table A17: Public TV and corruption relationship: exclusion of outliers (without the murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
         
Shares of Public TV 4.325 3.799 4.988 4.554 13.39 16.79 30.42** 29.87** 
 (5.690) (5.463) (4.860) (4.706) (18.02) (17.14) (14.47) (14.08) 
(Shares of Public TV)
2
     -7.393 -10.80 -20.54* -20.38* 
     (16.15) (14.53) (11.36) (11.35) 
Total HHI  2.000    2.660   
  (4.206)    (4.179)   
Private HHI TV   -7.712* -12.52   -9.908** -13.75 
   (3.966) (12.87)   (3.618) (11.86) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
   4.575    3.679 
    (12.79)    (11.01) 
Economic Freedom 0.258** 0.265* 0.281** 0.278** 0.255** 0.261* 0.285** 0.282** 
 (0.0942) (0.132) (0.118) (0.119) (0.0928) (0.132) (0.117) (0.119) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.214 -0.276 -0.172 -0.177 -0.244 -0.318 -0.229 -0.233 
 (0.257) (0.256) (0.200) (0.199) (0.252) (0.260) (0.206) (0.207) 
Human Capital -9.008 -8.959 -9.427 -9.173 -8.570 -8.346 -8.445 -8.249 
 (6.070) (6.545) (6.106) (6.278) (6.100) (6.702) (6.301) (6.489) 
log(RGDPa) 27.31*** 26.32*** 30.32*** 30.49*** 27.01*** 25.67*** 29.83*** 29.97*** 
 (7.954) (8.426) (8.112) (7.992) (7.873) (8.398) (8.196) (8.098) 
Trade Openness 0.0160 0.0362 0.0243 0.0233 0.0149 0.0360 0.0207 0.0199 
 (0.0339) (0.0365) (0.0337) (0.0342) (0.0353) (0.0376) (0.0353) (0.0359) 
Government Intervention -0.0194 -0.0145 -0.0227 -0.0179 -0.0125 -0.00409 -0.00339 0.000358 
 (0.0627) (0.0674) (0.0675) (0.0685) (0.0666) (0.0704) (0.0679) (0.0712) 
Defense Expenditures 38.77 35.93 56.51 59.02 37.60 32.41 53.33 55.37 
 (49.55) (54.64) (45.03) (44.61) (49.61) (54.47) (45.63) (45.46) 
Political Press Freedom -0.157 -0.150 -0.202 -0.197 -0.154 -0.139 -0.198 -0.194 
 (0.141) (0.161) (0.183) (0.183) (0.140) (0.160) (0.179) (0.180) 
Constant -33.83 -25.16 -48.14 -48.35 -32.64 -22.95 -48.72 -48.88 
 (46.49) (46.67) (40.53) (40.17) (46.82) (47.27) (41.28) (40.98) 
         
Observations 211 198 186 186 211 198 186 186 
R-squared 0.200 0.205 0.236 0.236 0.202 0.210 0.251 0.251 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 















Table A18: Public TV and corruption: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
         
Shares of Public TV 9.602 9.524* 9.757* 6.839 19.45 21.54 30.87** 27.28 
 (6.002) (5.503) (5.297) (4.305) (13.01) (14.02) (14.90) (16.22) 
(Shares of Public TV)
2
     -8.011 -9.906 -16.96 -16.38 
     (12.24) (12.57) (11.04) (12.71) 
Total HHI  0.225    0.776   
  (2.212)    (2.346)   
Private HHI TV   -5.209* -31.24*   -7.052** -32.62* 
   (2.678) (15.81)   (2.607) (16.39) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
   24.64*    24.27* 
    (13.05)    (13.62) 
Economic Freedom 0.265*** 0.255*** 0.252*** 0.239*** 0.259*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.236*** 
 (0.0567) (0.0639) (0.0603) (0.0607) (0.0576) (0.0648) (0.0607) (0.0620) 
Murdered Journalists 0.665* 1.170*** 1.689*** 1.659*** 0.642* 1.173*** 1.553*** 1.528*** 
 (0.368) (0.342) (0.505) (0.448) (0.374) (0.351) (0.478) (0.431) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.284 -0.367 -0.280 -0.302* -0.315 -0.405 -0.320 -0.340* 
 (0.284) (0.282) (0.195) (0.172) (0.277) (0.281) (0.208) (0.196) 
Human Capital -3.905 -3.581 -3.703 -2.785 -3.541 -3.067 -3.200 -2.312 
 (5.160) (4.958) (3.861) (4.028) (4.915) (4.856) (3.812) (4.096) 
log(RGDPa) 28.73*** 29.09*** 32.50*** 33.36*** 28.34*** 28.55*** 31.79*** 32.66*** 
 (4.596) (4.902) (4.549) (4.216) (4.609) (4.973) (4.396) (4.055) 
Trade Openness 0.0229 0.0376 0.0289 0.0228 0.0221 0.0375 0.0271 0.0211 
 (0.0244) (0.0286) (0.0263) (0.0259) (0.0243) (0.0286) (0.0262) (0.0264) 
Government Intervention 0.0401 0.0474 0.0386 0.0584 0.0486 0.0591 0.0566 0.0755 
 (0.0492) (0.0551) (0.0573) (0.0591) (0.0440) (0.0509) (0.0581) (0.0633) 
Defense Expenditures 64.87** 69.91** 90.80*** 102.5*** 62.88** 66.72** 85.37*** 97.07*** 
 (27.40) (28.86) (27.38) (25.34) (26.98) (28.64) (25.66) (23.85) 
Political Press Freedom -0.171** -0.191** -0.200** -0.171* -0.166** -0.182** -0.191*** -0.163* 
 (0.0774) (0.0723) (0.0737) (0.0942) (0.0770) (0.0740) (0.0672) (0.0871) 
Constant -56.32*** -51.10** -71.61*** -71.40*** -54.52*** -49.05** -70.20*** -70.05*** 
 (16.90) (18.70) (15.37) (16.70) (17.73) (19.71) (14.57) (15.87) 
         
Observations 216 203 191 191 216 203 191 191 
R-squared 0.203 0.217 0.241 0.258 0.205 0.220 0.248 0.265 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 





































Table A19: Public TV and corruption: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (without the murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
         
Shares of Public TV 9.911 10.34* 10.67* 7.675* 20.64 22.21 35.56** 31.83* 
 (6.087) (5.912) (5.645) (4.434) (12.90) (13.82) (15.36) (16.10) 
(Shares of Public TV)
2
     -8.735 -9.784 -20.05* -19.42 
     (12.38) (12.95) (11.11) (12.53) 
Total HHI  -0.799    -0.257   
  (2.021)    (2.181)   
Private HHI TV   -6.640** -33.16*   -8.684*** -34.62* 
   (3.001) (16.61)   (3.086) (17.22) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
   25.14*    24.65* 
    (13.40)    (13.96) 
Economic Freedom 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.304*** 0.290*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 0.294*** 0.281*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0670) (0.0669) (0.0651) (0.0574) (0.0670) (0.0658) (0.0655) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.292 -0.366 -0.265 -0.287 -0.325 -0.405 -0.313 -0.334 
 (0.289) (0.297) (0.206) (0.181) (0.280) (0.290) (0.218) (0.205) 
Human Capital -4.066 -4.172 -4.225 -3.278 -3.664 -3.666 -3.580 -2.672 
 (5.286) (5.130) (4.088) (4.236) (5.000) (4.920) (3.966) (4.251) 
log(RGDPa) 27.20*** 26.90*** 29.67*** 30.59*** 26.83*** 26.35*** 29.09*** 30.02*** 
 (4.493) (5.254) (4.694) (4.328) (4.460) (5.339) (4.406) (4.088) 
Trade Openness 0.0283 0.0447 0.0382 0.0318 0.0272 0.0447 0.0351 0.0289 
 (0.0260) (0.0306) (0.0299) (0.0291) (0.0258) (0.0305) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
Government Intervention 0.0372 0.0415 0.0307 0.0511 0.0466 0.0530 0.0528 0.0720 
 (0.0501) (0.0546) (0.0564) (0.0580) (0.0447) (0.0492) (0.0576) (0.0630) 
Defense Expenditures 58.07** 60.97* 75.72** 87.93*** 56.16* 57.80* 70.73** 82.86*** 
 (28.20) (30.75) (29.89) (26.93) (27.53) (30.79) (27.57) (25.24) 
Political Press Freedom -0.139* -0.148** -0.168** -0.139 -0.135* -0.138* -0.160** -0.132 
 (0.0713) (0.0717) (0.0696) (0.0889) (0.0710) (0.0747) (0.0627) (0.0809) 
Constant -49.72*** -41.44** -61.86*** -61.83*** -48.00** -39.40* -61.12*** -61.11*** 
 (16.81) (20.17) (16.03) (17.68) (17.49) (21.09) (14.68) (16.42) 
         
Observations 216 203 191 191 216 203 191 191 
R-squared 0.198 0.205 0.222 0.239 0.200 0.207 0.232 0.249 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 


























Table A20: Public TV, private sector concentration and corruption (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
         
Public TV * Private HHI TV -12.41*** -13.77*** -18.61* -19.38* -12.95*** -13.96*** -15.95* -17.02* 
 (3.789) (4.469) (9.233) (9.520) (3.975) (4.533) (9.293) (9.929) 
Shares of Public TV 19.05*** 21.16*** 22.94** 20.30** 35.86** 34.76* 34.54** 30.53* 
 (4.990) (5.655) (9.071) (8.044) (17.30) (17.50) (16.28) (16.25) 
(Shares of Public TV)2     -13.36 -11.12 -10.76 -9.459 
     (12.97) (14.17) (12.79) (14.04) 
Total HHI  -3.798    -3.098   
  (5.000)    (5.338)   
Private HHI TV   5.742 -21.62*   2.875 -23.73* 
   (7.725) (11.74)   (7.592) (12.50) 
(Private HHI TV)2    26.41**    26.02** 
    (11.25)    (11.18) 
Economic Freedom 0.332** 0.319** 0.331** 0.317** 0.320** 0.311** 0.322** 0.310** 
 (0.132) (0.127) (0.132) (0.129) (0.132) (0.129) (0.134) (0.134) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.191 -0.183 -0.193 -0.214 -0.238 -0.225 -0.229 -0.245 
 (0.194) (0.189) (0.204) (0.174) (0.210) (0.205) (0.212) (0.195) 
Human Capital -4.676 -5.611 -4.575 -3.595 -4.122 -5.062 -4.179 -3.261 
 (4.560) (4.658) (4.681) (4.591) (4.933) (5.074) (4.948) (4.958) 
log(RGDPa) 30.17*** 31.41*** 30.02*** 31.01*** 29.63*** 30.79*** 29.66*** 30.68*** 
 (8.152) (8.829) (8.124) (7.914) (8.195) (8.918) (8.186) (7.932) 
Trade Openness 0.0402 0.0375 0.0425 0.0359 0.0388 0.0377 0.0402 0.0340 
 (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0419) (0.0416) (0.0421) (0.0421) 
Government Intervention 0.0381 0.0391 0.0439 0.0658 0.0540 0.0529 0.0538 0.0742 
 (0.0775) (0.0773) (0.0800) (0.0755) (0.0822) (0.0827) (0.0828) (0.0801) 
Defense Expenditures 77.45 86.14 78.47* 91.41* 74.27 82.28 75.40 88.52* 
 (46.16) (52.09) (46.10) (45.53) (45.92) (52.17) (46.10) (45.08) 
Political Press Freedom -0.140 -0.147 -0.116 -0.0838 -0.129 -0.136 -0.120 -0.0871 
 (0.173) (0.169) (0.179) (0.170) (0.172) (0.170) (0.180) (0.170) 
Constant -77.16* -79.30* -80.51* -81.24** -75.43* -77.30* -77.45* -78.54* 
 (39.38) (40.46) (40.91) (38.90) (39.97) (41.07) (41.15) (39.27) 
         
Observations 191 190 191 191 191 190 191 191 
R-squared 0.240 0.247 0.243 0.263 0.246 0.251 0.246 0.265 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 












Table A21: Total media concentration and corruption (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CPI Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 
     
Total HHI -4.220 -3.763 -12.82 -11.97 
 (7.152) (7.158) (11.84) (11.50) 
Shares of Public TV 6.453 27.81   
 (4.825) (19.92)   
(Shares of Public TV)
2
  -17.49   
  (15.20)   
Shares of Public Press -7.913 12.99   
 (11.83) (135.5)   
(Shares of Public Press)
2
  -26.02   
  (169.0)   
Private HHI TV   13.53* -19.60 
   (7.674) (16.73) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
   28.79* 
    (15.30) 
Private HHI Press   -0.819 -6.821 
   (5.070) (27.38) 
(Private HHI Press)
2 
   6.091 
    (24.57) 
Economic Freedom 0.341** 0.342** 0.314* 0.302* 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.175) (0.177) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.290 -0.328 -0.278 -0.371 
 (0.279) (0.284) (0.341) (0.317) 
Human Capital -11.29* -10.44 -8.885 -6.760 
 (6.190) (6.827) (7.032) (7.006) 
log(RGDPa) 25.73** 24.77** 23.10** 25.84** 
 (10.79) (10.80) (10.56) (10.19) 
Trade Openness 0.0447 0.0451 0.0532 0.0426 
 (0.0466) (0.0485) (0.0478) (0.0472) 
Government Intervention 0.0695 0.0853 0.0498 0.0712 
 (0.0870) (0.0924) (0.0796) (0.0749) 
Defense Expenditures 17.29 12.95 37.36 62.30 
 (73.71) (74.01) (88.21) (84.98) 
Political Press Freedom Index -0.0887 -0.0767 0.0129 -0.00666 
 (0.218) (0.216) (0.258) (0.241) 
Constant -21.60 -20.87 -19.98 -23.92 
 (63.34) (66.34) (63.27) (59.72) 
     
Observations 183 183 143 143 
R-squared 0.247 0.255 0.289 0.309 
Number of Countries 29 29 28 28 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 












Table A22: Total media concentration and corruption: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 
         
Total HHI -3.712 -3.301 -12.64 -11.82 -4.220 -3.763 -12.82 -11.97 
 (4.425) (4.404) (9.724) (8.600) (4.422) (4.430) (9.738) (8.576) 
Shares of Public TV 6.167 26.53   6.453 27.81   
 (5.225) (18.37)   (5.246) (18.48)   
(Shares of Public TV)2  -16.57    -17.49   
  (14.41)    (14.47)   
Shares of Public Press -5.995 -11.39   -7.913 12.99   
 (8.734) (43.63)   (7.311) (45.40)   
(Shares of Public Press)2  9.389    -26.02   
  (51.55)    (52.97)   
Private HHI TV   13.64*** -19.02   13.53*** -19.60 
   (2.623) (16.73)   (2.334) (16.68) 
(Private HHI TV)2    28.38*    28.79* 
    (14.78)    (14.76) 
Private HHI Press   -0.656 -7.338   -0.819 -6.821 
   (3.103) (17.94)   (3.102) (17.96) 
(Private HHI Press)2    6.734    6.091 
    (15.59)    (15.64) 
Economic Freedom 0.326*** 0.327*** 0.299*** 0.289*** 0.341*** 0.342*** 0.314*** 0.302*** 
 (0.0699) (0.0676) (0.0535) (0.0549) (0.0668) (0.0643) (0.0478) (0.0497) 
Murdered Journalists 0.860* 0.804* 1.001 0.948*     
 (0.431) (0.424) (0.613) (0.529)     
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.313** -0.347** -0.289 -0.380** -0.290* -0.328** -0.278 -0.371** 
 (0.136) (0.153) (0.200) (0.163) (0.145) (0.157) (0.215) (0.170) 
Human Capital -10.48*** -9.714** -7.851** -5.805 -11.29*** -10.44*** -8.885** -6.760* 
 (3.579) (3.752) (3.414) (3.933) (3.496) (3.635) (3.366) (3.839) 
log(RGDPa) 26.96*** 26.05*** 24.41*** 27.02*** 25.73*** 24.77*** 23.10*** 25.84*** 
 (5.756) (5.670) (7.127) (6.312) (6.198) (5.965) (7.298) (6.445) 
Trade Openness 0.0386 0.0394 0.0447 0.0346 0.0447 0.0451 0.0532 0.0426 
 (0.0346) (0.0348) (0.0434) (0.0406) (0.0363) (0.0361) (0.0456) (0.0421) 
Government Intervention 0.0673 0.0838 0.0470 0.0679 0.0695 0.0853 0.0498 0.0712 
 (0.0621) (0.0600) (0.0460) (0.0571) (0.0616) (0.0596) (0.0464) (0.0578) 
Defense Expenditures 25.97 21.19 47.45 71.47* 17.29 12.95 37.36 62.30 
 (38.71) (36.45) (39.01) (37.67) (41.68) (38.25) (39.90) (38.10) 
Political Press Freedom Index -0.106 -0.0955 -0.00270 -0.0208 -0.0887 -0.0767 0.0129 -0.00666 
 (0.0965) (0.0907) (0.105) (0.110) (0.0927) (0.0874) (0.108) (0.111) 
Constant -26.39 -27.02 -26.60 -29.87 -21.60 -20.87 -19.98 -23.92 
 (25.19) (24.53) (31.93) (31.68) (25.62) (24.32) (31.15) (30.69) 
         
Observations 183 183 143 143 183 183 143 143 
R-Squared 0.253 0.259 0.295 0.314 0.247 0.255 0.289 0.309 
Number of Countries 29 29 28 28 29 29 28 28 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 










Table A23: Total media concentration and heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
                 
Total HHI * EF 0.115        0.0118        
 (0.132)        (0.152)        
Total HHI * PS  -0.363        -0.252       
  (0.291)        (0.277)       
Total HHI * HC   -0.642        -0.453      
   (1.730)        (1.928)      
Total HHI * LR    5.923        1.888     
    (3.745)        (4.507)     
Total HHI * TO     0.0787*        0.0784    
     (0.0457)        (0.0613)    
Total HHI * GI      -0.0259        -0.0656   
      (0.0654)        (0.0887)   
Total HHI * DE       -56.91        -89.00*  
       (35.11)        (44.11)  
Total HHI * PF        -0.207        0.0232 
        (0.193)        (0.247) 
Total HHI -8.788 33.78 0.856 -26.06 -6.102* 0.493 2.768 1.175 -1.796 23.04 0.252 -9.107 -6.084 2.718 4.477 -1.260 
 (8.870) (27.68) (4.730) (15.85) (3.471) (5.289) (3.897) (3.493) (9.865) (25.73) (5.471) (18.20) (4.275) (6.558) (4.292) (4.053) 
Economic 
Freedom 
 0.186 0.169 0.211 0.150 0.202* 0.223** 0.167 0.164 0.181 0.171 0.166 0.150 0.153 0.194 0.169 
  (0.123) (0.126) (0.127) (0.121) (0.110) (0.106) (0.126) (0.147) (0.125) (0.128) (0.128) (0.126) (0.137) (0.115) (0.125) 
Primary School 
Enrollment 
-0.278  -0.279 -0.204 -0.238 -0.272 -0.241 -0.243 -0.281 -0.118 -0.281 -0.282 -0.238 -0.289 -0.258 -0.282 
 (0.219)  (0.223) (0.220) (0.201) (0.214) (0.202) (0.227) (0.223) (0.162) (0.223) (0.221) (0.197) (0.217) (0.199) (0.221) 
Human Capital -1.079 -1.828  1.147 -1.417 -1.226 -1.922 -2.737 -1.314 -1.703 -1.075 -1.058 -1.431 -1.052 -0.384 -1.226 
 (3.861) (3.761)  (3.875) (4.062) (3.964) (3.911) (3.847) (4.004) (3.881) (4.213) (4.053) (3.871) (3.940) (3.857) (3.978) 
Log(RGDPa) 21.47** 19.53** 20.03**  19.27** 19.76** 12.57 17.57** 20.13** 20.17** 20.37** 18.36* 19.26** 20.12** 17.10** 20.17** 
 (8.842) (8.616) (8.258)  (8.716) (8.210) (7.714) (8.054) (8.584) (8.612) (8.568) (10.69) (8.397) (8.062) (8.016) (8.383) 
Trade Openness 0.0335 0.0338 0.0309 0.0482  0.0327 0.0355 0.0384 0.0345 0.0362 0.0340 0.0351 0.000534 0.0337 0.0298 0.0344 
 (0.0387) (0.0364) (0.0383) (0.0426)  (0.0379) (0.0386) (0.0399) (0.0383) (0.0376) (0.0380) (0.0382) (0.0557) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0382) 
Government 
Intervention 
0.0438 0.00756 0.0161 0.0232 0.0324  0.0202 0.0267 0.0178 0.0116 0.0164 0.0211 0.0324 0.0518 0.0273 0.0169 
 (0.0540) (0.0571) (0.0594) (0.0627) (0.0585)  (0.0576) (0.0590) (0.0589) (0.0587) (0.0599) (0.0607) (0.0592) (0.0791) (0.0582) (0.0573) 
Defense 
Expenditures 
10.94 -1.457 7.767 -43.63 1.155 5.700  -7.562 4.096 1.599 5.102 4.717 1.124 12.33 74.85 4.890 
 (43.24) (42.54) (43.31) (30.55) (40.65) (39.06)  (40.82) (43.21) (41.90) (41.06) (39.95) (39.92) (40.95) (50.34) (40.73) 
Political Press 
Freedom 
-0.245* -0.241* -0.252* -0.153 -0.257* -0.259* -0.161  -0.246* -0.248* -0.245* -0.244* -0.257* -0.248* -0.170 -0.257 
 (0.127) (0.121) (0.123) (0.126) (0.131) (0.133) (0.133)  (0.129) (0.126) (0.128) (0.130) (0.126) (0.129) (0.131) (0.168) 
Murdered 
Journalists 
1.065* 1.037* 1.013** 0.797 1.011* 0.975* 0.980* 0.862 1.021* 1.029* 1.027* 0.989* 1.011* 0.946* 0.970** 1.023* 
 (0.527) (0.556) (0.493) (0.583) (0.586) (0.538) (0.504) (0.610) (0.526) (0.545) (0.515) (0.529) (0.586) (0.551) (0.454) (0.514) 
Constant -4.974 -31.10 -11.21 63.00** -4.805 -8.349 18.53 1.316 -7.369 -22.94 -9.595 -0.778 -4.694 -8.814 -6.531 -7.959 
 (42.94) (38.35) (41.74) (24.53) (40.57) (37.42) (36.67) (36.46) (44.48) (38.28) (41.63) (49.67) (35.36) (37.79) (36.33) (39.18) 
                 
Observations 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 
R-squared 0.135 0.144 0.142 0.121 0.157 0.142 0.159 0.132 0.142 0.146 0.142 0.143 0.157 0.147 0.169 0.142 
Number of 
Countries 
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 


























Table A24: Total media concentration and heterogeneous effects (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
                 
Total HHI * EF 0.120        0.00616        
 (0.133)        (0.152)        
Total HHI * PS  -0.366        -0.236       
  (0.298)        (0.273)       
Total HHI * HC   -0.325        -0.325      
   (1.786)        (1.786)      
Total HHI * LR    6.118        2.542     
    (3.681)        (4.387)     
Total HHI * TO     0.0777        0.0788    
     (0.0462)        (0.0632)    
Total HHI * GI      -0.0344        -0.0768   
      (0.0647)        (0.0876)   
Total HHI * DE       -57.60        -90.55**  
       (35.94)        (43.37)  
Total HHI * PF        -0.188        0.0137 
        (0.190)        (0.238) 
Total HHI -9.206 33.91 -0.170 -27.11* -6.071* 0.931 2.837 1.047 -1.476 21.54 -0.170 -11.98 -6.146 3.294 4.457 -1.216 
 (8.911) (28.35) (4.847) (15.57) (3.505) (5.208) (3.879) (3.399) (9.781) (25.43) (4.847) (17.76) (4.426) (6.434) (4.159) (4.084) 
Economic 
Freedom 
 0.196 0.179 0.223* 0.157 0.211* 0.230** 0.168 0.174 0.187 0.179 0.173 0.157 0.158 0.205* 0.177 
  (0.122) (0.127) (0.125) (0.120) (0.108) (0.104) (0.121) (0.147) (0.120) (0.127) (0.123) (0.123) (0.132) (0.113) (0.122) 
Primary School 
Enrollment 
-0.283  -0.285 -0.214 -0.244 -0.275 -0.242 -0.245 -0.285 -0.132 -0.285 -0.286 -0.242 -0.294 -0.263 -0.286 
 (0.226)  (0.229) (0.225) (0.206) (0.217) (0.206) (0.231) (0.229) (0.164) (0.229) (0.226) (0.201) (0.221) (0.205) (0.227) 
Human Capital -0.389 -1.180               
 (4.022) (3.939)               
Log(RGDPa) 20.36** 18.30** 18.95**  17.71** 18.38** 10.48 15.87** 18.73** 18.59** 18.95** 16.47 17.78** 18.87** 16.04** 18.77** 
 (8.870) (8.691) (8.308)  (8.488) (7.718) (6.780) (7.302) (8.247) (8.102) (8.308) (9.886) (7.919) (7.712) (7.719) (7.949) 
Trade Openness 0.0335 0.0336 0.0327 0.0528  0.0308 0.0317 0.0320 0.0326 0.0331 0.0327 0.0343 -0.00191 0.0324 0.0305 0.0327 
 (0.0390) (0.0367) (0.0384) (0.0438)  (0.0379) (0.0378) (0.0394) (0.0387) (0.0375) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0565) (0.0383) (0.0380) (0.0384) 
Government 
Intervention 
0.0431 0.00506 0.0144 0.0217 0.0302  0.0181 0.0244 0.0154 0.00984 0.0144 0.0203 0.0303 0.0557 0.0252 0.0149 
 (0.0543) (0.0572) (0.0597) (0.0630) (0.0584)  (0.0573) (0.0580) (0.0586) (0.0583) (0.0597) (0.0604) (0.0591) (0.0789) (0.0581) (0.0571) 
Defense 
Expenditures 
10.86 -2.307 5.561 -46.75 2.509 7.430  -2.060 5.380 3.750 5.561 5.037 2.485 14.12 74.84 5.680 
 (44.00) (42.97) (43.95) (29.17) (43.48) (42.38)  (44.06) (46.06) (45.39) (43.95) (43.52) (43.64) (42.94) (50.12) (44.03) 
Political Press 
Freedom 
-0.205 -0.201* -0.211* -0.113 -0.225* -0.229* -0.132  -0.213* -0.217* -0.211* -0.209 -0.225* -0.217* -0.130 -0.219 
 (0.123) (0.117) (0.119) (0.112) (0.122) (0.123) (0.131)  (0.121) (0.119) (0.119) (0.125) (0.120) (0.122) (0.130) (0.155) 
Constant -1.816 -28.30 -6.647 66.27**
* 
-2.153 -6.225 21.77 1.238 -5.369 -20.07 -6.647 4.245 -2.527 -6.638 -3.401 -5.614 
 (43.15) (38.50) (42.28) (23.56) (40.65) (37.96) (36.92) (37.43) (44.96) (38.84) (42.28) (50.12) (35.98) (38.19) (37.08) (40.02) 
                 
Observations 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 
R-squared 0.123 0.133 0.131 0.114 0.146 0.132 0.148 0.123 0.131 0.134 0.131 0.133 0.146 0.137 0.159 0.131 
Number of 
Countries 
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 

























Table A25: Total media concentration and additional heterogeneous effects (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
         
Total HHI * Public TV 17.64**    15.86    
 (7.591)    (11.47)    
Total HHI * Public Press  -0.759    -1.910   
  (7.792)    (9.950)   
Total HHI * Private HHI TV   -9.909    -10.32  
   (6.324)    (8.341)  
Total HHI * Private HHI Press    5.233    19.68 
    (7.075)    (19.19) 
Public TV     2.098    
     (8.440)    
Public Press      2.155   
      (8.539)   
Private HHI TV       0.430  
       (7.592)  
Private HHI Press        -6.730 
        (8.128) 
Total HHI -8.976 -3.112 2.537 -10.66 -8.301 -3.082 2.835 -13.45 
 (5.518) (2.876) (7.116) (8.791) (6.049) (2.897) (8.633) (9.929) 
Economic Freedom 0.247* 0.331** 0.249* 0.387** 0.252* 0.332** 0.249* 0.388** 
 (0.126) (0.154) (0.137) (0.146) (0.129) (0.153) (0.137) (0.146) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.287 -0.219 -0.310 -0.433 -0.294 -0.221 -0.312 -0.446 
 (0.241) (0.237) (0.234) (0.270) (0.246) (0.239) (0.227) (0.275) 
Human Capital -5.095 -9.913** -4.803 -11.11* -4.978 -9.906** -4.823 -10.81* 
 (4.680) (4.779) (5.085) (5.541) (4.706) (4.779) (5.138) (5.522) 
log(RGDPa) 28.07*** 21.25** 34.21*** 17.92** 27.91*** 21.22** 34.20*** 17.51* 
 (8.123) (8.813) (9.939) (8.580) (8.243) (8.783) (9.962) (8.598) 
Trade Openness 0.0495 0.0553 0.0321 0.0723 0.0497 0.0550 0.0324 0.0697 
 (0.0410) (0.0457) (0.0373) (0.0485) (0.0408) (0.0461) (0.0368) (0.0482) 
Government Intervention 0.0476 0.0430 0.0176 0.0454 0.0479 0.0427 0.0180 0.0438 
 (0.0753) (0.0768) (0.0852) (0.0706) (0.0744) (0.0767) (0.0825) (0.0715) 
Defense Expenditures 52.31 -20.63 98.00* -30.34 52.83 -19.53 97.97* -31.25 
 (52.55) (53.10) (55.16) (59.13) (52.91) (53.98) (55.35) (60.24) 
Political Press Freedom -0.178 -0.160 -0.225 -0.0918 -0.175 -0.162 -0.223 -0.105 
 (0.178) (0.176) (0.196) (0.194) (0.179) (0.178) (0.196) (0.193) 
Constant -45.10 -3.829 -69.20 29.04 -45.28 -3.893 -69.25 33.30 
 (39.65) (49.49) (43.91) (43.62) (39.71) (49.63) (44.17) (43.45) 
         
Observations 203 305 198 188 203 305 198 188 
R-squared 0.224 0.200 0.228 0.278 0.225 0.200 0.228 0.280 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 



















Table A26: Total TV concentration and corruption (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CPI Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 
      
Total HHI TV 13.38 9.020 -5.673 -20.85 4.048 
 (8.502) (7.308) (16.66) (18.13) (20.30) 
(Total HHI TV)
2 
  19.01 31.39* 7.372 
   (14.80) (16.10) (19.00) 
Public TV  7.368*  37.79**  
  (4.112)  (18.16)  
(Public TV)
2 
   -25.54*  
    (13.92)  
Private HHI TV  -6.112   -33.78** 
  (4.430)   (13.16) 
(Private HHI TV)
2 
    27.54** 
     (11.16) 
Economic Freedom 0.279** 0.318** 0.304** 0.298** 0.303** 
 (0.131) (0.127) (0.133) (0.130) (0.127) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.285 -0.212 -0.210 -0.278 -0.216 
 (0.267) (0.225) (0.230) (0.237) (0.190) 
Human Capital -4.738 -4.958 -3.955 -1.799 -3.774 
 (4.563) (4.448) (4.681) (5.251) (4.543) 
log(RGDPa) 28.79*** 29.45*** 29.10*** 27.74*** 30.57*** 
 (8.184) (8.145) (8.045) (7.837) (7.926) 
Trade Openness 0.0524 0.0491 0.0470 0.0430 0.0405 
 (0.0448) (0.0434) (0.0421) (0.0437) (0.0430) 
Government Intervention 0.0444 0.0399 0.0403 0.0703 0.0612 
 (0.0837) (0.0803) (0.0832) (0.0837) (0.0771) 
Defense Expenditures 73.75 71.83 81.86* 78.54 89.44* 
 (46.65) (44.98) (48.06) (46.93) (46.32) 
Political Press Freedom Index -0.108 -0.139 -0.0743 -0.0347 -0.0848 
 (0.174) (0.183) (0.169) (0.164) (0.171) 
Constant -58.68 -68.59* -68.65* -70.24* -70.31* 
 (41.49) (37.57) (38.51) (38.64) (36.63) 
      
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 
R-squared 0.211 0.232 0.222 0.246 0.248 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 
























Table A27: Total TV concentration and heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
               
Total HHI TV * EF 0.267       -0.257       
 (0.372)       (0.501)       
Total HHI TV * HC  3.319       8.386      
  (8.133)       (10.33)      
Total HHI TV * LR   25.88***       11.36     
   (6.638)       (15.21)     
Total HHI TV * TO    0.0432       -0.00593    
    (0.0783)       (0.133)    
Total HHI TV * GI     -0.0937       -0.371*   
     (0.176)       (0.197)   
Total HHI TV * DE      21.88       -103.8  
      (85.25)       (100.0)  
Total HHI TV * PF       -0.00268       0.415 
       (0.261)       (0.362) 
Total HHI TV -3.827 4.072 -93.53*** 9.416 16.42 12.60 13.78* 27.97 -7.602 -33.94 13.22 33.13** 18.32* 8.351 
 (22.21) (20.67) (26.04) (7.808) (11.49) (10.47) (7.830) (30.74) (24.38) (60.55) (10.98) (14.62) (10.67) (10.31) 
Economic Freedom  0.204 0.269** 0.229 0.329** 0.257* 0.233 0.302 0.232* 0.240* 0.228 0.227* 0.237* 0.234* 
  (0.140) (0.125) (0.139) (0.146) (0.136) (0.139) (0.180) (0.137) (0.132) (0.139) (0.130) (0.135) (0.129) 
Human Capital -3.190  -0.528 -2.883 -3.864 -6.700 -5.791 -4.404 -6.770 -2.747 -4.364 -3.591 -4.117 -3.571 
 (4.562)  (4.712) (4.837) (4.159) (4.434) (4.329) (4.365) (6.345) (4.223) (4.637) (4.242) (4.529) (4.502) 
Log(RGDPa) 34.11*** 31.32***  32.89*** 32.48*** 23.60* 28.77*** 31.72*** 31.16*** 21.64 32.42*** 31.40*** 25.30* 30.57*** 
 (9.146) (8.796)  (8.926) (9.590) (12.93) (8.999) (9.135) (9.202) (18.42) (8.766) (8.925) (13.29) (9.123) 
Trade Openness 0.0396 0.0297 0.0749  0.0335 0.0541 0.0496 0.0374 0.0535 0.0506 0.0435 0.0441 0.0554 0.0392 
 (0.0452) (0.0449) (0.0489)  (0.0408) (0.0439) (0.0453) (0.0434) (0.0459) (0.0443) (0.0763) (0.0418) (0.0440) (0.0433) 
Government 
Intervention 
0.0833 0.0537 0.0844 0.0491  0.0530 0.0593 0.0482 0.0605 0.0658 0.0523 0.180* 0.0722 0.0499 
 (0.0815) (0.0844) (0.0887) (0.0832)  (0.0909) (0.0848) (0.0841) (0.0853) (0.0875) (0.0831) (0.102) (0.0922) (0.0822) 
Defense 
Expenditures 
102.5** 113.3** 71.16* 98.01** 101.5**  75.54 87.47* 104.0** 97.71** 90.87* 113.3** 140.2*** 93.41** 
 (46.66) (46.89) (39.92) (47.23) (48.01)  (44.94) (47.97) (46.32) (44.97) (48.05) (52.57) (50.18) (44.52) 
Political Press 
Freedom 
-0.159 -0.209 -0.0416 -0.172 -0.194 -0.0909  -0.152 -0.163 -0.130 -0.152 -0.182 -0.0912 -0.354 
 (0.184) (0.173) (0.149) (0.187) (0.193) (0.205)  (0.180) (0.180) (0.196) (0.186) (0.189) (0.216) (0.254) 
Murdered 
Journalists 
2.105*** 1.960** 1.340** 1.977*** 1.753** 1.752*** 1.838** 2.040*** 1.808** 1.778** 1.985*** 1.548** 1.804** 1.944*** 
 (0.720) (0.719) (0.496) (0.652) (0.685) (0.619) (0.697) (0.717) (0.690) (0.702) (0.667) (0.597) (0.680) (0.690) 
Primary School 
Enrollment 
-0.333 -0.339 -0.250 -0.249 -0.244 -0.211 -0.224 -0.233 -0.328 -0.284 -0.282 -0.282 -0.287 -0.239 
 (0.229) (0.224) (0.205) (0.226) (0.218) (0.237) (0.237) (0.236) (0.228) (0.224) (0.251) (0.192) (0.230) (0.245) 
Constant -65.85 -73.53* 45.73* -79.22* -80.34* -32.95 -61.14 -78.19* -58.89 -33.75 -72.95* -77.70* -48.07 -69.91 
 (41.20) (42.77) (22.98) (41.31) (44.51) (55.45) (43.86) (44.72) (46.62) (68.76) (42.48) (44.02) (53.39) (41.52) 
               
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
R-squared 0.224 0.234 0.229 0.235 0.236 0.217 0.232 0.240 0.244 0.244 0.238 0.273 0.247 0.247 
Number of 
Countries 
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 






























Table A28: Total TV concentration heterogeneous effects (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
               
Total HHI TV * EF 0.421       -0.138       
 (0.365)       (0.491)       
Total HHI TV * HC  5.394       11.20      
  (8.355)       (10.26)      
Total HHI TV * LR   25.56***       15.86     
   (6.722)       (15.02)     
Total HHI TV * TO    0.0684       0.0210    
    (0.0888)       (0.146)    
Total HHI TV * GI     -0.130       -0.419**   
     (0.173)       (0.193)   
Total HHI TV * DE      -6.157       -129.9  
      (81.98)       (100.3)  
Total HHI TV * PF       0.0554       0.436 
       (0.240)       (0.348) 
Total HHI TV -12.36 -0.594 -91.88*** 8.360 18.76 14.53 13.57 21.52 -13.99 -52.01 12.03 36.17** 20.18* 8.655 
 (22.12) (20.67) (25.96) (8.025) (11.42) (10.67) (8.327) (29.85) (23.70) (59.08) (11.22) (14.52) (11.09) (10.68) 
Economic Freedom  0.248* 0.299** 0.281** 0.379** 0.302** 0.279** 0.319* 0.278** 0.287** 0.281** 0.265** 0.283** 0.283** 
  (0.134) (0.122) (0.133) (0.142) (0.132) (0.134) (0.182) (0.134) (0.125) (0.132) (0.127) (0.129) (0.124) 
Human Capital -3.544  -0.971 -2.988 -4.179 -7.005 -5.987 -4.815 -8.017 -2.538 -4.422 -3.852 -4.489 -3.989 
 (4.677)  (4.704) (4.982) (4.326) (4.517) (4.426) (4.541) (6.406) (4.353) (4.818) (4.269) (4.653) (4.680) 
Log(RGDPa) 30.81*** 27.46***  29.03*** 29.35*** 18.84 25.54*** 28.40*** 27.62*** 14.35 28.56*** 28.60*** 20.36 26.99*** 
 (8.409) (8.118)  (8.436) (8.894) (11.99) (8.052) (8.311) (8.377) (17.68) (8.217) (8.325) (12.22) (8.259) 
Trade Openness 0.0536 0.0410 0.0796  0.0433 0.0678 0.0595 0.0508 0.0682 0.0646 0.0421 0.0534 0.0695 0.0506 
 (0.0474) (0.0459) (0.0499)  (0.0413) (0.0454) (0.0464) (0.0457) (0.0479) (0.0468) (0.0786) (0.0422) (0.0457) (0.0449) 
Government 
Intervention 
0.0790 0.0477 0.0780 0.0412  0.0514 0.0510 0.0421 0.0562 0.0643 0.0443 0.191* 0.0701 0.0420 
 (0.0826) (0.0856) (0.0883) (0.0840)  (0.0916) (0.0854) (0.0858) (0.0868) (0.0890) (0.0839) (0.104) (0.0936) (0.0832) 
Defense 
Expenditures 
86.87* 103.0** 68.44* 81.64* 89.06*  61.11 71.52 92.94* 85.46* 74.68 103.1* 137.1** 76.50* 
 (46.00) (46.18) (39.76) (47.96) (47.92)  (42.93) (46.79) (45.51) (43.44) (47.59) (52.69) (52.82) (44.43) 
Political Press 
Freedom 
-0.113 -0.179 -0.0271 -0.131 -0.160 -0.0370  -0.107 -0.127 -0.0826 -0.111 -0.152 -0.0357 -0.320 
 (0.177) (0.163) (0.143) (0.183) (0.185) (0.193)  (0.173) (0.172) (0.186) (0.179) (0.180) (0.204) (0.248) 
Primary School 
Enrollment 
-0.367 -0.365 -0.265 -0.245 -0.247 -0.220 -0.229 -0.260 -0.350 -0.291 -0.276 -0.286 -0.294 -0.242 
 (0.259) (0.257) (0.219) (0.252) (0.236) (0.258) (0.265) (0.268) (0.257) (0.242) (0.276) (0.207) (0.252) (0.275) 
Constant -47.60 -57.36 46.58* -65.03 -68.91 -14.83 -48.45 -61.25 -41.50 -5.940 -58.92 -67.53 -29.09 -55.72 
 (38.16) (41.94) (23.52) (41.42) (43.29) (53.63) (41.99) (42.82) (45.27) (66.97) (41.63) (42.77) (50.70) (40.75) 
               
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
R-squared 0.193 0.208 0.216 0.208 0.215 0.196 0.208 0.211 0.222 0.223 0.211 0.257 0.224 0.220 
Number of 
Countries 
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 














Table A29: Total TV concentration and additional heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
             
Total HHI TV * Public TV 13.47*  16.03  9.025  15.86**  19.55  12.50  
 (7.455)  (11.89)  (18.62)  (7.739)  (12.50)  (17.89)  
Total HHI TV * Private HHI TV  -7.127  -10.92  -9.445  -9.663*  -15.29  -13.97 
  (5.681)  (16.51)  (16.22)  (5.672)  (16.24)  (15.71) 
Public TV   -2.046  1.430    -2.969  0.526  
   (6.654)  (9.747)    (7.036)  (9.757)  
Private HHI TV    2.840  3.541    4.249  4.917 
    (11.83)  (11.34)    (11.86)  (11.46) 
Total HHI TV 2.983 15.84** 2.208 17.59 -6.403 5.018 1.716 17.36** 0.605 19.94* -8.051 8.272 
 (7.619) (7.346) (8.381) (11.66) (18.31) (20.73) (7.384) (7.244) (8.060) (11.59) (18.20) (18.67) 
(Total HHI TV)2     11.86 11.98     11.93 11.14 
     (19.99) (15.46)     (19.52) (14.01) 
Economic Freedom 0.250* 0.271* 0.252* 0.275* 0.261* 0.279* 0.297** 0.327** 0.300** 0.331** 0.309** 0.335** 
 (0.132) (0.137) (0.133) (0.139) (0.136) (0.140) (0.128) (0.131) (0.128) (0.134) (0.131) (0.136) 
Murdered Journalists 1.778*** 1.713*** 1.765*** 1.692*** 1.764*** 1.712***       
 (0.621) (0.588) (0.628) (0.575) (0.638) (0.608)       
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.236 -0.184 -0.222 -0.177 -0.208 -0.160 -0.234 -0.155 -0.213 -0.145 -0.199 -0.129 
 (0.220) (0.203) (0.217) (0.208) (0.207) (0.203) (0.244) (0.221) (0.238) (0.228) (0.229) (0.224) 
Human Capital -3.279 -5.464 -3.252 -5.685 -3.021 -4.860 -3.510 -6.265 -3.468 -6.581 -3.236 -5.823 
 (4.326) (4.352) (4.335) (4.408) (4.503) (4.726) (4.487) (4.498) (4.492) (4.526) (4.642) (4.821) 
log(RGDPa) 32.57*** 33.03*** 32.78*** 33.11*** 32.46*** 32.97*** 29.49*** 30.37*** 29.82*** 30.54*** 29.50*** 30.38*** 
 (8.870) (9.061) (9.112) (9.144) (8.957) (9.031) (8.096) (8.399) (8.409) (8.530) (8.328) (8.453) 
Trade Openness 0.0390 0.0384 0.0381 0.0385 0.0369 0.0363 0.0489 0.0471 0.0476 0.0471 0.0464 0.0452 
 (0.0419) (0.0423) (0.0413) (0.0422) (0.0410) (0.0412) (0.0427) (0.0428) (0.0418) (0.0426) (0.0415) (0.0418) 
Government Intervention 0.0497 0.0445 0.0488 0.0437 0.0480 0.0434 0.0423 0.0352 0.0411 0.0343 0.0403 0.0338 
 (0.0801) (0.0839) (0.0804) (0.0843) (0.0798) (0.0835) (0.0806) (0.0849) (0.0812) (0.0852) (0.0806) (0.0847) 
Defense Expenditures 91.53* 89.26* 92.46* 89.18* 95.30* 94.33* 76.34 74.43 77.85 74.59 80.72* 79.22 
 (45.95) (47.21) (46.94) (47.19) (47.53) (48.05) (45.44) (46.20) (46.76) (46.25) (47.18) (47.44) 
Political Press Freedom -0.185 -0.164 -0.190 -0.161 -0.152 -0.134 -0.151 -0.132 -0.158 -0.128 -0.121 -0.102 
 (0.187) (0.192) (0.195) (0.191) (0.202) (0.190) (0.179) (0.187) (0.189) (0.187) (0.197) (0.185) 
Constant -81.22* -83.74* -82.99* -85.70* -84.13** -88.36* -70.09* -75.88* -72.78* -78.95* -73.92* -81.35* 
 (39.98) (42.28) (41.56) (45.30) (40.43) (44.84) (37.84) (40.86) (39.35) (44.48) (38.22) (44.08) 
             
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
R-squared 0.252 0.247 0.252 0.247 0.255 0.251 0.230 0.227 0.231 0.228 0.234 0.231 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 
















Table A30: Total press concentration and corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CPI Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 
           
Total HHI Press -39.45*** -5.519 16.40 -13.45 -28.79 4.096 -24.75 5.840 84.91 -1.448 
 (4.959) (6.981) (16.00) (12.12) (39.74) (34.99) (50.65) (33.55) (68.40) (35.46) 
(Total HHI Press)2     -9.393 -17.10 20.29 -25.87 -125.7* -20.27 
     (34.15) (61.53) (99.98) (59.14) (73.02) (59.17) 
Public Press   -57.81*** -0.606   -123.2** 24.63   
   (13.58) (5.405)   (56.51) (15.39)   
(Public Press)2       88.63 -41.63   
       (109.7) (26.64)   
Private HHI Press   -38.09*** 5.507     -74.40 0.479 
   (12.80) (6.106)     (95.57) (19.71) 
(Private HHI Press)2         9.061 4.509 
         (88.80) (15.94) 
Economic Freedom  0.372**  0.398**  0.371**  0.382**  0.397** 
  (0.141)  (0.154)  (0.141)  (0.143)  (0.155) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate  -0.392  -0.404  -0.395  -0.389  -0.411 
  (0.256)  (0.267)  (0.253)  (0.255)  (0.264) 
Human Capital  -10.02*  -10.53*  -9.968*  -10.38*  -10.51* 
  (5.609)  (5.559)  (5.586)  (5.594)  (5.571) 
log(RGDPa)  16.75**  17.19**  16.59**  16.86**  16.81** 
  (7.271)  (7.144)  (7.452)  (7.377)  (7.383) 
Trade Openness  0.0693  0.0700  0.0692  0.0698  0.0702 
  (0.0496)  (0.0513)  (0.0500)  (0.0514)  (0.0509) 
Government Intervention  0.0410  0.0439  0.0402  0.0417  0.0415 
  (0.0759)  (0.0769)  (0.0760)  (0.0773)  (0.0772) 
Defense Expenditures  -45.62  -44.46  -46.25  -44.75  -45.52 
  (45.98)  (45.53)  (46.78)  (45.56)  (47.12) 
Political Press Freedom Index  -0.0733  -0.0816  -0.0690  -0.0606  -0.0722 
  (0.213)  (0.213)  (0.219)  (0.219)  (0.218) 
Constant 72.53*** 27.21 73.83*** 27.62 70.83*** 28.47 71.56*** 30.64 73.70*** 30.87 
 (4.775) (43.94) (6.309) (44.99) (7.065) (44.74) (6.073) (44.50) (12.07) (47.12) 
           
Observations 200 189 200 189 200 189 200 189 200 189 
R-squared 0.313 0.257 0.484 0.261 0.313 0.258 0.474 0.261 0.418 0.262 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 































Table A31: Total press concentration and corruption (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CPI Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 Model 9 
      
Total HHI Press -4.907 -12.50 5.998 7.477 1.741 
 (7.079) (12.10) (35.77) (33.71) (35.85) 
(Total HHI Press)
2 
  -19.40 -29.39 -23.60 
   (62.59) (58.88) (59.48) 
Public Press  -1.221  29.05*  
  (5.852)  (14.38)  
(Public Press)
2 
   -50.73*  
    (24.97)  
Private HHI Press  5.231   -1.454 
  (6.239)   (19.49) 
(Private HHI Press)
2 
    5.906 
     (15.67) 
Economic Freedom 0.381** 0.406** 0.379** 0.392** 0.405** 
 (0.139) (0.152) (0.140) (0.142) (0.153) 
Primary School Enrollment Rate -0.370 -0.380 -0.374 -0.370 -0.390 
 (0.261) (0.272) (0.257) (0.257) (0.267) 
Human Capital -10.53* -11.03* -10.47* -10.85* -10.99* 
 (5.525) (5.474) (5.499) (5.515) (5.496) 
log(RGDPa) 16.08** 16.47** 15.91** 16.38** 16.01** 
 (7.120) (7.026) (7.309) (7.276) (7.236) 
Trade Openness 0.0735 0.0742 0.0733 0.0730 0.0745 
 (0.0499) (0.0515) (0.0503) (0.0517) (0.0512) 
Government Intervention 0.0429 0.0457 0.0419 0.0434 0.0426 
 (0.0763) (0.0774) (0.0764) (0.0777) (0.0777) 
Defense Expenditures -51.23 -50.65 -51.89 -49.27 -51.62 
 (44.00) (43.47) (44.84) (43.73) (45.09) 
Political Press Freedom Index -0.0731 -0.0817 -0.0683 -0.0593 -0.0695 
 (0.215) (0.215) (0.221) (0.220) (0.221) 
Constant 28.77 29.30 30.19 32.56 33.25 
 (42.88) (43.77) (43.67) (43.56) (45.71) 
      
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 
R-squared 0.252 0.255 0.253 0.258 0.256 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 














Table A32: Total press concentration and heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
               
Total HHI Press * EF 0.427       -0.533       
 (0.376)       (0.407)       
Total HHI Press * HC  -15.18**       -9.721      
  (6.191)       (9.027)      
Total HHI Press * LR   5.598       -29.14**     
   (4.525)       (14.18)     
Total HHI Press * TO    -0.0346       -0.225**    
    (0.0320)       (0.102)    
Total HHI Press * GI     0.0875       0.000151   
     (0.180)       (0.277)   
Total HHI Press * DE      47.26       119.1  
      (78.90)       (76.68)  
Total HHI Press * PF       0.151       0.559 
       (0.197)       (0.380) 
Total HHI Press -32.46 33.78** -28.53 -4.488 -10.77 -9.385 -7.449 28.22 19.21 120.8* 8.579 -5.528 -13.06* -14.81 
 (24.28) (12.57) (21.19) (6.821) (12.40) (7.512) (7.937) (26.94) (21.45) (62.63) (9.106) (18.54) (7.141) (9.477) 
Economic Freedom  0.376** 0.409*** 0.358** 0.400*** 0.351** 0.389*** 0.512** 0.388** 0.349** 0.341** 0.372** 0.381** 0.367** 
  (0.148) (0.135) (0.155) (0.139) (0.141) (0.137) (0.196) (0.145) (0.148) (0.145) (0.141) (0.146) (0.141) 
Human Capital -9.057  -8.759 -7.867 -9.759* -7.950 -10.68* -9.566 -7.670 -14.84** -12.92** -10.02* -11.14* -8.033 
 (5.592)  (5.808) (6.458) (5.493) (5.280) (5.424) (5.727) (7.003) (5.587) (5.422) (5.631) (5.635) (5.800) 
Log(RGDPa) 21.20*** 20.36***  21.81** 17.94** 27.81** 13.51* 14.87* 19.37** 45.27** 22.73** 16.75** 25.73** 12.89* 
 (7.454) (7.281)  (8.600) (7.312) (11.95) (7.078) (7.372) (8.243) (17.23) (8.292) (6.132) (11.55) (7.328) 
Trade Openness 0.0675 0.0386 0.0885*  0.0662 0.0508 0.0734 0.0680 0.0580 0.0430 0.154* 0.0693 0.0448 0.0782 
 (0.0525) (0.0498) (0.0507)  (0.0505) (0.0475) (0.0489) (0.0497) (0.0473) (0.0434) (0.0792) (0.0507) (0.0463) (0.0496) 
Government Intervention 0.0978 0.0182 0.0465 0.0338  0.0288 0.0451 0.0381 0.0318 0.0246 0.0483 0.0410 0.0308 0.0455 
 (0.0746) (0.0801) (0.0794) (0.0791)  (0.0764) (0.0773) (0.0754) (0.0783) (0.0790) (0.0763) (0.115) (0.0777) (0.0760) 
Defense Expenditures -22.84 -34.19 -94.81** -26.50 -43.07  -52.05 -54.24 -54.64 -58.12 -36.32 -45.62 -97.06* -46.19 
 (43.17) (41.08) (40.95) (46.20) (48.34)  (46.59) (45.47) (45.16) (48.07) (45.80) (45.95) (48.09) (45.66) 
Political Press Freedom -0.118 -0.151 0.00174 -0.0910 -0.0832 -0.120  -0.0778 -0.0900 -0.132 -0.0965 -0.0733 -0.123 -0.362 
 (0.219) (0.218) (0.200) (0.219) (0.212) (0.235)  (0.211) (0.219) (0.222) (0.221) (0.214) (0.228) (0.340) 
Primary School Enrollment 1.107** 1.153** 0.795 1.104** 0.968* 1.082** 0.870* 0.867* 0.988* 0.997** 0.786* 0.921* 0.982** 0.738 
 (0.448) (0.479) (0.505) (0.455) (0.507) (0.452) (0.486) (0.473) (0.503) (0.485) (0.453) (0.459) (0.477) (0.454) 
Murdered Journalists -0.368 -0.379 -0.354 -0.368 -0.404 -0.394 -0.335 -0.368 -0.376 -0.558** -0.428* -0.392 -0.440* -0.320 
 (0.278) (0.243) (0.291) (0.264) (0.249) (0.246) (0.241) (0.240) (0.231) (0.266) (0.231) (0.259) (0.236) (0.256) 
Constant 23.73 -15.06 90.58*** 2.017 22.89 -25.35 35.08 23.04 8.664 -62.82 8.710 27.20 1.172 34.24 
 (45.70) (43.49) (29.69) (47.78) (44.91) (52.71) (43.36) (46.90) (52.13) (67.08) (43.71) (40.96) (54.42) (43.38) 
               
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 
R-squared 0.219 0.252 0.237 0.243 0.256 0.256 0.258 0.264 0.263 0.280 0.285 0.257 0.269 0.270 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 















Table A33: Total press concentration and heterogeneous effects (without murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
               
Total HHI Press * EF 0.433       -0.556       
 (0.368)       (0.408)       
Total HHI Press * HC  -14.98**       -9.047      
  (6.373)       (9.128)      
Total HHI Press * LR   5.276       -28.54*     
   (4.483)       (14.38)     
Total HHI Press * TO    -0.0324       -0.230**    
    (0.0372)       (0.105)    
Total HHI Press * GI     0.0834       -0.0174   
     (0.177)       (0.275)   
Total HHI Press * DE      39.57       115.3  
      (77.99)       (77.75)  
Total HHI Press * PF       0.169       0.594 
       (0.199)       (0.364) 
Total HHI Press -32.10 34.13** -26.63 -3.943 -9.936 -8.221 -7.135 30.22 18.15 118.9* 9.428 -3.918 -12.18 -14.91 
 (23.87) (13.03) (21.03) (7.021) (12.17) (7.637) (8.005) (27.01) (21.83) (63.49) (9.233) (18.39) (7.357) (9.359) 
Economic Freedom  0.385** 0.415*** 0.369** 0.413*** 0.360** 0.398*** 0.526** 0.397** 0.359** 0.348** 0.381** 0.390** 0.374** 
  (0.145) (0.134) (0.155) (0.138) (0.140) (0.136) (0.197) (0.144) (0.146) (0.144) (0.140) (0.145) (0.141) 
Human Capital -9.637*  -9.267 -8.330 -10.26* -8.359 -11.17** -10.03* -8.383 -15.30** -13.43** -10.53* -11.65** -8.314 
 (5.474)  (5.732) (6.385) (5.391) (5.241) (5.323) (5.651) (6.877) (5.543) (5.335) (5.539) (5.561) (5.755) 
Log(RGDPa) 20.52*** 19.41**  21.16** 17.21** 26.82** 12.64* 14.17* 18.48** 43.96** 22.31** 15.87** 24.74** 12.13* 
 (7.331) (7.215)  (8.653) (7.166) (11.99) (6.810) (7.286) (8.201) (17.46) (8.383) (6.010) (11.55) (7.075) 
Trade Openness 0.0724 0.0426 0.0915*  0.0705 0.0569 0.0776 0.0718 0.0632 0.0481 0.160* 0.0738 0.0500 0.0820 
 (0.0532) (0.0501) (0.0510)  (0.0506) (0.0484) (0.0492) (0.0501) (0.0478) (0.0443) (0.0792) (0.0508) (0.0473) (0.0494) 
Government Intervention 0.102 0.0198 0.0479 0.0355  0.0312 0.0471 0.0397 0.0344 0.0269 0.0500 0.0474 0.0331 0.0472 
 (0.0748) (0.0805) (0.0796) (0.0794)  (0.0767) (0.0777) (0.0759) (0.0787) (0.0792) (0.0764) (0.116) (0.0781) (0.0762) 
Defense Expenditures -28.93 -38.30 -98.62** -32.48 -48.56  -57.71 -59.87 -59.99 -63.92 -40.86 -51.21 -101.4** -50.65 
 (41.19) (39.93) (39.98) (44.44) (46.34)  (44.30) (43.98) (43.48) (46.91) (44.83) (44.39) (47.69) (43.77) 
Political Press Freedom -0.119 -0.156 -0.000204 -0.0913 -0.0833 -0.117  -0.0778 -0.0886 -0.130 -0.0968 -0.0718 -0.121 -0.380 
 (0.220) (0.220) (0.201) (0.221) (0.214) (0.238)  (0.212) (0.222) (0.224) (0.223) (0.216) (0.230) (0.329) 
Primary School Enrollment -0.341 -0.353 -0.337 -0.339 -0.381 -0.364 -0.310 -0.347 -0.354 -0.531* -0.410* -0.369 -0.416* -0.299 
 (0.290) (0.252) (0.291) (0.276) (0.253) (0.255) (0.243) (0.244) (0.237) (0.265) (0.234) (0.264) (0.239) (0.260) 
Constant 25.42 -14.16 89.88*** 2.959 24.46 -23.92 37.13 24.34 11.62 -59.28 9.610 29.36 3.655 35.93 
 (44.72) (43.46) (29.11) (47.37) (44.03) (53.44) (42.06) (46.13) (51.69) (67.79) (43.25) (40.15) (54.00) (42.16) 
               
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 
R-squared 0.212 0.244 0.233 0.235 0.250 0.249 0.254 0.259 0.257 0.274 0.281 0.252 0.263 0.267 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 


















Table A34: Total press concentration and additional heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
             
Total HHI Press * Public Press 12.32  16.75  16.47  11.47  19.63  19.29  
 (31.62)  (48.15)  (48.05)  (33.60)  (48.15)  (48.06)  
Total HHI Press * Private HHI 
Press 
 11.97  -7.881  -5.062  11.13  -6.849  -3.279 
  (18.53)  (27.24)  (28.62)  (19.43)  (27.60)  (29.04) 
Public Press   -1.518  -1.409    -2.786  -2.653  
   (8.396)  (8.321)    (8.373)  (8.311)  
Private HHI Press    7.403  6.669    6.692  5.768 
    (8.386)  (8.679)    (8.539)  (8.870) 
Total HHI Press -7.263 -16.03 -8.090 -9.144 1.508 -2.923 -6.526 -14.67 -8.061 -8.392 2.690 -0.497 
 (7.222) (19.06) (11.37) (21.21) (35.17) (37.23) (7.411) (19.55) (11.47) (21.51) (35.86) (38.00) 
(Total HHI Press)2     -16.97 -13.61     -19.01 -17.28 
     (59.23) (64.50)     (59.82) (65.29) 
Economic Freedom 0.382** 0.384** 0.384** 0.399** 0.382** 0.397** 0.390** 0.393** 0.395** 0.406** 0.392** 0.404** 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.153) (0.154) (0.153) (0.156) (0.146) (0.145) (0.151) (0.152) (0.151) (0.153) 
Murdered Journalists 0.931* 0.944* 0.919* 0.979* 0.912* 0.970*       
 (0.476) (0.470) (0.482) (0.483) (0.484) (0.482)       
Primary School Enrollment -0.400 -0.395 -0.399 -0.408 -0.402 -0.409 -0.377 -0.373 -0.376 -0.384 -0.380 -0.385 
 (0.261) (0.262) (0.261) (0.267) (0.258) (0.265) (0.265) (0.267) (0.266) (0.272) (0.262) (0.269) 
Human Capital -10.21* -10.45* -10.26* -10.44* -10.21* -10.44* -10.72* -10.94* -10.79* -10.96* -10.73* -10.94* 
 (5.614) (5.557) (5.606) (5.530) (5.572) (5.536) (5.528) (5.470) (5.526) (5.448) (5.491) (5.450) 
log(RGDPa) 16.76** 17.08** 16.75** 17.13** 16.59** 17.03** 16.09** 16.38** 16.08** 16.40** 15.91** 16.28** 
 (7.154) (7.151) (7.183) (7.153) (7.362) (7.314) (7.014) (7.023) (7.042) (7.019) (7.230) (7.188) 
Trade Openness 0.0700 0.0701 0.0702 0.0697 0.0700 0.0697 0.0742 0.0743 0.0744 0.0741 0.0742 0.0740 
 (0.0501) (0.0504) (0.0503) (0.0514) (0.0506) (0.0516) (0.0503) (0.0507) (0.0505) (0.0517) (0.0508) (0.0519) 
Government Intervention 0.0411 0.0440 0.0412 0.0429 0.0404 0.0425 0.0430 0.0457 0.0431 0.0447 0.0421 0.0442 
 (0.0764) (0.0775) (0.0769) (0.0774) (0.0769) (0.0775) (0.0768) (0.0779) (0.0773) (0.0778) (0.0774) (0.0781) 
Defense Expenditures -44.80 -44.27 -45.18 -44.59 -45.77 -44.96 -50.52 -50.10 -51.08 -50.58 -51.69 -50.99 
 (45.38) (45.49) (45.94) (45.46) (46.67) (46.18) (43.38) (43.46) (43.96) (43.32) (44.72) (44.07) 
Political Press Freedom -0.0700 -0.0725 -0.0706 -0.0840 -0.0663 -0.0794 -0.0701 -0.0724 -0.0710 -0.0827 -0.0662 -0.0769 
 (0.212) (0.212) (0.213) (0.211) (0.219) (0.220) (0.213) (0.214) (0.215) (0.213) (0.221) (0.222) 
Constant 26.15 29.11 25.94 26.42 27.21 27.83 27.81 30.58 27.37 28.20 28.78 29.97 
 (44.16) (44.76) (44.34) (45.24) (45.06) (46.61) (43.16) (43.56) (43.38) (43.97) (44.11) (45.35) 
             
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 
R-squared 0.258 0.259 0.258 0.261 0.258 0.261 0.253 0.254 0.253 0.255 0.253 0.256 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 














Table A35: Private TV concentration and heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
               
Private HHI TV * EF 0.0483       -0.591       
 (0.241)       (0.425)       
Private HHI TV * HC  4.595       10.55      
  (8.545)       (9.864)      
Private HHI TV * LR   11.69       11.89     
   (17.89)       (15.70)     
Private HHI TV * TO    0.0237       0.00585    
    (0.0600)       (0.0859)    
Private HHI TV * GI     -0.0737       -0.246   
     (0.158)       (0.209)   
Private HHI TV * DE      80.52       39.93  
      (59.35)       (83.39)  
Private HHI TV * PF       -0.567*       -0.442 
       (0.277)       (0.334) 
Private HHI TV -6.297 -16.96 -55.13 -6.863 -1.003 -7.585 0.683 37.39 -34.81 -57.03 -4.768 7.719 -5.759 -0.473 
 (18.37) (24.39) (78.26) (8.843) (9.419) (5.645) (6.092) (30.54) (28.03) (68.43) (10.50) (11.55) (6.447) (6.730) 
Economic Freedom  0.183 0.247* 0.193 0.269* 0.199 0.196 0.459* 0.213 0.194 0.197 0.176 0.187 0.198 
  (0.140) (0.137) (0.141) (0.141) (0.134) (0.131) (0.268) (0.132) (0.140) (0.144) (0.132) (0.135) (0.133) 
Human Capital -0.568  -1.030 -1.552 -1.512 -2.057 -1.073 -2.887 -7.504 -2.953 -1.812 -0.803 -0.916 -0.881 
 (5.519)  (5.705) (4.935) (4.919) (5.090) (5.342) (5.418) (5.820) (4.620) (4.977) (4.964) (4.780) (5.350) 
Log(RGDPa) 36.25*** 36.05***  36.75*** 36.73*** 22.96*** 33.40*** 36.47*** 38.51*** 35.43*** 35.55*** 39.12*** 33.11** 34.84*** 
 (10.73) (10.63)  (10.70) (10.33) (6.385) (8.336) (9.691) (11.87) (9.560) (11.22) (10.01) (12.67) (10.24) 
Trade Openness 0.0231 0.00866 0.0702**  0.0182 0.0479 0.0192 0.0317 0.0139 0.0195 0.0223 0.0156 0.0304 0.0186 
 (0.0359) (0.0337) (0.0336)  (0.0335) (0.0374) (0.0389) (0.0382) (0.0344) (0.0338) (0.0535) (0.0372) (0.0347) (0.0377) 
Government Intervention 0.0523 0.0187 0.0208 0.0169  0.0389 0.0158 0.0298 0.0163 0.0154 0.0194 0.148 0.0275 0.0152 
 (0.0792) (0.0810) (0.0938) (0.0846)  (0.0887) (0.0814) (0.0799) (0.0798) (0.0826) (0.0838) (0.0986) (0.0865) (0.0813) 
Defense Expenditures 108.0** 116.3** -43.97 105.8** 108.3**  111.1** 108.5** 105.1** 104.9* 101.0** 117.2** 80.95 113.3** 
 (45.40) (50.99) (60.70) (46.67) (44.96)  (43.51) (45.36) (51.05) (51.44) (48.75) (46.80) (64.70) (45.17) 
Political Press Freedom -0.310 -0.355 -0.0764 -0.325 -0.346 -0.253  -0.279 -0.331 -0.342 -0.315 -0.364* -0.315 -0.109 
 (0.221) (0.230) (0.195) (0.227) (0.227) (0.212)  (0.219) (0.224) (0.231) (0.229) (0.213) (0.234) (0.260) 
Primary School Enrollment -0.383* -0.397* -0.282 -0.355 -0.339 -0.288 -0.333 -0.315 -0.362* -0.433 -0.363 -0.423** -0.349 -0.351 
 (0.218) (0.214) (0.295) (0.229) (0.200) (0.217) (0.201) (0.223) (0.212) (0.276) (0.223) (0.199) (0.230) (0.214) 
Murdered Journalists 2.202*** 1.994*** 1.236** 2.019*** 1.835*** 1.585*** 1.916** 1.999*** 1.931*** 1.997*** 1.959*** 1.926*** 1.873** 1.955*** 
 (0.736) (0.691) (0.574) (0.697) (0.661) (0.528) (0.702) (0.661) (0.635) (0.674) (0.696) (0.673) (0.701) (0.700) 
Constant -67.48 -75.94* 70.79** -77.22* -84.04* -22.65 -72.12* -98.68** -69.99 -61.24 -72.65 -90.70** -65.61 -75.98* 
 (43.39) (42.17) (30.15) (44.35) (43.29) (28.02) (37.29) (44.16) (43.68) (40.25) (44.26) (43.79) (48.81) (41.53) 
               
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
R-squared 0.219 0.234 0.129 0.230 0.236 0.221 0.240 0.245 0.243 0.239 0.231 0.255 0.234 0.242 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 



























Table A36: Private TV concentration and heterogeneous effects (without the murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
               
Private HHI TV * EF 0.147       -0.565       
 (0.247)       (0.439)       
Private HHI TV * HC  4.267       10.77      
  (8.580)       (9.945)      
Private HHI TV * LR   11.13       11.00     
   (17.87)       (16.09)     
Private HHI TV * TO    0.0235       -0.00746    
    (0.0610)       (0.0883)    
Private HHI TV * GI     -0.0859       -0.249   
     (0.160)       (0.213)   
Private HHI TV * DE      81.59       51.36  
      (62.22)       (84.96)  
Private HHI TV * PF       -0.529*       -0.440 
       (0.266)       (0.335) 
Private HHI TV -14.89 -17.57 -53.72 -8.518 -1.872 -8.909 -1.219 33.95 -37.00 -54.68 -4.802 6.317 -7.723 -2.065 
 (18.40) (24.68) (78.20) (9.084) (9.729) (5.924) (6.249) (31.36) (28.44) (70.24) (10.79) (11.81) (6.628) (6.981) 
Economic Freedom  0.237* 0.280** 0.249* 0.316** 0.240* 0.251* 0.504* 0.268** 0.251* 0.254* 0.231* 0.236* 0.253* 
  (0.133) (0.134) (0.137) (0.136) (0.131) (0.126) (0.268) (0.126) (0.134) (0.137) (0.126) (0.130) (0.128) 
Human Capital -0.899  -1.447 -1.783 -1.993 -2.066 -1.578 -3.413 -8.181 -3.438 -2.222 -1.347 -1.212 -1.450 
 (5.592)  (5.598) (5.019) (5.009) (4.918) (5.406) (5.511) (6.053) (4.683) (5.039) (5.022) (4.821) (5.433) 
Log(RGDPa) 32.78*** 32.83***  34.17*** 34.09*** 22.14*** 30.87*** 33.36*** 35.62*** 32.38*** 32.22*** 36.22*** 29.62** 31.85*** 
 (10.27) (10.29)  (10.25) (9.822) (6.101) (7.927) (9.309) (11.53) (9.107) (10.69) (9.560) (12.05) (9.803) 
Trade Openness 0.0321 0.0171 0.0736**  0.0264 0.0527 0.0279 0.0407 0.0226 0.0292 0.0387 0.0243 0.0403 0.0277 
 (0.0363) (0.0340) (0.0341)  (0.0341) (0.0373) (0.0387) (0.0384) (0.0349) (0.0342) (0.0566) (0.0376) (0.0350) (0.0380) 
Government Intervention 0.0427 0.00849 0.0141 0.00518  0.0299 0.00568 0.0190 0.00627 0.00536 0.0102 0.140 0.0202 0.00508 
 (0.0813) (0.0824) (0.0938) (0.0863)  (0.0891) (0.0827) (0.0812) (0.0810) (0.0842) (0.0851) (0.0986) (0.0882) (0.0828) 
Defense Expenditures 89.81* 101.5* -46.14 92.12* 94.32**  96.32** 92.22* 89.86* 88.71* 84.55* 102.0** 60.60 97.68** 
 (46.54) (51.36) (58.29) (47.61) (46.03)  (44.87) (47.05) (51.56) (51.74) (49.26) (47.36) (63.41) (46.57) 
Political Press Freedom -0.278 -0.323 -0.0682 -0.296 -0.317 -0.239  -0.247 -0.299 -0.306 -0.281 -0.332 -0.284 -0.0774 
 (0.218) (0.225) (0.192) (0.224) (0.222) (0.209)  (0.216) (0.219) (0.228) (0.224) (0.209) (0.231) (0.258) 
Primary School Enrollment -0.377 -0.386 -0.278 -0.332 -0.331 -0.287 -0.324 -0.303 -0.348 -0.413 -0.346 -0.409* -0.332 -0.337 
 (0.238) (0.227) (0.298) (0.246) (0.211) (0.225) (0.212) (0.239) (0.223) (0.288) (0.237) (0.214) (0.243) (0.226) 
Constant -50.10 -65.00 70.26** -69.08 -74.09* -21.07 -62.20 -86.11* -58.89 -50.69 -61.57 -79.91* -53.02 -64.78 
 (41.31) (40.74) (30.18) (43.58) (42.34) (27.36) (36.78) (43.14) (42.77) (39.07) (42.65) (42.69) (46.71) (40.71) 
               
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
R-squared 0.188 0.209 0.119 0.204 0.215 0.205 0.217 0.220 0.219 0.214 0.207 0.232 0.213 0.218 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 

















Table A37: Private press concentration and heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
               
Private HHI Press * EF 0.565**       -0.0262       
 (0.217)       (0.564)       
Private HHI Press * HC  -9.079       -3.773      
  (7.300)       (8.086)      
Private HHI Press * LR   0.185       1.019     
   (28.43)       (27.61)     
Private HHI Press * TO    0.0406       -0.171    
    (0.133)       (0.147)    
Private HHI Press * GI     0.0543       -0.0664   
     (0.169)       (0.277)   
Private HHI Press * DE      -73.73       -20.99  
      (144.2)       (160.2)  
Private HHI Press * PF       -0.481       -0.562 
       (0.381)       (0.490) 
Private HHI Press -33.73*** 22.45 -0.0872 -2.038 -3.406 4.998 9.347 1.957 9.684 -3.941 8.966 4.753 1.747 10.85 
 (11.37) (17.37) (119.7) (6.171) (11.09) (10.06) (8.690) (33.45) (19.06) (116.4) (6.956) (18.80) (10.93) (10.81) 
Economic Freedom  0.342** 0.421*** 0.368** 0.408** 0.368** 0.332** 0.384 0.372** 0.374** 0.360** 0.380** 0.376** 0.330** 
  (0.152) (0.138) (0.159) (0.167) (0.149) (0.158) (0.316) (0.147) (0.147) (0.146) (0.155) (0.149) (0.159) 
Human Capital -8.002  -9.443 -7.923 -9.522* -8.955* -8.835 -9.881* -9.028 -9.876* -9.359 -9.701* -9.943* -9.062 
 (5.498)  (6.079) (6.233) (5.579) (5.046) (5.344) (5.634) (6.245) (5.708) (5.604) (5.656) (5.543) (5.433) 
Log(RGDPa) 17.82** 15.01**  19.63** 15.94** 22.07*** 16.39** 16.17** 15.90** 16.18** 14.60** 16.62** 16.80* 15.74** 
 (8.244) (6.769)  (8.065) (7.328) (4.362) (7.135) (7.291) (7.316) (7.262) (6.986) (7.733) (8.257) (7.637) 
Trade Openness 0.0673 0.0600 0.0913*  0.0712 0.0619 0.0696 0.0713 0.0735 0.0709 0.108 0.0689 0.0698 0.0698 
 (0.0522) (0.0503) (0.0483)  (0.0476) (0.0526) (0.0517) (0.0508) (0.0498) (0.0497) (0.0657) (0.0499) (0.0498) (0.0518) 
Government Intervention 0.0784 0.0400 0.0470 0.0373  0.0309 0.0488 0.0440 0.0471 0.0437 0.0463 0.0629 0.0416 0.0505 
 (0.0772) (0.0835) (0.0855) (0.0785)  (0.0824) (0.0741) (0.0757) (0.0797) (0.0814) (0.0765) (0.115) (0.0838) (0.0750) 
Defense Expenditures -34.19 -12.46 -122.5*** -34.78 -44.70  -42.06 -48.65 -46.90 -48.47 -50.32 -48.36 -43.93 -42.93 
 (45.09) (45.99) (36.71) (45.63) (48.94)  (45.55) (45.90) (47.56) (46.79) (47.38) (46.60) (51.11) (45.66) 
Political Press Freedom -0.0628 -0.111 0.0244 -0.0775 -0.0638 -0.0991  -0.0670 -0.0572 -0.0670 -0.0567 -0.0742 -0.0715 0.0594 
 (0.202) (0.212) (0.200) (0.216) (0.206) (0.216)  (0.213) (0.212) (0.217) (0.210) (0.202) (0.223) (0.231) 
Primary School Enrollment -0.337 -0.426 -0.406 -0.401 -0.417 -0.408 -0.377 -0.423 -0.419 -0.423 -0.409 -0.434 -0.419 -0.356 
 (0.241) (0.304) (0.294) (0.276) (0.263) (0.247) (0.261) (0.277) (0.266) (0.275) (0.266) (0.274) (0.258) (0.266) 
Murdered Journalists 1.009* 0.866* 0.729 1.022** 0.883* 0.958* 0.768 0.873* 0.802 0.880* 0.884* 0.889 0.880* 0.752 
 (0.502) (0.499) (0.543) (0.478) (0.515) (0.470) (0.516) (0.485) (0.509) (0.495) (0.507) (0.531) (0.487) (0.507) 
Constant 30.26 9.457 95.97*** 11.94 29.55 -0.656 22.13 29.39 28.34 30.01 32.96 27.13 26.94 22.74 
 (45.32) (42.61) (31.17) (46.79) (44.65) (23.79) (42.87) (45.23) (44.83) (47.09) (43.44) (46.64) (47.77) (43.11) 
               
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 
R-squared 0.236 0.241 0.233 0.239 0.252 0.252 0.262 0.255 0.256 0.255 0.261 0.256 0.255 0.263 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 

































Table A38: Private press concentration and heterogeneous effects (without the murdered journalists variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CPI Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
               
Private HHI Press * EF 0.574**       -0.0409       
 (0.220)       (0.567)       
Private HHI Press * HC  -10.62       -5.097      
  (7.337)       (8.179)      
Private HHI Press * LR   -2.296       -1.988     
   (28.89)       (28.21)     
Private HHI Press * TO    0.0502       -0.169    
    (0.136)       (0.150)    
Private HHI Press * GI     0.0606       -0.0591   
     (0.168)       (0.274)   
Private HHI Press * DE      -76.64       -16.28  
      (142.8)       (159.3)  
Private HHI Press * PF       -0.511       -0.602 
       (0.383)       (0.496) 
Private HHI Press -34.27*** 26.27 10.53 -2.497 -3.779 5.204 9.926 2.861 12.97 8.943 8.934 4.311 1.482 11.63 
 (11.70) (17.54) (121.6) (6.400) (10.96) (10.11) (8.834) (33.61) (19.31) (118.8) (7.160) (18.49) (10.98) (10.99) 
Economic Freedom  0.350** 0.428*** 0.379** 0.416** 0.377** 0.336** 0.399 0.379** 0.383** 0.369** 0.389** 0.385** 0.335** 
  (0.150) (0.137) (0.158) (0.166) (0.147) (0.157) (0.314) (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) (0.153) (0.147) (0.158) 
Human Capital -8.547  -9.774 -8.477 -10.06* -9.346* -9.193* -10.42* -9.203 -10.26* -9.883* -10.24* -10.44* -9.443* 
 (5.398)  (5.991) (6.131) (5.470) (4.981) (5.261) (5.564) (6.203) (5.627) (5.513) (5.543) (5.450) (5.351) 
Log(RGDPa) 17.23** 14.34**  19.15** 15.31** 22.08*** 15.95** 15.60** 15.29** 15.59** 14.03** 15.98** 16.08* 15.22* 
 (8.147) (6.608)  (7.903) (7.139) (4.371) (6.918) (7.134) (7.184) (7.179) (6.834) (7.550) (8.109) (7.495) 
Trade Openness 0.0716 0.0642 0.0948*  0.0752 0.0653 0.0727 0.0752 0.0777 0.0758 0.112 0.0730 0.0740 0.0729 
 (0.0528) (0.0501) (0.0491)  (0.0477) (0.0532) (0.0518) (0.0510) (0.0498) (0.0501) (0.0665) (0.0498) (0.0501) (0.0520) 
Government Intervention 0.0815 0.0424 0.0493 0.0387  0.0316 0.0504 0.0454 0.0495 0.0466 0.0478 0.0624 0.0437 0.0522 
 (0.0781) (0.0841) (0.0859) (0.0789)  (0.0828) (0.0745) (0.0761) (0.0802) (0.0819) (0.0770) (0.115) (0.0843) (0.0754) 
Defense Expenditures -39.59 -16.04 -124.3*** -40.14 -49.86  -45.95 -53.85 -50.88 -53.37 -55.45 -53.53 -50.05 -46.86 
 (43.29) (44.27) (35.72) (43.48) (46.74)  (43.55) (43.99) (46.17) (45.12) (45.39) (44.51) (49.29) (43.77) 
Political Press Freedom -0.0642 -0.109 0.0245 -0.0791 -0.0635 -0.102  -0.0684 -0.0547 -0.0635 -0.0573 -0.0739 -0.0708 0.0679 
 (0.204) (0.215) (0.202) (0.218) (0.208) (0.217)  (0.216) (0.214) (0.220) (0.211) (0.205) (0.225) (0.232) 
Primary School Enrollment -0.308 -0.404 -0.382 -0.374 -0.392 -0.381 -0.355 -0.402 -0.398 -0.393 -0.385 -0.409 -0.397 -0.332 
 (0.247) (0.312) (0.292) (0.285) (0.266) (0.252) (0.261) (0.280) (0.271) (0.279) (0.270) (0.277) (0.263) (0.266) 
Constant 31.65 9.811 94.08*** 12.62 31.11 -2.801 22.65 30.54 29.03 30.14 34.24 28.71 28.84 23.34 
 (44.49) (42.11) (30.69) (45.92) (43.50) (24.15) (41.79) (44.32) (44.01) (46.34) (42.41) (45.48) (46.65) (42.07) 
               
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 
R-squared 0.230 0.236 0.230 0.232 0.247 0.247 0.259 0.250 0.252 0.250 0.256 0.251 0.250 0.259 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by countries. 











































































































































































Graph B9: Structural differences between press and TV in terms of concentration (measured by HHI) 




















Graph B10: Public ownership trend since the mid 2000’s 
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